Modern Indian History Notes 05

The Military Ascendancy of the Marathas (c. 1719-1760)

The early 18th century, marked by the rapid disintegration of the Mughal Empire following the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, created a political vacuum that the Marathas, under the capable leadership of the Peshwas, were uniquely positioned to fill. Their expansion was not merely opportunistic but was driven by a sophisticated blend of military strategy, diplomatic maneuvering, and a systematic revenue extraction system.

• The Alliance with the Sayyid Brothers (1719): A pivotal moment in the legitimization of Maratha power was their alliance with the ‘Kingmakers’, the Sayyid brothers (Hussain Ali Khan and Abdullah Khan). In 1719, a Maratha force led by Balaji Vishwanath marched to Delhi to help the Sayyids depose the Mughal emperor Farrukhsiyar. In return for their support, the new puppet emperor, Muhammad Shah, issued three significant firmans.

  • Swarajya: Recognition of Shahu’s claim to Shivaji’s core territories as his independent kingdom (Swarajya). While Shahu nominally accepted Mughal suzerainty, this was, as noted by historian Satish Chandra in his work “Medieval India: From Sultanat to the Mughals-Mughal Empire (1526-1748)”, a de facto recognition of Maratha sovereignty.
  • Chauth and Sardeshmukhi: The right to collect Chauth (one-fourth of revenue) and Sardeshmukhi (an additional one-tenth) from the six Mughal provinces of the Deccan (Aurangabad, Berar, Bidar, Bijapur, Hyderabad, and Khandesh) was granted. This provided the Marathas with immense financial resources and a legal pretext for intervention in Deccan politics.
  • The rise of Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I, who eliminated the Sayyid brothers by 1720 and established his autonomous state in Hyderabad in 1724, temporarily nullified these gains, setting the stage for a prolonged Maratha-Nizam conflict.

• The Era of Peshwa Baji Rao I (1720-1740): Baji Rao I is widely regarded as the architect of the Maratha Empire. His military vision was predicated on rapid expansion northwards, a policy famously articulated as “striking at the trunk of the withering tree” of the Mughal Empire.

  • Confrontation with the Nizam: Baji Rao decisively defeated the Nizam at the Battle of Palkhed (1728). This battle is a classic example of superior Maratha guerrilla tactics and strategic mobility. The ensuing Treaty of Mungi-Shevgaon forced the Nizam to reaffirm the Maratha rights to Chauth and Sardeshmukhi in the Deccan, cementing Maratha supremacy in the region.
  • Expansion into Gujarat, Malwa, and Bundelkhand: Baji Rao I’s campaigns systematically brought these prosperous regions under Maratha control. Malwa and Gujarat were crucial for their access to trade routes and rich agricultural lands. By 1729, Maratha influence was firmly established in these territories.
  • Raid on Delhi (1737): In a bold move that stunned the Mughal court, Baji Rao I led a lightning raid on the outskirts of Delhi. While he did not attempt to occupy the city, the raid exposed the utter helplessness of the Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah and demonstrated Maratha military might at the heart of the empire.
  • Battle of Bhopal (1738): A large Mughal army, led by the Nizam himself, was dispatched to drive the Marathas out of northern India. Baji Rao trapped this army near Bhopal and forced it to sign the Treaty of Bhopal (or Duraha Sarai) in January 1739. This treaty was a landmark achievement, granting the Marathas the full subadari (governorship) of Malwa and sovereignty over all territories between the Narmada and Chambal rivers.

• Defining Chauth and Sardeshmukhi:

  • Chauth: Literally meaning “one-fourth,” it was a tribute levied on non-Maratha territories. Historian André Wink, in “Land and Sovereignty in India”, interprets Chauth not simply as plunder but as a claim to co-sovereignty. In exchange for this payment, the Marathas offered protection from external aggression, including from other Maratha bands. Failure to pay often resulted in devastating raids and eventual annexation. It was a primary instrument of Maratha foreign policy and finance.
  • Sardeshmukhi: This was an additional 10% levy, based on a fictional claim that Shivaji was the hereditary Sardeshmukh (chief headman) of all Deshmukhs in the Deccan. Unlike Chauth, which was a claim on alien territories, Sardeshmukhi was a claim of superior authority, applicable to both Maratha and non-Maratha lands.

• Consolidation under Balaji Baji Rao (Nana Saheb) (1740-1761):

  • Eastern Expansion: The Bhonsles of Nagpur, under Raghuji Bhonsle, conducted repeated raids into the Bengal Suba between 1745 and 1751. These campaigns compelled the Nawab of Bengal, Alivardi Khan, to cede the province of Orissa to the Marathas and agree to pay an annual Chauth of 1.2 million rupees for Bengal and Bihar.
  • The Protectorate over the Mughals (1752): Fearing the invasions of Ahmad Shah Abdali, the Mughal court, under Wazir Safdar Jang, entered into an agreement with the Marathas. The Marathas agreed to protect the empire from all internal and external threats in exchange for the Chauth of the northwest provinces and the subadari of Ajmer and Agra. This made the Marathas the de facto rulers of Delhi, though they ruled in the name of the Mughal emperor.
  • Southern Campaigns: The Marathas continued their campaigns against the Nizam of Hyderabad, culminating in the Treaty of Bhalke (1751) where Khandesh was ceded to them. They also defeated Hyder Ali of Mysore in 1765 and extracted tribute.
  • Relations with Rajputs: The Maratha relationship with the Rajputs was exploitative. They frequently intervened in succession disputes, levying heavy tributes. As historian Jadunath Sarkar extensively documented in his “Fall of the Mughal Empire”, this policy of relentless plunder alienated the Rajputs, turning potential allies into resentful neutrals during the crucial Panipat campaign.

By 1760, the Maratha Confederacy was the undisputed paramount power in India. Their influence extended from the Punjab in the north to the Carnatic in the south, and from Gujarat in the west to Orissa in the east. The stage was set for them to replace the Mughals as the imperial authority of India, a destiny that would be decided on the battlefield of Panipat.

The Third Battle of Panipat, 1761

This cataclysmic battle was a culmination of the contest for supremacy in North India between the expanding Maratha Empire and the resurgent Afghan power under Ahmad Shah Abdali (also known as Durrani).

• The Combatants:

  • Afghan Coalition: Led by Ahmad Shah Abdali, founder of the Durrani Empire in Afghanistan. He was supported by Indian allies:
    • Shuja-ud-Daula, the Nawab of Awadh, who feared the Marathas more than the distant Afghans.
    • Najib-ud-Daula, the chief of the Rohilla Afghans, who shared ethnic and religious ties with Abdali and was a bitter enemy of the Marathas.
    • The Bangash Pathans of Farrukhabad.
  • The Marathas: Commanded by Sadashivrao Bhau, the cousin of the Peshwa, and the Peshwa’s young son, Vishwasrao (the nominal commander). Their allies were few; Surajmal, the Jat ruler of Bharatpur, initially supported them but withdrew due to strategic disagreements with the haughty Bhau. The Mughals were only technically on their side as their protectors.

• Reasons for the Battle:

  • Imperial Ambitions: The core of the conflict was the clash between two expansionist powers vying for control over the rich plains of North India.
  • The Punjab Dispute: In 1758, the Marathas, under Raghunath Rao, had driven Abdali’s son and viceroy, Timur Shah, out of Lahore and occupied the Punjab. This was a direct challenge to Abdali’s authority and made a retaliatory invasion inevitable.
  • Invitation from Indian Nobles: Anti-Maratha factions at the Mughal court, including Najib-ud-Daula, had repeatedly invited Abdali to invade India and “liberate” the emperor from Maratha control.

• Analysis of Abdali’s Victory:

  • Superior Alliances and Diplomacy: Abdali proved to be a master diplomat. He successfully isolated the Marathas by appealing to Shuja-ud-Daula’s strategic fears and Najib-ud-Daula’s religious and ethnic sentiments. The Marathas, in contrast, failed to build a “national” coalition against a foreign invader, largely due to their past policies of plunder which had alienated the Rajputs, Jats, and Sikhs.
  • Military Superiority: Abdali’s army was better organized and equipped. His artillery, particularly the camel-mounted swivel guns (zamburaks), was more mobile and effective than the heavy, cumbersome Maratha artillery. His cavalry was better disciplined.
  • Strategic Blunder of the Marathas: Sadashivrao Bhau abandoned traditional Maratha guerrilla tactics, which were unsuited for the open plains of Panipat. He opted for a conventional European-style pitched battle, a form of warfare in which the Afghans were more experienced.
  • Logistical Failure: Abdali’s most decisive strategic move was to cut off the Maratha army’s supply lines from Delhi. For nearly two months, the large Maratha army and its camp followers were besieged at Panipat, facing starvation. The final Maratha charge on January 14, 1761, was a desperate attack by a famished army.
  • Disunity within Maratha Ranks: Factionalism among the Maratha sardars was a persistent weakness. Key leaders like Malhar Rao Holkar were accused of not fully committing to the battle, and some contingents, like that of the Bhonsles of Nagpur, did not participate.

• Impact of the Maratha Defeat:

  • Catastrophic Human Loss: The Marathas suffered devastating losses. Almost the entire military leadership of a generation was wiped out, including Sadashivrao Bhau and Vishwasrao. The news of the disaster shattered Peshwa Balaji Baji Rao, who died a few months later.
  • Political Fragmentation: The defeat severely weakened the authority of the Peshwa. The great Maratha sardars—Scindia, Holkar, Gaekwad, and Bhonsle—began to act with greater autonomy, transforming the empire into a loose confederacy.
  • The Power Vacuum: As famously summarized by historian J.N. Sarkar, “The third battle of Panipat did not decide who was to rule India but rather who was not.” Abdali, plagued by a mutiny in his army and the rising power of the Sikhs in Punjab, could not consolidate his victory and returned to Afghanistan. The Marathas’ ambition of establishing a pan-Indian empire was shattered. This created a power vacuum at the center, which was ultimately filled not by another Indian power, but by the British East India Company, which was then consolidating its hold over Bengal after the Battle of Plassey (1757). The path for British ascendancy was now significantly clearer.

The Geostrategic Importance of Panipat

The region around Panipat, including Karnal and Kurukshetra, has been the site of numerous decisive battles in Indian history not by coincidence, but due to a unique confluence of geographic and strategic factors.

• Gateway to Delhi: For any invader coming from the northwest via the Khyber Pass, the traditional invasion route, the plains of Panipat served as the natural and final battlefield before the capital, Delhi.
• Strategic Imperative: For the rulers of Delhi, it was strategically vital to confront an invading army here, far from the capital, to prevent a direct siege. It was the outer defense line of Delhi.
• Topography: The region is a vast, flat plain, ideal for the movement and deployment of large armies, particularly the cavalry which was the mainstay of medieval warfare.
• Logistics and Resources: Its proximity to the agriculturally rich Ganga-Yamuna doab and to Delhi ensured a steady supply of food and provisions for a large, stationary army. The region was also inhabited by martial communities, making recruitment easier.
• Favorable Climate: The weather, particularly during the post-monsoon and winter months, was suitable for long campaigns.
• Historical Precedent:
  1. Battles of Tarain (1191, 1192): Fought nearby between Prithviraj Chauhan and Muhammad Ghori, which established Turkic rule in North India.
  2. First Battle of Panipat (1526): Babur defeated Ibrahim Lodi, ending the Delhi Sultanate and establishing the Mughal Empire.
  3. Second Battle of Panipat (1556): Akbar’s forces defeated Hemu, re-establishing and consolidating Mughal rule.
  4. Battle of Karnal (1739): Nadir Shah defeated the Mughal army, leading to the sack of Delhi.
  5. Third Battle of Panipat (1761): Halted the Maratha advance and paved the way for British dominance.

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Prelims Pointers

• 1719: Marathas, under Balaji Vishwanath, allied with the Sayyid brothers to depose Farrukhsiyar.
• Terms of 1719 Agreement: Marathas received recognition of Swarajya, and the right to collect Chauth and Sardeshmukhi from the 6 Mughal provinces of the Deccan.
• Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah I: Founder of the autonomous state of Hyderabad in 1724.
• Peshwa Baji Rao I (1720-1740): Known for his policy of northward expansion (“striking at the trunk of the withering tree”).
• Battle of Palkhed (1728): Baji Rao I defeated the Nizam of Hyderabad.
• Treaty of Bhopal (1739): Following the Battle of Bhopal (1738), the Marathas were granted the subadari of Malwa and sovereignty over the territory between the Narmada and Chambal rivers.
• Chauth: A tax equivalent to 1/4th of the land revenue, levied on non-Maratha territories as protection money.
• Sardeshmukhi: An additional levy of 1/10th, based on a claim of being the hereditary chief headman (Sardeshmukh).
• Raghuji Bhonsle: Maratha sardar of Nagpur who raided Bengal; forced Alivardi Khan to cede Orissa in 1751.
• 1752: Marathas became the official protectors of the Mughal Emperor after a treaty with Wazir Safdar Jang.
• Third Battle of Panipat: Fought on January 14, 1761.
• Combatants at Panipat: Ahmad Shah Abdali (supported by Shuja-ud-Daula of Awadh and Najib-ud-Daula of Rohilkhand) vs. the Marathas (led by Sadashivrao Bhau).
• Jat Ruler: Surajmal of Bharatpur withdrew his support from the Marathas before the battle.
• Maratha Leaders Killed at Panipat: Sadashivrao Bhau, Vishwasrao (Peshwa’s son), Jankoji Scindia, Ibrahim Khan Gardi (artillery chief).
• Peshwa at the time of Panipat: Balaji Baji Rao (Nana Saheb), who died shortly after hearing news of the defeat.
• Battle of Kharda (1795): Last major battle between the Marathas and the Nizam of Hyderabad; Marathas were victorious.
• Subsidiary Alliance: Hyderabad was the first state to sign the Subsidiary Alliance with the British East India Company (EIC) in 1798.

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Mains Insights

1. The Nature of the Maratha State and its Expansion:

   • Confederacy vs. Empire: While often called the Maratha Empire, it functioned more as a confederacy (Maratha Mandal), especially after the 1740s. The Peshwa in Pune was the central authority, but powerful sardars like the Scindias of Gwalior, Holkars of Indore, Gaekwads of Baroda, and Bhonsles of Nagpur held significant autonomous power. This internal factionalism was a key weakness, starkly evident at Panipat.
   • Financial Imperatives Driving Politics: The Maratha state was heavily dependent on revenue from Chauth and Sardeshmukhi. This created a military-fiscal state that needed to constantly expand or raid to sustain its large armies. This policy, while effective in funding expansion, was politically counter-productive as it alienated almost all other regional powers (Rajputs, Jats, etc.), leaving the Marathas diplomatically isolated.

2. The Third Battle of Panipat as a Turning Point:

   • Cause-Effect Analysis: The battle was not an isolated event but the climax of a half-century of Maratha northward expansion. The cause was the direct clash over the political vacuum in North India. The effect was profound:
     • It decapitated the Maratha leadership, leading to a period of internal strife and recovery.
     • It permanently halted their ambition to create a pan-Indian empire ruled from Pune.
     • It created a power vacuum that neither the Afghans (who retreated) nor other Indian powers could fill.
   • Historiographical Debate: The statement that Panipat “decided who would not rule India” is a central theme. The battle eliminated the strongest Indian contender for imperial power. This cleared the field for the British EIC, which, between the battles of Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764), was establishing its own territorial and military dominance from its base in Bengal. The weakening of the Marathas allowed the British to tackle Indian powers piecemeal over the next 50 years.

3. Failure of Maratha Diplomacy:

   • The defeat at Panipat was as much a diplomatic failure as a military one. Sadashivrao Bhau’s arrogance and the Marathas’ reputation as plunderers prevented the formation of a united front against a foreign invader.
   • Contrast with Abdali: Abdali skilfully used diplomacy, shared ethnicity, and religious appeals to forge a powerful coalition with key North Indian Muslim nobles. The Marathas failed to convince Hindu powers like the Rajputs and Jats that their cause was a common one, a critical strategic failure.

4. Military Evolution and its Limits:

   • The Marathas were masters of guerrilla warfare (ganimi kava), which was highly effective in the hilly terrain of the Deccan.
   • Their attempt to adopt European-style infantry and artillery formations under leaders like Ibrahim Khan Gardi showed a willingness to modernize.
   • However, at Panipat, this shift in doctrine proved fatal. They abandoned their core strength (mobility and surprise) for a conventional battle in unfamiliar terrain against a more experienced conventional army, leading to a logistical nightmare and eventual defeat.

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