The Second Phase of the Quit India Movement (1942-1945)
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Underground Activities and Popular Support: Following the initial phase of mass demonstrations and the arrest of top leaders, the Quit India Movement (QIM) transitioned into a prolonged phase of underground revolutionary activity.
- Intelligence and Logistics: The movement was sustained by a network of sympathizers within the colonial administration. Government officials often leaked crucial information about impending raids and police actions, allowing activists to evade capture.
- Financial and Material Support: Businessmen and industrialists provided crucial financial backing. A notable example is Sumati Morarji, a prominent industrialist, who reportedly provided a different car each day for the underground leader Achyut Patwardhan to avoid detection. This highlights the broad-based support for the movement, extending beyond the peasantry and students.
- Technical Support: The movement utilized skilled personnel for its operations. Pilots from commercial airlines and trained drivers were instrumental in transporting leaders, bombs, and arms across the country, showcasing a sophisticated logistical network. For instance, Biju Patnaik, who later became the Chief Minister of Odisha, used his piloting skills to ferry leaders.
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Gandhi’s Fast (February-March 1943):
- Context: While imprisoned at the Aga Khan Palace, Mahatma Gandhi was pressured by the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, to condemn the violence that had occurred during the QIM. The British government sought to hold Gandhi and the Congress responsible for the disturbances.
- Gandhi’s Response: Instead of condemning the violence of the people, Gandhi turned the tables on the government, accusing it of “leonine violence.” On February 10, 1943, he commenced a 21-day fast “unto death” as an act of self-purification and to protest against the British government’s repression.
- Impact of the Fast:
- Re-energized the Movement: The fast infused new energy and a sense of moral purpose into the subdued movement, leading to a fresh wave of popular upsurges, hartals, and demonstrations across India.
- Political Pressure on the British: It created a crisis within the Viceroy’s Executive Council. Three Indian members—H.P. Mody, N.R. Sarkar, and M.S. Aney—resigned in protest, refusing to be party to Gandhi’s potential death.
- International Censure: The global media extensively covered the fast, portraying the British administration as intransigent and repressive. This generated significant international pressure, particularly from the United States.
- National Unity: The fast served as a unifying force. Even political groups that had opposed the QIM, such as the Muslim League and the Communist Party of India, demanded Gandhi’s immediate and unconditional release.
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Parallel Governments (Prati Sarkars): In several regions, British authority collapsed entirely, leading to the establishment of independent parallel governments. These were a significant feature of the QIM’s later phase.
- Ballia (Uttar Pradesh): In August 1942, a parallel government was established for a week under the leadership of a local Congressman, Chittu Pandey. They secured the release of all arrested Congress leaders and took over the administration before being brutally suppressed.
- Tamluk, Midnapore (Bengal): A Jatiya Sarkar (National Government) was formed and remained functional from December 1942 to September 1944. It had its own armed wing (Vidyut Vahinis), ran arbitration courts (biplabi adalat), and undertook significant relief work during the 1943 famine.
- Satara (Maharashtra): This was the most successful and longest-lasting parallel government, known as Prati Sarkar. It operated from mid-1943 to 1945 under leaders like Nana Patil, and received guidance from socialist leaders such as Y.B. Chavan and Achyut Patwardhan. It established a comprehensive administrative structure, including people’s courts (nyayadan mandals), village libraries, and actively worked for social reforms like opposing untouchability and enforcing prohibition. It also had its own police and revenue collection systems.
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End of the Movement: The movement effectively concluded with the end of World War II. In June 1945, all senior Congress leaders, including the Congress Working Committee members, were released from prison to participate in negotiations for the transfer of power, beginning with the Shimla Conference. Winston Churchill, facing an election in Britain, was also compelled to seek a political solution for India to bolster his position.
The Bengal Famine of 1943
- Nature and Scale: A catastrophic famine struck Bengal, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 3 to 4 million people. It was not caused by a natural failure of crops but was a man-made disaster.
- Causes:
- Wartime Policies: The British government’s primary focus was on the war effort. Large quantities of food grains from Bengal were diverted to feed the army and to supplement supplies in Europe. This was part of a broader “denial policy” to prevent resources from falling into Japanese hands if they invaded.
- Logistical Failure: The administration demonstrated gross mismanagement in the distribution and transportation of available food supplies. Hoarding and black-marketeering by traders exacerbated the crisis.
- Cessation of Imports: The Japanese occupation of Burma in 1942 cut off the traditional import of rice to Bengal, a critical source of food supply.
- Churchill’s Refusal: As documented in works like Madhusree Mukerjee’s Churchill’s Secret War (2010), Viceroy Linlithgow sent desperate appeals to Prime Minister Winston Churchill to divert food shipments to Bengal. Churchill repeatedly refused, prioritizing European stockpiles and expressing a callous disregard for Indian lives.
- Analysis by Amartya Sen: In his seminal work, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (1981), Nobel laureate Amartya Sen argued that the famine was not due to a food availability decline (FAD) but an “entitlement failure.” The rural poor, particularly landless laborers, lost their ability to command food due to wartime inflation, unemployment, and the breakdown of the rural economy, while food was still available for those who could afford it.
- Impact: The famine created immense distrust and bitterness towards British rule. It starkly revealed the colonial government’s prioritization of British and European interests over Indian lives, leading to widespread international criticism. The parallels drawn between Churchill’s policies and Hitler’s atrocities gained currency, and within Britain itself, support for Indian independence grew, as the moral authority of the Empire was irrevocably damaged.
The Rajagopalachari (Rajaji) Formula, 1944
- Context: By 1944, with an Allied victory in WWII looking certain, the question of post-war power transfer became urgent. C. Rajagopalachari, a pragmatic Congress leader, devised a formula to bridge the gap between the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Muslim League (ML) to ensure a united front for demanding independence and to avoid partition.
- Proposals: The formula, which had the tacit approval of Mahatma Gandhi, proposed:
- The Muslim League would endorse the Congress’s demand for complete independence (Purna Swaraj) and cooperate in forming a provisional interim government at the centre.
- After the war, a commission would demarcate contiguous-majority districts in the North-West and North-East of India where Muslims were in an absolute majority.
- A plebiscite of all inhabitants (not just Muslims) in these demarcated areas would be held to decide on the question of separation.
- In the event of partition, joint agreements would be made for essential common services like defence, commerce, and communications.
- Gandhi-Jinnah Talks and Failure: Gandhi and Jinnah held extensive talks in September 1944 based on this formula. However, the talks failed due to Jinnah’s objections:
- He insisted that the plebiscite should be restricted to Muslims only, as he argued that Hindus and Sikhs in these regions would invariably vote against separation.
- He rejected the idea of a “maimed, mutilated, and moth-eaten” Pakistan, which would result from the exclusion of non-Muslim majority districts of Punjab and Bengal.
- He demanded that the Two-Nation Theory be accepted first, and the creation of a fully independent and sovereign Pakistan should precede the British departure, not be a consequence of it.
Desai-Liaquat Pact, 1945
- Context: In another attempt to break the political deadlock, Bhulabhai Desai, the leader of the Congress Party in the Central Legislative Assembly, and Liaquat Ali Khan, his counterpart from the Muslim League, held private negotiations.
- Proposals: They drafted a proposal for the formation of an interim government at the Centre, suggesting:
- An equal number of persons nominated by the Congress and the League in the Central Executive.
- 20% of seats reserved for other minorities.
- Outcome: The pact was a private initiative and ultimately failed. When it became public, both the Congress and the League officially disowned it. Jinnah claimed Liaquat Ali Khan had no formal authority to negotiate such a pact, and the Congress leadership was also not formally consulted.
Wavell Plan and Shimla Conference, 1945
- Context: After the war in Europe ended, Viceroy Lord Wavell was authorized by the new British government to seek a solution. Following the release of Congress leaders in June 1945, he convened a conference in Shimla.
- The Wavell Plan: The plan proposed a reconstitution of the Viceroy’s Executive Council, which would serve as an interim government.
- All members of the council, except the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief, would be Indians.
- It proposed equal representation for ‘caste Hindus’ and Muslims.
- Shimla Conference (June-July 1945): The plan was discussed by leaders of all major parties.
- Reason for Failure: The conference broke down on the issue of representation. The Muslim League, led by Jinnah, insisted that it was the sole representative of Indian Muslims and therefore had the exclusive right to nominate all Muslim members to the council. The Congress, being a secular organization with a Muslim president at the time (Maulana Abul Kalam Azad), could not accept this claim.
- Significance of Failure: Wavell’s public declaration of the conference’s failure, attributing it to the inability to reach an agreement, was interpreted as granting the Muslim League a de facto veto over any future constitutional progress. This significantly boosted the League’s prestige and its claim to be the sole voice of Muslims, which was validated in the 1945-46 elections.
The Indian National Army (INA) / Azad Hind Fauj
- First Phase (1942): The idea of the INA was conceived by Rash Behari Bose, a veteran revolutionary living in Japan. The first INA was formed in 1942 under Captain Mohan Singh, an officer in the British Indian Army, from among Indian prisoners of war (POWs) captured by the Japanese in Malaya. However, disagreements with the Japanese military leadership over the INA’s autonomy and role led to its collapse and Mohan Singh’s arrest.
- Second Phase under Subhas Chandra Bose (1943-45):
- Leadership: After his dramatic escape from India, Subhas Chandra Bose arrived in Singapore from Germany in July 1943. Rash Behari Bose handed over the leadership of the Indian Independence League and the INA to him.
- Reorganization: Netaji Bose revitalized the INA, expanding its ranks by recruiting not only POWs but also civilian volunteers from the Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia. He raised funds from the community, emphasizing self-reliance.
- Structure: He established different regiments, naming them after national leaders like Gandhi and Nehru. A notable creation was the all-female Rani of Jhansi Regiment, led by Captain Lakshmi Sahgal.
- Provisional Government: On October 21, 1943, Bose proclaimed the establishment of the Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind (Provisional Government of Free India) in Singapore. This government was recognized by the Axis powers.
- Military Campaign: The Japanese handed over the administration of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to the Provisional Government in late 1943, which Bose renamed Shaheed (Martyr) and Swaraj (Self-Rule) Dweep. In 1944, the INA, alongside the Japanese army, launched an offensive into India, planting the tricolor in Moirang, Manipur. However, the Imphal-Kohima campaign ultimately failed due to logistical collapse, the onset of the monsoon, and superior Allied air power.
Post-War Upheavals (1945-1946)
- Change in Britain: In July 1945, the Labour Party, led by Clement Attlee, came to power in Britain. The new government was more inclined towards granting independence to India.
- The INA Trials (Red Fort Trials, 1945-46):
- Event: After the war, the British decided to put the captured INA soldiers on trial for treason. The first and most famous trial was held at the Red Fort in Delhi, featuring three officers: Colonel Prem Kumar Sahgal (a Hindu), Colonel Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon (a Sikh), and Major General Shah Nawaz Khan (a Muslim).
- Nationalist Response: The trials sparked an unprecedented wave of protest across India. The symbolism of a Hindu, a Muslim, and a Sikh being tried together for fighting for India’s freedom galvanized the entire nation, cutting across communal and political divides.
- Impact: The INA agitation saw near-total unity among diverse political groups (Congress, Muslim League, Communists, etc.). The Congress formed a Defence Committee for the accused, including prominent lawyers like Bhulabhai Desai, Tej Bahadur Sapru, and Jawaharlal Nehru. The agitation marked the highest point of Hindu-Muslim unity since the Khilafat Movement and demonstrated the deep nationalist sentiment that had permeated all sections of society, including government officials and the armed forces.
- The Royal Indian Navy (RIN) Mutiny (February 1946):
- Reasons: The mutiny was triggered by poor service conditions, racial discrimination by British officers, and the inspirational impact of the INA trials. The immediate spark was a protest by ratings (sailors) on the signal ship HMIS Talwar in Bombay.
- Actions: The mutiny spread rapidly to 78 ships and 20 shore establishments. The mutineers hoisted the tricolor, along with the flags of the Congress and the Muslim League, on their ships. They took to the streets of Bombay in trucks, carrying portraits of Netaji Bose, and received widespread support from the city’s workers, who went on a sympathy strike.
- End of Mutiny: The mutiny was eventually called off following the intervention of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who advised the ratings to surrender. Both the Congress and the League were wary of such undisciplined and radical action within the armed forces.
- Overall Impact: The series of events—QIM, INA trials, and the RIN mutiny—conclusively demonstrated to the British that they could no longer rely on the loyalty of the Indian armed forces, their ultimate tool of control. It made the transfer of power an urgent necessity.
The Elections of 1945-46
- Results: The elections held in the winter of 1945-46 starkly revealed the political polarization of the country.
- Indian National Congress: Won an overwhelming majority of the general (non-Muslim) seats, securing about 91% of the non-Muslim vote. It formed ministries in eight provinces.
- Muslim League: Captured all 30 Muslim seats in the Central Legislative Assembly and 442 out of 509 Muslim seats in the provincial assemblies. It formed governments in Bengal and Sindh.
- Significance: The results validated the claims of both parties. The Congress demonstrated its command over the non-Muslim electorate, while the League solidified its position as the almost exclusive representative of Muslim sentiment, making its demand for Pakistan seem politically undeniable.
The Cabinet Mission Plan, 1946
- Context: The Labour government under Attlee sent a high-powered mission comprising three cabinet members—Lord Pethick-Lawrence (Secretary of State for India), Sir Stafford Cripps (President of the Board of Trade), and A.V. Alexander (First Lord of the Admiralty)—to negotiate the transfer of power.
- Objectives: To facilitate the creation of a constitution-making body (Constituent Assembly) and to establish an interim government.
- Proposals: The Mission rejected the demand for a sovereign Pakistan and proposed a complex three-tiered federal structure:
- A Union of India: Comprising both British India and the Princely States, with control over only three subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Communications.
- Provincial Grouping: Provinces were to be divided into three sections/groups:
- Section A: Hindu-majority provinces (Madras, Bombay, Central Provinces, United Provinces, Bihar, and Orissa).
- Section B: Muslim-majority provinces in the North-West (Punjab, NWFP, and Sindh).
- Section C: Muslim-majority provinces in the North-East (Bengal and Assam).
- Constituent Assembly (CA): The CA would be formed by members indirectly elected by provincial assemblies. After a preliminary meeting, the members would split into the three sections to frame constitutions for their respective groups and the provinces within them. The full CA would then reassemble to draft the Union constitution.
- Opt-out Clause: A province could opt out of a group after the first general election under the new constitution.
- Debate and Breakdown:
- Conflicting Interpretations: The plan’s major flaw was its ambiguity regarding the grouping clause. The Muslim League interpreted the grouping as compulsory, seeing it as a step towards an eventual, larger Pakistan. The Congress insisted that grouping was optional for provinces from the outset.
- Rejection and Direct Action: The deadlock persisted. Initially, both parties accepted the plan. However, after Nehru’s statement in July 1946 that the Congress was “not bound” by the plan and would enter the CA to frame a constitution as it saw fit, the Muslim League withdrew its acceptance. On August 16, 1946, it launched ‘Direct Action Day’ to achieve Pakistan, which triggered the Great Calcutta Killings and a cycle of communal violence that engulfed much of North India.
Attlee’s Statement, February 1947
- Context: The failure of the Cabinet Mission and the escalating violence forced the British government to take a decisive step.
- Key Announcements: On February 20, 1947, Prime Minister Clement Attlee made a historic statement in the House of Commons:
- Deadline for Withdrawal: The British would quit India by a fixed date, June 30, 1948, regardless of whether Indian parties had agreed on a constitution.
- Transfer of Power: Power would be transferred either to a single government for British India or, if the Constituent Assembly was not fully representative, to the existing provincial governments or in some other way that seemed “most reasonable.”
- Princely States: The British paramountcy over the princely states would lapse and would not be transferred to any successor government.
- New Viceroy: Lord Mountbatten would replace Lord Wavell as the Viceroy to oversee the final transfer of power.
- Impact: The statement was a shock tactic intended to force a compromise. However, by explicitly mentioning the possibility of transferring power to provincial governments, it implicitly accepted the idea of partition and further encouraged separatist tendencies. It led to the collapse of the coalition government in Punjab and an intensification of communal riots.
The Mountbatten Plan / 3rd June Plan, 1947
- Context: Lord Mountbatten arrived in India in March 1947 with a mandate for a swift transfer of power. He quickly concluded that the Cabinet Mission Plan was no longer viable and that partition was the only way to avoid a full-scale civil war.
- “Plan Balkan” / Dickie Bird Plan: An initial plan drafted by Mountbatten’s staff proposed granting independence to individual provinces, with the choice to join a larger union or remain independent. Nehru vehemently rejected this, calling it a recipe for the “balkanization” of India.
- The 3rd June Plan: Mountbatten then formulated a final plan, which was accepted by all major parties. Its key provisions were:
- Principle of Partition: The partition of British India into two dominions, India and Pakistan, was accepted.
- Ascertaining the Will of the People:
- The Legislative Assemblies of Punjab and Bengal would meet in two parts (representing Muslim-majority and non-Muslim-majority districts) to vote on whether to partition their respective provinces. A simple majority in either part in favor of partition would divide the province.
- A referendum would be held in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Sylhet district of Assam to decide their fate.
- The Sindh Legislative Assembly would vote to decide which Dominion to join.
- Boundary Commission: Two boundary commissions, one for Punjab and one for Bengal, would be set up under the chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliffe to demarcate the final borders.
- Princely States: The states were given the choice to accede to either India or Pakistan.
- Date of Transfer: The date for the transfer of power was advanced from June 1948 to August 15, 1947.
- Acceptance and Outcome: The INC, pained but seeing no other alternative to end the horrific violence, accepted the plan. The Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan was fulfilled. In every contested region, the vote went in favor of partition and joining Pakistan. The Indian Independence Act was passed by the British Parliament in July 1947, formalizing the plan.
Prelims Pointers
- Parallel Governments (QIM):
- Ballia (UP): Led by Chittu Pandey.
- Tamluk, Midnapore (Bengal): Known as Jatiya Sarkar.
- Satara (Maharashtra): Known as Prati Sarkar, led by Nana Patil; longest-lasting.
- Gandhi’s Fast (1943): Commenced on February 10, 1943, for 21 days against British government’s “leonine violence”.
- Viceroy’s Executive Council Resignations (1943): H.P. Mody, N.R. Sarkar, and M.S. Aney resigned in protest during Gandhi’s fast.
- Bengal Famine (1943): A man-made famine, not caused by a natural drought. Key factors included wartime diversion of food, cessation of rice imports from Burma, and administrative failure.
- Rajaji Formula (1944): Proposed by C. Rajagopalachari to resolve the Congress-League deadlock. It included a proposal for a plebiscite in Muslim-majority areas on partition.
- Desai-Liaquat Pact (1945): An unofficial pact between Bhulabhai Desai (INC) and Liaquat Ali Khan (ML) to form an interim government with equal representation.
- Wavell Plan (1945): Proposed a new Executive Council with all Indian members except the Viceroy and C-in-C, and equal representation for ‘caste Hindus’ and Muslims.
- Shimla Conference (1945): Convened by Lord Wavell to discuss the Wavell Plan. Failed due to the Muslim League’s insistence on being the sole nominator of Muslim members.
- INA Formation:
- First conceived by Rash Behari Bose.
- First INA formed under Captain Mohan Singh (1942).
- Revived and led by Subhas Chandra Bose (July 1943 onwards).
- INA Regiments: Rani of Jhansi Regiment (all-women), Gandhi Brigade, Nehru Brigade.
- Provisional Government of Free India (Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind): Proclaimed by S.C. Bose in Singapore on October 21, 1943.
- INA Trial (Red Fort Trials): Key accused were Prem Kumar Sahgal, Gurbaksh Singh Dhillon, and Shah Nawaz Khan.
- RIN Mutiny (February 1946): Started on the ship HMIS Talwar in Bombay. Key leaders who helped end the mutiny were Sardar Patel and M.A. Jinnah.
- Cabinet Mission (1946):
- Members: Pethick-Lawrence, Stafford Cripps, A.V. Alexander.
- Rejected the demand for Pakistan.
- Proposed a three-tiered federation with provincial groupings (Sections A, B, C).
- Direct Action Day: Called by the Muslim League on August 16, 1946.
- Attlee’s Statement (February 20, 1947): Set a deadline of June 30, 1948, for British withdrawal from India.
- Mountbatten Plan (June 3, 1947): Also known as the 3rd June Plan. It was the final plan for the partition and independence of India.
- Boundary Commission Chairman: Sir Cyril Radcliffe was appointed to head the commissions for both Punjab and Bengal.
Mains Insights
Historiographical Debates and Analytical Perspectives
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The Quit India Movement: Spontaneous Uprising or Planned Revolution?
- British Viewpoint: The official narrative, presented in Tottenham’s report “Congress Responsibility for the Disturbances,” portrayed the movement as a pre-planned conspiracy by Congress to sabotage the war effort through violence.
- Nationalist Viewpoint: Early historians depicted it as a spontaneous reaction of a leaderless people to the arrest of their beloved leaders.
- Modern Historiography (e.g., Gyanendra Pandey): Contemporary analysis suggests a middle path. While there was a high degree of spontaneity, the groundwork had been laid by years of Congress mobilization. Lower-level leaders and activists, who evaded arrest, provided guidance. Gandhi’s “Do or Die” call was an open-ended instruction that was interpreted differently at the grassroots, leading to diverse and often militant forms of protest. The movement showcased the immense revolutionary potential of the Indian masses.
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The Inevitability of Partition: A Contested Narrative
- Traditional View: Argues that partition was the unavoidable outcome of the Muslim League’s intransigence, Jinnah’s “Two-Nation Theory,” and the British policy of ‘Divide and Rule’. In this view, Congress made every effort to keep India united.
- Revisionist View (e.g., Ayesha Jalal): In her book The Sole Spokesman (1985), Jalal argues that Jinnah used the demand for Pakistan as a bargaining chip to secure maximum political power for Muslims within a united, confederal India. The Congress leadership’s tactical mistakes, particularly their rejection of the Cabinet Mission’s compulsory grouping clause and their insistence on a strong centre, pushed Jinnah into a corner, leaving him with no option but to accept a “mutilated” Pakistan.
- Role of the British: The British role evolved from active ‘Divide and Rule’ to a passive, mediating role in the final stages. Their haste to transfer power (as seen in the advancement of the date by Mountbatten) and their failure to effectively control the communal violence can be seen as a dereliction of duty that made the bloodshed of partition worse. The flawed and hurried demarcation by the Radcliffe Commission also contributed significantly to the chaos.
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The Impact of Post-War Upheavals (INA Trials & RIN Mutiny)
- Cause-Effect Relationship: These events fundamentally altered the political equation. The widespread support for the INA and the RIN mutiny demonstrated that nationalist sentiment had permeated the very pillars of the Raj: the bureaucracy and the armed forces.
- British Realization: Clement Attlee himself later admitted that the RIN mutiny was a crucial factor in the British decision to leave. They realized that they could no longer hold India by force, as the instruments of that force were no longer reliable.
- Shift in Congress-League Stance: While these events showcased popular unity, the established leadership of both the Congress and the League was uncomfortable with the radical, undisciplined nature of the mutiny. Their role in pacifying the mutineers shows a preference for a negotiated, orderly transfer of power over a violent mass revolution.
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Why did Congress Accept Partition?
- To End Violence: The primary reason was the extreme communal violence following ‘Direct Action Day’. Leaders like Nehru and Patel concluded that partition was a tragic necessity to stop the “continual bonfire” and bring peace.
- To Secure a Strong Centre: The alternative, as proposed by the Cabinet Mission Plan, was a weak central government with limited powers. Congress leaders believed that a strong, unitary state was essential for India’s future development, security, and for tackling socio-economic problems. They chose a smaller India with a strong centre over a larger India with a weak one.
- The Lure of Immediate Power: Years of struggle had taken their toll, and the leaders were weary. The prospect of immediate transfer of power was attractive, as opposed to a protracted civil war or continued negotiations.
- British Pressure: Mountbatten effectively convinced the Congress leadership that partition was the only workable solution and that any further delay would lead to complete anarchy and balkanization.