GS Notes

Modern Indian History Notes 03

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The Decline of the Mughals (continued)

  • Military Weakness:

    • The Nature of the Mughal State: The Mughal Empire, from its inception under Babur, was fundamentally a military-conquest state. Its administrative structure, the Mansabdari system, was a military-bureaucratic apparatus where ranks (zat and sawar) determined both status and military obligations. As historian Jadunath Sarkar argued in his “History of Aurangzib” (1912-1924), the empire’s stability rested on its military prowess. It was not a ‘nation-state’ in the modern sense, as it lacked a unified national identity; its coherence depended on the emperor’s ability to command loyalty and project military power.
    • Technological and Organisational Stagnation: While the Mughals under Babur had mastered gunpowder technology (artillery and matchlocks), by the 18th century, their military science had stagnated. There was a conspicuous absence of innovation in military tactics, weaponry, and organization, especially when compared to the rapidly modernizing European armies and even agile regional forces like the Marathas, who excelled in guerrilla warfare. The Mughal army remained heavily reliant on its cumbersome cavalry and slow-moving artillery, making it ineffective against swift raids.
    • Decline in Commandership: The line of formidable military commanders that characterized the early Mughal period (like Bairam Khan, Man Singh, Mir Jumla) ended with Aurangzeb. The later Mughals and their nobles often lacked the personal valor, strategic acumen, and leadership qualities essential to command vast, diverse armies. Emperors like Muhammad Shah ‘Rangeela’ were more interested in courtly pleasures than military campaigns.
    • Corruption and the Jagirdari Crisis: The military’s effectiveness was intrinsically linked to the Jagirdari system. A mansabdar was required to maintain a specified number of troopers (sawar) from the revenue of his assigned jagir. As the Jagirdari crisis intensified (discussed below), many mansabdars failed to maintain their full quota of soldiers and horses. They would often present hired men and horses only at the time of official inspection (dagh system), leading to a ‘paper army’ that was weak on the battlefield. This corruption stemmed from financial insecurity and declining loyalty to a weakening central authority.

  • Factionalism (Group Politics):

    • Origins and Composition of Factions: The Mughal court had always been a composite nobility, but under strong rulers, factional rivalries were kept in check. After Aurangzeb, these factions engaged in zero-sum power struggles.
      • Irani Group: Comprising nobles of Persian origin, they were often Shias. Their influence dated back to Humayun’s return to power in 1555 with the help of the Persian Shah Tahmasp I. They were noted for their administrative skills and included prominent figures like Saadat Khan (founder of the Awadh dynasty).
      • Turani Group: These were nobles of Central Asian (Turan) descent and, like the Mughal emperors themselves, were Sunnis. They were considered old-guard nobility and prided themselves on their military prowess. Key figures included Nizam-ul-Mulk (founder of the Hyderabad state).
      • Hindustani Group: This faction consisted of Indian Muslims, many of whom were converts or belonged to families that had been in India for generations. The most famous proponents of this group were the Sayyid Brothers (Abdullah Khan and Hussain Ali Khan), who became ‘kingmakers’ after Aurangzeb’s death.
      • Deccani Group: A later addition, this group comprised nobles from the annexed Sultanates of Bijapur (1686, not 1685 as in the summary) and Golconda (1687). Aurangzeb co-opted them into the Mughal nobility to pacify the Deccan, but their integration exacerbated the strain on the Jagirdari system.
      • Hindus: This group primarily consisted of Rajput chiefs, such as those from Amber and Marwar, who had been crucial allies of the empire since Akbar’s reign.
    • Impact of Factionalism: The primary goal of these factions was not the welfare of the empire but the consolidation of their own power and the acquisition of lucrative jagirs and offices. This led to a series of succession wars, coups, and assassinations (e.g., the murder of Farrukhsiyar). As argued by Satish Chandra in “Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740” (1959), this intense factionalism paralysed the central administration and prevented the implementation of any long-term reforms, ultimately encouraging nobles to carve out their own semi-independent principalities.

Jagirdari Crisis of the 18th Century

  • Genesis of the Crisis: The crisis had its roots in the late years of Aurangzeb’s reign.

    • Expansion and Co-option: The annexation of Bijapur (1686) and Golconda (1687) led to a significant influx of Deccani nobles into the Mughal mansabdari system. To secure their loyalty, Aurangzeb had to grant them mansabs and jagirs.
    • Shortage of Jagirs (Be-jagiri): Simultaneously, Aurangzeb, needing direct revenue to fund his protracted and expensive Deccan campaigns against the Marathas, converted a significant portion of the newly conquered, productive lands into Khalisa (crown land), from which revenue went directly to the imperial treasury. This created a severe mismatch: the number of mansabdars (claimants to revenue) increased, while the pool of assignable land (paibaqi) shrank. This condition of jagir-lessness was termed be-jagiri.
    • Inequitable Distribution: The problem was compounded by extreme inequality. As documented by historians like M. Athar Ali in “The Mughal Nobility Under Aurangzeb” (1966), a small clique of high-ranking nobles controlled a disproportionately large share of the jagirs. For instance, data suggests that less than 5% of mansabdars controlled over 60% of the total jama (estimated revenue) from jagirs, leaving smaller mansabdars in a precarious position.
    • Inflation and Economic Pressure: The influx of European silver in the 17th and 18th centuries caused price inflation, particularly for luxury goods that were essential for maintaining a noble’s lifestyle. The official revenue estimates (jama) of jagirs were often outdated and grossly inflated compared to the actual yield (hasil). This discrepancy meant a mansabdar’s real income was much lower than his official salary, making it difficult to maintain his contingent and lifestyle.

  • Impact of the Jagirdari Crisis:

    • Oppression of Peasantry: Faced with income insecurity and frequent transfers of jagirs, a mansabdar had no incentive to invest in agricultural productivity. Instead, the focus shifted to extracting the maximum possible revenue in the shortest time. This led to increased oppression of the peasantry (ryots) and exploitation of the primary zamindars.
    • Rise of the Ijaradari System: To ensure a quick and guaranteed income, jagirdars increasingly farmed out the right to collect revenue to the highest bidder. This system, known as ijaradari or revenue farming, was disastrous for agriculture, as the ijaradar (revenue farmer) had no long-term interest in the land and sought only to maximize profit.
    • Peasant Revolts: The intense economic pressure was a major cause of the widespread peasant rebellions that plagued the empire in the late 17th and 18th centuries. As Irfan Habib argues in “The Agrarian System of Mughal India” (1963), these revolts (by Jats, Sikhs, Satnamis) were a symptom of a deep-seated agrarian crisis triggered by the state’s exploitative revenue demands, which the Jagirdari crisis amplified. These revolts were often led by local zamindars, like Churaman Jat, who channeled peasant grievances to build their own political power, thereby directly challenging Mughal authority.
    • Erosion of Military Strength and Political Stability: The crisis directly fuelled the military weakness mentioned earlier. It intensified factional conflicts as nobles competed fiercely for the best jagirs. This systemic failure crippled the very foundation of the Mughal military-administrative structure and accelerated the process of political disintegration.

The Proof of the Decline of the Mughal Empire

  • The Era of ‘Kingmakers’ (1713-1720):

    • The accession of Farrukhsiyar in 1713 with the help of the Sayyid Brothers (Hussain Ali Khan and Abdullah Khan) of the Hindustani faction marked a new low in imperial prestige. The emperor became a puppet in their hands.
    • When Farrukhsiyar attempted to assert his authority, the Sayyid Brothers, in an unprecedented move, deposed and executed him in 1719. They did so by forging an alliance with the Maratha Peshwa Balaji Vishwanath, demonstrating the complete collapse of Mughal authority even within their own capital. They subsequently placed several puppet emperors on the throne in quick succession, including Muhammad Shah.
    • The eventual overthrow of the Sayyid Brothers in 1720 by a rival coalition of Turani (Nizam-ul-Mulk) and Irani nobles did not restore imperial power; it merely replaced one dominant faction with another.

  • Weak Rulers and Administrative Apathy:

    • The post-Aurangzeb emperors, often referred to as the Later Mughals, were generally weak, indecisive, and hedonistic.
    • Muhammad Shah, who had a long reign (1719-1748), earned the epithet ‘Rangeela’ (the colourful/pleasure-loving) due to his preoccupation with arts, music, and courtly revelries at the expense of administration and military affairs. During his reign, key nobles like Nizam-ul-Mulk, frustrated with court politics, left Delhi to establish independent successor states (e.g., Hyderabad in 1724), symbolising the empire’s fragmentation.

  • The Maratha Ascendancy:

    • The Marathas, once a regional power, grew to become the primary challengers to Mughal dominance.
    • In 1737, Peshwa Baji Rao I, in a daring campaign, marched to the gates of Delhi, plundered its suburbs, and exposed the hollowness of Mughal military might.
    • A large Mughal army, personally led by the veteran commander Nizam-ul-Mulk, was comprehensively defeated by the Marathas near Bhopal in 1738.
    • The subsequent Treaty of Bhopal (signed in early 1739) was a humiliating capitulation. The Mughals ceded the entire province (subah) of Malwa and acknowledged Maratha sovereignty over the vast territories between the Narmada and Chambal rivers. This treaty formally recognised the Marathas as a dominant power in northern India.

  • Invasion of Nadir Shah (1739):

    • Reasons for Invasion:
      • Pretext: The Persian ruler Nadir Shah used the Mughal court’s failure to prevent his Afghan enemies from taking refuge in their territory as a casus belli. His envoy to the Mughal court was also detained and later killed.
      • Real Motive: The primary driver was the immense wealth of India, which Nadir Shah needed to fund his own wars, and the widely known political and military weakness of the Mughal Empire.
    • The Battle of Karnal (February 1739):
      • The Mughal army, though numerically superior, was a disjointed and poorly led force, plagued by internal rivalries.
      • Factionalism played a decisive role. Saadat Khan (Nawab of Awadh), feeling slighted when the post of Mir Bakshi (Paymaster General) was given to Nizam-ul-Mulk instead of him, is said to have treacherously advised Nadir Shah to march on Delhi, promising even greater plunder.
      • Nadir Shah’s smaller, disciplined army, equipped with superior swivel guns mounted on camels, completely routed the Mughal forces in a matter of hours.
    • Aftermath: Nadir Shah entered Delhi with the captive emperor Muhammad Shah. He proclaimed himself sovereign. A rumour of his death led to an uprising in Delhi, which Nadir Shah crushed with a general massacre of the city’s inhabitants. He plundered the city for nearly two months, carrying away immense treasures, including the Peacock Throne and the Koh-i-Noor diamond. The invasion was a death blow to the prestige and power of the Mughal Empire, exposing its utter helplessness and accelerating its disintegration. Saadat Khan, unable to deliver the promised ransom and humiliated by Nadir Shah, committed suicide.

Prelims Pointers

  • Mughal Nobility Factions:
    • Irani: Shia nobles from Persia. Example: Saadat Khan.
    • Turani: Sunni nobles from Central Asia. Example: Nizam-ul-Mulk.
    • Hindustani: Indian Muslims. Example: Sayyid Brothers (Abdullah Khan and Hussain Ali Khan).
    • Deccani: Nobles from annexed states of Bijapur and Golconda.
  • Key Terms:
    • Khalisa: Crown land, revenue collected directly for the imperial treasury.
    • Jagir: A temporary land assignment given to a Mansabdar in lieu of salary.
    • Ijaradari: Revenue farming system where the right to collect revenue was sold to the highest bidder.
    • Mansabdar: Holder of a rank (mansab) in the Mughal administrative system.
    • Sawar: The rank indicating the number of cavalrymen a mansabdar was required to maintain.
  • Important Dates and Events:
    • 1686: Annexation of Bijapur by Aurangzeb.
    • 1687: Annexation of Golconda by Aurangzeb.
    • 1719: Deposition and execution of Emperor Farrukhsiyar by the Sayyid Brothers.
    • 1724: Nizam-ul-Mulk established the autonomous state of Hyderabad.
    • 1737: Peshwa Baji Rao I raided the outskirts of Delhi.
    • 1739: Battle of Karnal between Nadir Shah and Muhammad Shah’s forces.
    • 1739: Treaty of Bhopal signed between the Marathas and the Mughals, ceding Malwa.
  • Key Personalities:
    • Churaman Jat: Zamindar who led a peasant revolt and founded the Jat kingdom of Bharatpur.
    • Sayyid Brothers: Known as “kingmakers” in the post-Aurangzeb era.
    • Nizam-ul-Mulk: Turani noble, served as Wazir, and later founded the state of Hyderabad.
    • Muhammad Shah ‘Rangeela’: Mughal emperor (1719-1748) during whose reign the empire significantly fragmented.
    • Saadat Ali Khan: Irani noble who founded the state of Awadh.
    • Nadir Shah: Persian ruler who invaded India in 1739.

Mains Insights

  • Historiographical Debate on Mughal Decline:

    1. Religious/Personal-Centric View: Early historians like Jadunath Sarkar blamed the decline on Aurangzeb’s religious bigotry (re-imposition of Jizya, temple destruction) and Deccan policy, which alienated Rajputs, Sikhs, and Marathas and exhausted the imperial treasury. This view sees the decline as a consequence of the personal failures of later rulers.
    2. Institutional/Structural Crisis View: Later Marxist historians shifted the focus to deeper structural flaws.
      • Irfan Habib (“The Agrarian System of Mughal India”): Argued that the high rate of Mughal land revenue demand and the exploitative nature of the Jagirdari system led to an agrarian crisis. This crisis manifested in peasant rebellions that destroyed the economic foundation of the empire.
      • Satish Chandra (“Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court”): Focused on the Jagirdari crisis, linking it to a shortage of productive jagirs (be-jagiri) relative to the number of mansabdars. This triggered intense factionalism at the court, paralysed the administration, and led nobles to create independent power bases.
    3. Region-Centric Approach: Scholars like Muzaffar Alam argue that the decline of the central Mughal authority should not be seen as a period of absolute chaos but rather as a period of political readjustment. The rise of “successor states” like Awadh, Bengal, and Hyderabad represented a new phase of regional economic and political vitality, even as the imperial center weakened.

  • Cause and Effect Analysis: Jagirdari Crisis as the Core Problem:

    • Cause: Aurangzeb’s Deccan expansion → Increase in Mansabdars + Scarcity of Jagirs (be-jagiri) → Jagirdari Crisis.
    • Immediate Effects:
      • Administrative: Rise of Ijaradari; frequent transfer of jagirdars.
      • Economic: Oppression of peasantry; decline in agricultural investment and productivity.
      • Military: Mansabdars failed to maintain required contingents, leading to military decay.
    • Long-term Consequences:
      • Social: Widespread peasant revolts (Jats, Sikhs).
      • Political: Intensified factionalism at court; rise of autonomous successor states as powerful nobles secured their own territories.
      • Imperial: Terminal weakening of central authority, making the empire vulnerable to internal and external threats (Marathas, Nadir Shah).

  • Nadir Shah’s Invasion: Symptom or Cause of Decline?

    • The invasion of Nadir Shah was not the cause of Mughal decline but rather a brutal symptom of an already decayed political and military system.
    • It was the empire’s internal weaknesses—factionalism at the Battle of Karnal, a demoralised and corrupt army, and an apathetic central leadership—that ensured Nadir Shah’s success.
    • However, the invasion acted as a powerful accelerator of the decline. It shattered the remaining prestige of the Mughal emperor, drained the treasury of its accumulated wealth, and exposed the empire’s vulnerability to the entire world, emboldening regional powers and European trading companies.

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