1.2.3 - Modern Indian History Notes 02

Elaborate Notes

Khalisa and Jagir Lands

The land under the Mughal Empire was broadly divided into two categories for revenue and administrative purposes: Khalisa and Jagir.

• Khalisa Land: This was the ‘crown’ or ‘royal’ land, the revenue from which was collected directly for the imperial treasury. This revenue was used to pay for the expenses of the imperial household, the emperor’s personal troops (Ahadis), and other court and administrative overheads. The proportion of Khalisa land varied under different emperors. According to historian Irfan Habib in “The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556-1707,” Akbar significantly expanded the Khalisa lands to assert central authority, while under Jahangir, a larger portion was given out as Jagirs, a trend that continued and contributed to the fiscal stress of the empire in its later phase.
• Jagir Land: These were lands assigned to nobles (Mansabdars) in lieu of a cash salary. The right to collect revenue from a Jagir was known as jagirdari. The revenue assigned was supposed to be equal to the Mansabdar’s salary claim (talab).
  • Tankha Jagirs: These were the most common type of jagirs and were transferable. A Mansabdar would be assigned a jagir in one region for a few years and then transferred to another to prevent them from developing local roots and challenging imperial authority.
  • Vatan Jagirs: These were hereditary jagirs assigned to local chieftains and zamindars who were incorporated into the Mughal nobility. Their ancestral lands were designated as their Vatan Jagir, from which they paid a fixed tribute (peshkash) to the emperor. Unlike Tankha Jagirs, these were non-transferable and hereditary.

The Land Revenue System of the Mughals

The Mughal agrarian system was a complex hierarchy of rights and obligations involving the state, intermediaries, and the cultivators.

• Zamindars: The term ‘Zamindar’ had a wide connotation. They were intermediaries with varying degrees of rights. Historian Nurul Hasan categorized them into three types: autonomous chieftains, intermediary zamindars, and primary zamindars.

  • Their primary function was to collect land revenue from the peasants on behalf of the state or the Jagirdar. For this service, they received a share of the revenue, typically around 10% (nankar).
  • Zamindars also had police and judicial duties within their jurisdictions (zamindari).
  • A crucial point is that the Zamindar was not the owner of the land in the modern sense. They held a hereditary right (vatan) to collect revenue. They owned certain lands personally, called their milkiyat or khudkasht lands, from which they paid revenue to the state just like any other cultivator.
  • Nankar Lands: These were plots of land assigned to Zamindars that were revenue-free. This was a part of their remuneration for collecting revenue and maintaining law and order.
  • Abwab: Zamindars often levied additional cesses or illegal exactions over and above the stipulated land revenue. These were known as abwabs and were a significant burden on the peasantry.
  • Patta System: To formalize the revenue arrangement and protect the peasant (ryot) from over-extraction, the state issued a Patta (a document stating the area cultivated, crops grown, and the revenue demand). The ryot, in turn, signed a Qabuliyat (deed of agreement), accepting the terms. This system, refined by Akbar based on Sher Shah Suri’s earlier reforms, aimed to create a direct relationship between the state and the peasant, though its implementation was often mediated by the Zamindar.

• Types of Peasants (Ryots):

  • Khudkasht: These were resident cultivators who owned their own ploughs and bullocks and cultivated land in the village where they resided. They had customary and hereditary occupancy rights and could not be evicted as long as they paid the land revenue. They were the privileged class among the peasantry.
  • Pahikasht: These were non-resident cultivators who tilled land in a village other than their own, either because they were landless or had insufficient land in their home village. As per Satish Chandra in “Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals”, they were often tenants-at-will and had weaker rights than the Khudkasht peasants. Their status was precarious, making them more mobile and susceptible to exploitation.

Ijaradari System

The Ijaradari or revenue farming system was a departure from the traditional Mughal land revenue administration.

• Concept: Under this system, the right to collect revenue from a particular territory (ijara) was sold to the highest bidder at a public auction. The winning bidder, the Ijaradar, paid a fixed, pre-agreed amount to the state or the Jagirdar and was then free to collect as much as they could from the territory.
• Historical Context: The system was officially introduced by Jahandar Shah (1712-13) and became widespread during the 18th century as the central authority weakened. Even Khalisa lands were given out on Ijara under Farrukhsiyar (1713-19).
• Causes and Consequences: It was a response to the administrative and financial crisis of the late Mughal period. The state and Jagirdars, unable to efficiently collect revenue themselves, resorted to this method to ensure a guaranteed income. However, the system had disastrous consequences.
  • The Ijaradars were often merchants, bankers, or urban moneylenders with no long-term interest in the welfare of the land or the peasantry. Their sole motive was profit maximization.
  • This led to rampant exploitation, rack-renting, and the impoverishment of the peasants, destabilizing the agrarian economy.
  • Under the British, this system was institutionalized as the ‘Farming System’ by Warren Hastings in Bengal in 1772, with similar ruinous effects.

The Decline of Mughals

The disintegration of the Mughal Empire was a complex process resulting from multiple interconnected factors.

• Role of Aurangzeb (1658-1707):
  • Continuous Warfare and the ‘Deccan Ulcer’: Aurangzeb’s reign was marked by incessant warfare, particularly his nearly 27-year-long campaign in the Deccan.
    • He annexed the Shia kingdoms of Bijapur (1886) and Golconda (1887), extending the empire to its territorial zenith.
    • However, his prolonged and costly war against the Marathas proved to be a strategic failure. As historian Jadunath Sarkar famously termed it, the Deccan campaign became a “Deccan Ulcer” that drained the imperial treasury, military, and manpower.
    • The constant warfare disrupted trade and agriculture, and the absence of the emperor from the north for a long period weakened the administration there.
  • Religious Policy: Aurangzeb’s orthodox religious policies alienated significant sections of the non-Muslim population.
    • He re-imposed the Jizya, a poll tax on non-Muslims, in 1679, which was seen as a discriminatory measure.
    • The destruction of prominent temples, such as the Kashi Vishwanath temple and the Keshav Rai temple in Mathura, caused widespread resentment.
    • The execution of the ninth Sikh Guru, Guru Tegh Bahadur, in 1675 for refusing to convert to Islam, and the brutal execution of the Maratha ruler Sambhaji in 1689, transformed the Sikhs and Marathas into irreconcilable foes of the Mughal Empire. These acts fueled regional resistance and rebellions.
• Institutional Failure: The Mansabdari and Jagirdari Crisis
  • The Mughal administrative structure was built on the Mansabdari system, where nobles (Mansabdars) provided military service in exchange for salary, usually paid through Jagirs.
  • The system relied on a delicate balance: the loyalty of the Mansabdar was conditional upon the Emperor’s ability to provide them with a suitable Jagir.
  • As argued by historians like Satish Chandra (“Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740”) and Athar Ali, Aurangzeb’s Deccan conquests, while expanding the empire, also led to an influx of Deccani nobles into the Mansabdari system. This created a severe shortage of available Jagirs (paibaqi) to be assigned.
  • This led to the Jagirdari Crisis: a gap between the number of claimants for jagirs and the actual land available. Mansabdars had to wait for long periods to get a Jagir, and the ones they got were often less productive than their official valuation (jama).
  • This crisis eroded the personal loyalty that bound the nobles to the Emperor. The post-Aurangzeb weak rulers were unable to manage the powerful factions of nobles (like the Turanis and Iranis) who fought amongst themselves for control over the best jagirs, further weakening the central authority and paving the way for the emergence of autonomous successor states.

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Prelims Pointers

• Khalisa Land: Crown land whose revenue went directly to the imperial treasury.
• Jagir Land: Land assigned to nobles (Mansabdars) in lieu of salary.
• Tankha Jagir: A transferable jagir.
• Vatan Jagir: A hereditary, non-transferable jagir, usually held by local chieftains.
• Zamindar: An intermediary responsible for revenue collection; not the owner of the land.
• Milkiyat: Personal lands owned by a Zamindar.
• Nankar: Revenue-free lands given to Zamindars as remuneration.
• Abwab: Additional illegal cesses levied by Zamindars on peasants.
• Patta: A document given to the peasant specifying the revenue demand.
• Qabuliyat: An agreement signed by the peasant accepting the revenue demand.
• Khudkasht: Resident cultivators with hereditary occupancy rights.
• Pahikasht: Non-resident, migratory cultivators with weaker rights.
• Ijaradari System: A system of revenue farming where the right to collect revenue was auctioned to the highest bidder (Ijaradar).
• The Ijaradari system was officially introduced by Mughal emperor Jahandar Shah (1712-13).
• Farrukhsiyar extended the Ijaradari system even to Khalisa lands.
• The British introduced a similar ‘Farming System’ in Bengal in 1772 under Warren Hastings.
• Aurangzeb annexed the kingdom of Bijapur in 1686.
• Aurangzeb annexed the kingdom of Golconda in 1687.
• Aurangzeb re-imposed the Jizya tax on non-Muslims in 1679.
• The ninth Sikh Guru, Guru Tegh Bahadur, was executed in 1675 on the orders of Aurangzeb.
• The Maratha ruler Sambhaji was executed in 1689 on the orders of Aurangzeb.

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Mains Insights

Historiographical Debates on the Decline of the Mughal Empire

1. The ‘Personal-Centric’ View:

   • Early historians like Jadunath Sarkar (“History of Aurangzib”) attributed the decline primarily to the personal character and flawed policies of Aurangzeb. His religious bigotry alienated the Rajputs, Sikhs, and Marathas, while his suspicious nature and Deccan obsession fatally weakened the empire. This view sees the decline as a direct consequence of the ruler’s failures.

2. The ‘Institutional Crisis’ View:

   • Revisionist historians shifted the focus from the individual to structural and institutional flaws.
   • Satish Chandra (“Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740”) and Athar Ali proposed the Jagirdari Crisis thesis. They argued that the system collapsed under its own weight due to a shortage of viable jagirs, leading to factionalism among the nobility and a breakdown of the patron-client relationship between the emperor and his mansabdars.
   • Irfan Habib (“The Agrarian System of Mughal India”) advanced the Agrarian Crisis thesis. He argued that the high rate of Mughal revenue demand and the exploitation by Jagirdars impoverished the peasantry. This led to peasant resistance and rebellions, which undermined the economic foundation of the empire. The Ijaradari system was a symptom and accelerator of this crisis.

3. The ‘Region-Centric’ View:

   • More recent scholarship by historians like Muzaffar Alam (“The Crisis of Empire in Mughal North India”) offers a different perspective. They challenge the narrative of ‘decline’ and ‘decay’.
   • They argue that the 18th century was not a period of collapse but of political re-configuration. Power shifted from the imperial center to the regions.
   • The rise of successor states like Awadh, Bengal, and Hyderabad was not a sign of chaos but of the emergence of new, dynamic regional polities led by former Mughal governors who successfully managed local economic and social groups (like zamindars, merchants, and bankers). In this view, the decline of the center enabled the rise of the regions.

Cause and Effect Analysis

• Cause: Aurangzeb’s prolonged Deccan Wars.
  • Effect 1 (Economic): Drained the imperial treasury and disrupted the economy.
  • Effect 2 (Institutional): Exacerbated the Jagirdari Crisis by increasing the number of nobles without a corresponding increase in productive jagirs.
  • Effect 3 (Political): Allowed regional powers like the Marathas to gain strength and legitimacy by resisting Mughal authority.
• Cause: Introduction of the Ijaradari System.
  • Effect 1 (Social): Led to severe exploitation of the peasantry by revenue farmers who had no long-term interest in agriculture.
  • Effect 2 (Economic): Destabilized agrarian production and contributed to rural depopulation in certain areas.
  • Effect 3 (Political): Weakened the traditional authority of Zamindars and the state, replacing it with the power of a new class of financiers and merchants.

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Previous Year Questions

Prelims

1. With reference to the history of India, consider the following pairs: (UPSC Prelims 2023)

   1. Aurang: In-charge of treasury of the State
   2. Banian: Indian agent of the East India Company
   3. Mirasidar: Designated revenue payer to the State How many of the above pairs are correctly matched? (a) None (b) Only one (c) Only two (d) All three

   Answer: (c) Only two.

   • Aurang was a Persian term for a warehouse where goods were collected before being exported. So, pair 1 is incorrect.
   • Banian (or Baniya) was a term used for Indian agents and brokers employed by the East India Company. So, pair 2 is correct.
   • Mirasidar was a term for persons with hereditary rights in land, especially in South India, and they were designated revenue payers. So, pair 3 is correct.

2. Who among the following rulers of medieval Gujarat surrendered Diu to the Portuguese? (UPSC Prelims 2021) (a) Ahmad Shah (b) Mahmud Begarha (c) Bahadur Shah (d) Muhammad Shah

   Answer: (c) Bahadur Shah.

   • While not directly from the provided summary, this question relates to the period of weakening central authority and rising regional and foreign powers. In 1535, facing a Mughal invasion by Humayun, Sultan Bahadur Shah of Gujarat sought help from the Portuguese and allowed them to build a fort at Diu.

3. With reference to Indian history, which of the following statements is/are correct? (UPSC Prelims 2021)

   1. The Nizamat of Arcot emerged out of Hyderabad State.
   2. The Mysore Kingdom emerged out of Vijayanagara Empire.
   3. Rohilkhand Kingdom was formed out of the territories occupied by Ahmad Shah Durrani. Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1 and 2 (b) 2 only (c) 2 and 3 (d) 3 only

   Answer: (a) 1 and 2.

   • This question is about the successor states that emerged from the decline of the Mughal Empire and other earlier empires, a direct consequence of the processes discussed. The Nizamat of Arcot (Carnatic) was a subordinate nawabi of the Nizam of Hyderabad. Mysore was initially a feudatory of the Vijayanagara Empire. Rohilkhand was founded by Afghan adventurers, not carved out of Durrani’s territories.

4. Consider the following statements: (UPSC Prelims 2019)

   1. In the revenue administration of Delhi Sultanate, the in-charge of revenue collection was known as ‘Amil’.
   2. The Iqta system of Sultans of Delhi was an ancient indigenous institution.
   3. The office of ‘Mir Bakshi’ came into existence during the reign of Khalji Sultans of Delhi. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3

   Answer: (a) 1 only.

   • This question relates to revenue administration, a theme continuous from the Sultanate to the Mughals. The term ‘Amil’ was indeed used for revenue collector. The Iqta system had origins in West Asia. The office of Mir Bakshi was a well-defined institution under the Mughals, responsible for military administration, not the Khaljis.

5. With reference to the Mughal India, what is/are the difference/differences between Jagirdar and Zamindar? (UPSC Prelims 2019)

   1. Jagirdars were holders of land assignments in lieu of judicial and police duties, whereas Zamindars were holders of revenue rights without obligation to perform any duty other than revenue collection.
   2. Land assignments to Jagirdars were hereditary and revenue rights of Zamindars were not hereditary. Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2

   Answer: (d) Neither 1 nor 2.

   • Statement 1 is incorrect. Jagirdars were primarily holders of land assignments (jagirs) in lieu of salary for their military and administrative services, not just judicial and police duties. Zamindars did have police and judicial duties at the local level.
   • Statement 2 is incorrect. Jagirs (specifically Tankha jagirs) were not hereditary but transferable. The rights of Zamindars were generally hereditary (vatan). The statement reverses the facts.

Mains

1. Clarify how mid-eighteenth century India was beset with the spectre of a fragmented polity. (UPSC Mains 2017)

   Answer: The mid-eighteenth century in India was characterized by the rapid disintegration of the Mughal Empire and the emergence of a fragmented political landscape. This fragmentation can be understood through three key developments:

   • Rise of Successor States: The weakening of central Mughal authority allowed provincial governors to establish virtual independence. States like Bengal under Murshid Quli Khan, Awadh under Saadat Khan, and Hyderabad under Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah emerged. While they nominally accepted Mughal suzerainty, they operated as autonomous hereditary monarchies, controlling their own administration, revenue, and armies.
   • Emergence of ‘Rebel’ States: Several polities that had risen in rebellion against Mughal rule consolidated their power. The Marathas, under the Peshwas, established a vast confederacy across western and central India. The Sikhs, unified under various Misls, carved out a kingdom in Punjab. The Jats under leaders like Suraj Mal created a powerful state around Bharatpur. These states directly challenged and supplanted Mughal authority in their regions.
   • Intervention of Foreign Powers: The political vacuum created by Mughal decline invited foreign intervention. The invasion of Nadir Shah in 1739 exposed the hollowness of the empire, while repeated invasions by Ahmad Shah Abdali further destabilized North India. Simultaneously, European trading companies, particularly the British and French East India Companies, began to transform from commercial entities into political and military powers, intervening in the conflicts of Indian states and gradually carving out their own territories. Thus, mid-18th century India was a complex mosaic of decaying imperial authority, dynamic successor states, new warrior polities, and ambitious foreign powers, leading to a highly fragmented and contested polity.

2. Why did the armies of the British East India Company – mostly comprising of Indian soldiers – win consistently against the more numerous and better equipped armies of the then Indian rulers? Give reasons. (UPSC Mains 2022)

   Answer: The consistent victories of the British East India Company’s armies, despite being often outnumbered, can be attributed to a combination of superior military, organizational, and strategic factors:

   • Superior Military Discipline and Training: The Company’s army, though composed mainly of Indian sepoys, was trained and drilled according to European standards. They were taught to fight in disciplined formations, maintain volley fire, and respond to commands with precision. This discipline often proved decisive against the larger, but less organized and individually-fighting armies of Indian rulers.
   • Advanced Military Technology and Tactics: The British possessed superior artillery, which was lighter, more mobile, and had a faster rate of fire. Their use of flintlock muskets with bayonets gave their infantry a significant advantage in both ranged and close-quarter combat.
   • Unified Command and Professional Leadership: The Company’s armies were led by professional officers who rose through the ranks based on merit. They had a clear and unified chain of command. In contrast, Indian armies were often feudal levies, where commanders were hereditary nobles whose personal loyalties could be fickle, leading to divisions and desertions during battle.
   • Strong Financial Backing and Regular Pay: The East India Company had a robust financial system, enabling them to pay their soldiers regularly. This ensured the loyalty and morale of the sepoys. Indian rulers, especially in the 18th century, often faced financial crises, leading to irregular pay, mutinies, and a lack of motivation among their troops.
   • Effective Use of Intelligence and Diplomacy: The British were adept at gathering intelligence and exploiting the internal rivalries among Indian states. They frequently used diplomacy and subterfuge to “divide and rule,” ensuring their opponents were often isolated and unsupported.

3. The third battle of Panipat was fought in 1761. Why were so many empire-shaking battles fought at Panipat? (UPSC Mains 2014)

   Answer: Panipat’s strategic location and geography made it the site of several decisive, empire-shaking battles in Indian history.

   • Strategic Location: Panipat is located on the high road from the northwest frontier (the traditional route for invaders) to Delhi, the political capital of North India. Any invading force aiming to conquer Delhi had to pass through Panipat, making it a natural battleground for the defenders of the city.
   • Proximity to Delhi: Its closeness to Delhi allowed the incumbent rulers to receive supplies, reinforcements, and information relatively easily, while also making it a crucial final line of defense. For the invader, a victory at Panipat meant the road to the capital was clear.
   • Favorable Topography: The flat, open plains of Panipat were ideal for large-scale cavalry and infantry movements, which were central to warfare in that era. The lack of dense forests or difficult terrain made it suitable for the deployment of large armies.
   • Economic Importance: The region was fertile and part of the Ganga-Yamuna doab, making it capable of sustaining large armies for extended periods. Control over this region was crucial for controlling the economic heartland of North India.
   • Short Monsoon Season: The duration of the monsoon in the region is relatively short, providing a long, dry campaign season suitable for warfare. The First Battle (1526) established Mughal rule, the Second (1556) consolidated it, and the Third (1761), between the Marathas and Ahmad Shah Abdali, checked the rising Maratha power and created a power vacuum that ultimately benefited the British.

4. “Aurangzeb’s Deccan policy was a major factor in the decline of the Mughal Empire.” Critically analyze.

   Answer: Aurangzeb’s Deccan policy, pursued with relentless determination for over 25 years, is widely considered a significant, if not the primary, factor in the decline of the Mughal Empire.

   Arguments for the statement (Policy as a major cause of decline):

   1. Economic Drain: The continuous warfare was a massive drain on the imperial treasury. The cost of maintaining a large army, long supply lines, and endless sieges depleted the state’s finances, leading to a fiscal crisis.
   2. Jagirdari Crisis: The annexation of Bijapur (1686) and Golconda (1687) and the war against the Marathas led to the incorporation of a large number of Deccani nobles into the Mughal mansabdari system. This created a severe shortage of jagirs (lands assigned for salary), weakening the loyalty of the nobility and undermining the very foundation of Mughal administration.
   3. Military Failure: Despite immense effort, Aurangzeb failed to crush the Marathas. Their guerrilla warfare tactics exhausted the Mughal army. The protracted conflict not only failed in its objective but also boosted the morale and power of the Marathas, who emerged as the primary challenger to Mughal authority.
   4. Administrative Neglect of the North: The emperor’s prolonged absence from North India led to a neglect of administration there. Law and order deteriorated, and regional powers, including the Jats, Sikhs, and Bundelas, grew stronger.

   Counter-arguments (Policy as one among many factors):

   1. Institutional Flaws: Historians like Satish Chandra argue that the decline was rooted in deeper institutional flaws like the Jagirdari crisis, which predated the Deccan policy and was only exacerbated by it. The crisis was structural, not merely a result of one emperor’s policy.
   2. Agrarian Crisis: Scholars like Irfan Habib point to the long-term agrarian crisis caused by high revenue demand and exploitation, which led to peasant rebellions and weakened the empire’s economic base.
   3. Weak Successors and Factionalism: The decline accelerated after Aurangzeb’s death due to a succession of weak rulers and intense factionalism at the court, which the emperor’s strong personality had kept in check.

   In conclusion, while structural issues like the agrarian and jagirdari crises were fundamental weaknesses, Aurangzeb’s Deccan policy acted as a catalyst that fatally aggravated these problems. It drained the empire’s resources, overstretched its administrative capacity, and ultimately proved to be the “Deccan ulcer” that left the Mughal Empire mortally wounded and unable to recover.

5. Examine the nature of the Mughal state during the 17th and 18th centuries. How did the Ijaradari system reflect a change in its character?

   Answer: The Mughal state in the 17th century, particularly under Shah Jahan and the early reign of Aurangzeb, was a highly centralized, bureaucratic empire. Its nature was defined by:

   • Centralized Authority: The emperor was the absolute authority, and power flowed from the center to the provinces.
   • Mansabdari System: A sophisticated system of ranking officials (mansabdars) integrated the political, military, and administrative elite into a single imperial hierarchy.
   • Standardized Revenue Administration: A regulated and systematic land revenue system (like the Zabti system) aimed to directly assess and collect revenue, maximizing state income while theoretically providing stability to the peasant.
   • Patron-Client Relationship: The stability of the state depended on the emperor’s ability to act as an effective patron, dispensing jagirs and ranks to a loyal nobility.

   By the 18th century, the character of the Mughal state underwent a significant transformation, marked by the decline of central authority and the rise of decentralizing forces. The Ijaradari system was both a symptom and an accelerator of this change.

   The Ijaradari System as a reflection of change:

   1. Shift from Administration to Farming: The adoption of Ijaradari signified a shift from direct state administration of revenue to revenue farming. It was an admission by the state and the jagirdars that they could no longer manage revenue collection efficiently, outsourcing this core state function to the highest bidder.
   2. Erosion of Central Control: By auctioning off revenue rights, the state lost its direct link with the peasantry and local officials. Power shifted from the salaried, transferable Mughal officials to Ijaradars, who were often local magnates, merchants, or moneylenders with no accountability for the welfare of the region.
   3. Rise of a New Financial Class: The system empowered a new class of merchant-bankers and financiers who acted as Ijaradars. This indicated the growing influence of commercial capital in the political and administrative affairs of the weakening state.
   4. From Regulation to Exploitation: The regulated revenue system, enshrined in the Patta-Qabuliyat arrangement, was replaced by a system driven purely by profit. The Ijaradar’s short-term contract incentivized maximum extraction and rack-renting, severely exploiting the peasantry and disrupting the agrarian economy, which was the bedrock of the Mughal state’s power.

   In essence, the spread of the Ijaradari system in the 18th century reflected the transition of the Mughal state from a centralized, bureaucratic entity to a hollowed-out structure whose key functions were being privatized and commercialized, paving the way for its eventual disintegration.