Modern Indian History Notes 10

The Nature of British Conquest: Policy or Accident?

A central debate in Modern Indian History revolves around whether the British conquest of India was a preconceived, deliberate plan orchestrated by the British state, or an unplanned consequence of the actions of individual Company officials on the ground.

• The ‘Sub-Imperialism’ or ‘Peripheral’ Thesis:

  • This viewpoint, famously articulated for the British Empire in general by scholars like John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson (1953) in their work on Africa, and applied to India by others, posits that the primary impetus for territorial expansion came from the ‘periphery’ (India) rather than the ‘metropole’ (Britain).
  • It argues that the British government in London had no consistent or long-term policy for acquiring an Indian empire. The historian John Seeley in his book The Expansion of England (1883) famously remarked that the British seem to have “conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind.”
  • Proponents point to the personal ambitions and on-the-spot decisions of key East India Company (EIC) officials. For instance:
    • Robert Clive (Governor of Fort William) exploited the political conspiracy in the Bengal court, leading to the Battle of Plassey (1757), which was not directly ordered by London.
    • Richard Wellesley (Governor-General, 1798-1805) pursued an aggressive forward policy through his Subsidiary Alliance system, often exceeding his instructions from the Company’s Directors, who were primarily concerned with profits, not costly wars.
    • Lord Hastings (Governor-General, 1813-1823) and Lord Dalhousie (Governor-General, 1848-1856) were arch-imperialists who expanded British territories through wars and annexations (like the Doctrine of Lapse), driven by a mix of strategic concerns and a belief in British superiority.
  • Further evidence cited is the clause in Pitt’s India Act of 1784 which explicitly stated that “to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour and policy of this nation.” This suggests a formal parliamentary disavowal of imperial expansion.
  • The Royal Charter of 1600, granted by Queen Elizabeth I, gave the EIC a monopoly on trade, not a mandate for conquest. Its initial objective was purely commercial.

• The ‘State-Sponsored Imperialism’ or ‘Metropolitan’ Thesis:

  • This counter-argument, supported by historians like P.J. Marshall, holds that the British state cannot be absolved of responsibility. While individual actions were significant, they operated within a framework created and supported by the state.
  • The Charter itself was a state instrument. It granted the EIC sovereign powers, including the right to “wage war or make peace,” sign treaties, acquire territory, and govern it. This was an explicit delegation of state power to a commercial entity.
  • Direct Military and Logistical Support was crucial. The conquest of India was a joint enterprise. The Royal Navy provided maritime supremacy, protecting EIC’s sea lanes and blockading its European rivals. Royal Army troops fought alongside the Company’s army in key conflicts, from the Battle of Plassey to the suppression of the 1857 Revolt.
  • The state actively facilitated the EIC’s consolidation of power. For example, the island of Bombay, received by King Charles II as part of a dowry from the Portuguese crown, was leased to the EIC in 1668 for a nominal annual rent of £10. This provided the Company with a strategic western port.
  • Monetary and Political Symbiosis: The British state and its elite were direct beneficiaries of the EIC’s success.
    • The Crown received substantial payments for the renewal of charters.
    • In 1698, Parliament effectively auctioned the monopoly on Eastern trade, with a ‘New Company’ offering a £2 million loan to the state. This led to the eventual merger of the old and new companies in 1709, demonstrating the state’s financial interest.
    • Following the plunders of Bengal after the Battles of Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764), the British Parliament, through an Act in 1767, mandated the EIC to pay the state £400,000 annually, thus directly sharing in the “loot.”
    • Many Members of Parliament and even monarchs like Queen Elizabeth I were shareholders in the Company, creating a powerful pro-EIC lobby within the British political establishment.
  • Progressive State Control: The British state progressively increased its control over the Company, effectively turning it into a semi-official arm of the state. The Regulating Act of 1773 and Pitt’s India Act of 1784 established a Board of Control in London, giving the British cabinet final authority over the EIC’s civil, military, and revenue affairs in India. The Governor-General was increasingly an appointee of the Crown. This indicates that while the Company was the agent, the state was the ultimate authority and beneficiary.

Early Conflicts and Anglo-French Rivalry

• EIC vs. Aurangzeb (1686):

  • In the 1680s, under the influence of its aggressive director, Sir Josiah Child, the EIC attempted to assert its power against the Mughal Empire. They sought to fortify their settlements and operate independently of Mughal authority, partly due to disruptions in trade caused by Aurangzeb’s Deccan wars.
  • This led to a short-lived war where the EIC attacked Mughal shipping and ports in Bengal and on the west coast. The Mughal response was swift and overwhelming. The EIC’s factories at Surat, Masulipatnam, and Vizagapatam were seized, and their fort in Bombay was besieged.
  • The EIC was decisively defeated and forced to plead for pardon. Aurangzeb forgave them for pragmatic reasons:
    1. Revenue: The EIC was a significant source of customs revenue for the Mughal treasury.
    2. Economic Ecosystem: Indian merchants, intermediaries, and producers relied heavily on the business provided by the Company.
    3. Bullion Inflow: The EIC’s trade model involved paying for Indian goods (textiles, spices) with silver and gold, which was vital for the monetized Mughal economy.
    4. Local Employment: The demand generated by EIC’s exports supported numerous artisans and peasants.
  • Recognizing this mutual dependence, Aurangzeb, in 1691, issued a farman (royal decree) granting the EIC exemption from customs duties in Bengal in exchange for a fixed annual payment of Rs. 3,000. This restored the EIC’s trading privileges and taught them the lesson that territorial conquest was impossible without the disintegration of central Mughal authority.

• The First Carnatic War (1746-1748):

  • This conflict was a direct extension of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748) in Europe, demonstrating how European political rivalries were now being fought on Indian soil.
  • The primary actors in India were the British EIC, based in Madras (Fort St. George), and the French Compagnie des Indes Orientales, based in Pondicherry, led by the ambitious Governor-General Joseph-François Dupleix.
  • Dupleix harboured imperial ambitions and sought to eliminate British competition. When a British naval squadron threatened Pondicherry, Dupleix retaliated by capturing Madras in 1746.
  • He had promised to hand over Madras to the Nawab of the Carnatic, Anwar-ud-din. When Dupleix reneged on this promise, the Nawab sent a large army to enforce his authority.
  • This led to the pivotal Battle of Adyar (or St. Thome) in 1746, where a small, well-trained French force of about 1,000 men decisively routed the Nawab’s 10,000-strong army. This battle was a watershed moment, demonstrating the vast superiority of disciplined European infantry and artillery over traditional, larger Indian armies. It exposed the military weakness of Indian states and set a precedent for European intervention in their affairs.
  • The war ended not because of events in India, but due to the signing of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) in Europe. As per the treaty’s terms, territories were returned to their original owners. France regained its North American territories (like Louisbourg), and in exchange, Britain got back Madras. The treaty restored the status quo ante bellum in India, but the lessons of the war, particularly Dupleix’s strategy of intervening in local politics, were not forgotten and would fuel the Second Carnatic War.

Prelims Pointers

• Key EIC Officials (Empire Builders):
  • Robert Clive: Governor of Calcutta Presidency, key figure in Battle of Plassey.
  • Richard Wellesley: Governor-General (1798-1805), architect of the Subsidiary Alliance system.
  • Lord Hastings: Governor-General (1813-1823), fought Anglo-Nepalese and Third Anglo-Maratha Wars.
  • Lord Dalhousie: Governor-General (1848-1856), known for Doctrine of Lapse, annexations of Punjab, Awadh.
• Important Legislation:
  • Royal Charter (1600): Granted by Queen Elizabeth I, gave EIC trade monopoly in the East.
  • Regulating Act (1773): First step by the British Parliament to control EIC; created Governor-General of Bengal.
  • Pitt’s India Act (1784): Established the Board of Control to supervise EIC’s political, military, and revenue affairs.
• Key Events and Dates:
  • 1668: Bombay was leased to EIC by King Charles II for an annual rent of £10.
  • 1686: EIC waged an unsuccessful war against Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb.
  • 1691: Aurangzeb issued a farman granting EIC duty-free trade in Bengal for Rs. 3,000 per annum.
  • 1746-1748: First Carnatic War.
  • 1746: Battle of Adyar (St. Thome) between French forces and the army of the Nawab of Carnatic.
  • 1748: Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle concluded the First Carnatic War.
• Key Personalities (French):
  • Joseph-François Dupleix: Governor of the French EIC in Pondicherry, a pioneer of using European troops in Indian political disputes.
• Locations:
  • Pondicherry: Main base of the French in India, founded in 1674.
  • Madras (Fort St. George): Main base of the British EIC on the Coromandel Coast.

Mains Insights

The Historiographical Debate on British Conquest

The rise of the EIC as a political power is a classic topic for analytical questions, primarily centered on the debate of ‘accident versus design’.

1. The ‘Accident’ vs. ‘Design’ Dichotomy:

   • Argument for ‘Accident’ (Sub-imperialism): This view emphasizes the chaotic political vacuum left by the decline of the Mughal Empire. The EIC, initially a commercial body, was drawn into local politics to protect its trade interests. The ambition of ‘men on the spot’ like Clive and Wellesley, who often acted against the explicit wishes of their superiors in London, was the primary driver. The formal disavowal of conquest in Pitt’s India Act (1784) is key evidence. This is often termed the ‘peripheral’ explanation.
   • Argument for ‘Design’ (State Policy): This view argues that the British state was a willing and active, if sometimes indirect, participant. The state provided the legal framework (charters), military muscle (Royal Navy and Army), and diplomatic support. The financial entanglement of the British elite and Parliament with the EIC created a powerful structural incentive for imperialism. Acts like the Regulating Act (1773) show a clear intent to manage the acquired territories, turning the EIC into a proxy for the British state. This is the ‘metropolitan’ explanation.
   • A Synthesized View: Most modern historians, like C.A. Bayly, argue for a middle path. They suggest that it was neither a grand master plan nor a complete accident. It was a complex process of ‘improvisation’ where commercial greed, the ambitions of individuals, the political fragmentation of India, and a supportive, opportunistic state structure all interacted to create the British Raj. The state may not have had a blueprint in 1700, but by 1800, it was fully committed to managing and expanding the empire.

2. Cause-and-Effect Relationship: Mughal Decline and EIC’s Rise:

   • The disintegration of the Mughal Empire after Aurangzeb’s death in 1707 was the single most important permissive cause for the EIC’s political ascendancy.
   • Political Vacuum: The rise of successor states (Bengal, Awadh, Hyderabad) and other powers (Marathas, Sikhs, Mysore) created a multi-polar, unstable political system.
   • Opportunity for Intervention: The EIC and the French exploited the constant warfare and succession disputes among these states. Dupleix’s strategy in the Carnatic Wars, of lending military support to one claimant in exchange for commercial and territorial concessions, became the classic model for British expansion. The British simply proved better at this game than the French.

3. The Anglo-French Rivalry as a Catalyst:

   • The Carnatic Wars were a crucial learning ground. They forced the EIC to militarize itself to a degree far beyond what was necessary for purely commercial purposes.
   • The wars demonstrated the superiority of European military tactics and technology, which gave the EIC a decisive military edge over Indian powers.
   • Victory over the French left the British as the only European power capable of projecting significant military force in India, removing a major obstacle to their expansion. Wellesley’s attack on Mysore (Fourth Anglo-Mysore War, 1799) was partly justified by the perceived threat of a Franco-Mysore alliance under Tipu Sultan.