GS Notes

17. Polity Notes 22

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Elaborate Notes

Types of Majority

The Indian Constitution and the Rules of Procedure of the Houses of Parliament prescribe different kinds of majorities for the passage of various bills, motions, and resolutions. These are crucial for the functioning of the legislature and for maintaining the delicate balance of power.

  • Simple Majority:

    • Definition: This refers to a majority of more than 50% of the members present and voting in the House.
    • Context: This is the most common type of majority required in parliamentary business. The expression “present and voting” signifies that members who are absent or abstain from voting are not counted in the total.
    • Application: It is used for passing Ordinary Bills (Article 107), Money Bills (Article 110), and Financial Bills. It is also required for passing motions like the No-Confidence Motion (under Rule 198 of the Lok Sabha Rules), Confidence Motion, Adjournment Motion, and Censure Motion. The removal of the Vice President in the Lok Sabha (after the Rajya Sabha passes a resolution with an effective majority) also requires a simple majority.

  • Absolute Majority:

    • Definition: This refers to a majority of more than 50% of the total membership of the House. The total membership is the total number of seats in the House, irrespective of vacancies or absentees.
    • Context: For the Lok Sabha, with a total strength of 543, an absolute majority would be 272. This type of majority is not used independently but serves as a crucial component of a ‘Special Majority’ under Article 368.
    • Application: It is primarily used during the formation of a government at the Centre and states, where a party or coalition must prove it has the support of an absolute majority of members. It is also one of the conditions for passing a Constitutional Amendment Bill under Article 368.

  • Effective Majority:

    • Definition: This refers to a majority of more than 50% of the effective strength of the House. The effective strength is calculated as the total membership of the House minus the number of vacancies (due to death, resignation, or disqualification).
    • Context: This majority is slightly more stringent than a simple majority but less so than an absolute majority in a full house. It ensures that significant resolutions are passed by a majority of the members who are currently entitled to sit and vote.
    • Application: As per Article 67(b), the removal of the Vice-President of India requires a resolution passed by an effective majority in the Rajya Sabha. Similarly, the removal of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha (Article 94) and the corresponding posts in State Legislative Assemblies requires an effective majority.

  • Special Majority:

    • Definition: The term ‘special majority’ is not a single type but a category that includes any majority other than a simple, absolute, or effective majority. The Constitution specifies different kinds of special majorities for different purposes. The most common type is:
      • Type 1 (Article 368): A majority of the total membership of the house (absolute majority) AND a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that house present and voting.
    • Context: This stringent requirement is reserved for actions that have significant and often permanent consequences, such as amending the Constitution or removing high constitutional functionaries. This ensures that such changes are made with broad consensus.
    • Application:
      • Amending the Constitution (Article 368): This type of majority is required in both Houses to pass a Constitutional Amendment Bill.
      • Removal of Judges: Removal of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts.
      • Removal of CEC/CAG: Removal of the Chief Election Commissioner and the Comptroller and Auditor General of India.
      • National Emergency: Approval of a national emergency proclamation (Article 352) requires this majority in both houses.

Passing of the Bills

The legislative process is the cornerstone of a parliamentary democracy. It is governed by constitutional provisions (Articles 107-111 for ordinary bills) and the rules of procedure of each House.

  • Delegated Legislation:

    • Concept: While the legislature’s primary function is law-making, the complexity of modern governance necessitates that it delegates the power to make detailed rules and regulations to the executive. The legislature passes a ‘parent act’ or ‘enabling act’ that outlines the broad policy framework, and the executive frames the specific rules to implement it.
    • Historical Context: The practice gained prominence in the 20th century. The Donoughmore Committee Report (UK, 1932) on Ministers’ Powers was a seminal work that examined the necessity and dangers of this practice. In India, the Supreme Court in In Re Delhi Laws Act, 1951 case, upheld the constitutionality of delegated legislation but laid down the principle that the legislature cannot delegate its essential legislative functions.
    • Oversight: Parliament exercises control over delegated legislation through the Committee on Subordinate Legislation, which scrutinizes whether the rules framed by the executive are within the powers conferred by the parent act.

  • Types of Bills:

    • Public Bill (Government Bill): Introduced by a minister. It reflects the policy of the ruling party. It has a higher chance of passage due to the government’s majority. Its rejection can be seen as a loss of confidence in the government.
    • Private Member’s Bill: Introduced by any Member of Parliament (MP) who is not a minister. It reflects the stance of an individual MP or the opposition on a public matter. Such bills have a very low success rate. The last private member’s bill to be enacted was The Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Bill, 1968, which became an Act in 1970.

Procedure for Ordinary Bills (Article 107)

  • First Reading:

    • The member seeking to introduce the bill asks for the leave of the House. The bill’s title and objectives are read out. No debate occurs at this stage. If leave is granted, the bill is introduced and published in the Gazette of India. This stage is largely a formality.

  • Second Reading: This is the most substantive stage, involving detailed scrutiny.

    • Stage of General Discussion: The principles of the bill and its provisions are discussed broadly. The House can take one of four actions:
      1. Take the bill into consideration immediately.
      2. Refer it to a Select Committee of the House.
      3. Refer it to a Joint Committee of both Houses.
      4. Circulate the bill for the purpose of eliciting public opinion.
    • Committee Stage: The committee (Select or Joint) examines the bill clause-by-clause, invites expert opinions, and can suggest amendments. The establishment of Departmentally Related Standing Committees (DRSCs) in 1993 was a major step to institutionalize this scrutiny process. The committee then submits a report to the House.
    • Consideration Stage: The House considers the bill as reported by the committee. Each clause is discussed and voted upon separately. Members can move amendments, and if accepted, they become part of the bill.

  • Third Reading:

    • The debate is confined to arguments for or against the bill as a whole. No amendments can be moved at this stage. The motion put to the house is “that the Bill be passed.” If passed by a simple majority, the bill is authenticated by the presiding officer and transmitted to the other House.

  • Bill in the Second House:

    • The second House has four alternatives:
      1. Pass the bill in its original form.
      2. Pass the bill with amendments and return it to the first House.
      3. Reject the bill altogether.
      4. Take no action, effectively keeping the bill pending.
    • A deadlock is deemed to have occurred if the second House rejects the bill, proposes amendments not agreeable to the first House, or does not pass the bill within six months from the date of its receipt.

  • Joint Sitting (Article 108):

    • To resolve a deadlock, the President can summon a joint sitting of both Houses.
    • The sitting is presided over by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
    • Decisions are taken by a simple majority of the total members of both Houses present and voting. Due to its larger size, the Lok Sabha usually has an advantage in a joint sitting.
    • Historical Examples: Joint sittings have been held only three times: Dowry Prohibition Act (1961), Banking Service Commission (Repeal) Bill (1978), and Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA, 2002).
    • Note: There is no provision for a joint sitting for a Money Bill or a Constitutional Amendment Bill.

Analytical Aspects: The Decline of Parliament

  • Reduced Debate and Scrutiny:

    • Recent parliamentary sessions have seen bills being passed with minimal debate. The 2021 Monsoon session is a case in point, where bills were reportedly passed in minutes. This undermines the deliberative function of Parliament.
    • The referral of bills to parliamentary committees has declined sharply. According to data from PRS Legislative Research, while 71% of bills were referred to committees in the 15th Lok Sabha (2009-14), this figure fell to 27% in the 16th Lok Sabha (2014-19) and has been even lower since. This bypasses a crucial stage of detailed, non-partisan scrutiny.

  • The Whip and the Anti-Defection Law:

    • Whip: A whip is an official of a political party who acts as the party’s ‘enforcer’ inside the legislative assembly or parliament. They are responsible for ensuring party discipline. A three-line whip is the strictest instruction to attend and vote as per the party line.
    • Anti-Defection Law (ADL):
      • Introduction: Inserted into the Constitution as the Tenth Schedule by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985, to curb the “evil of political defections.”
      • Provisions: A member can be disqualified for: (a) voluntarily giving up membership of their political party, or (b) voting or abstaining from voting in the House contrary to any direction (whip) issued by their political party.
      • Exceptions: The law initially allowed a ‘split’ if one-third of a party’s legislators broke away. The 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003, removed this provision, finding it was misused to engineer mass defections. It now only protects a ‘merger’, where at least two-thirds of a party’s legislators merge with another party.
      • Role of Speaker: The presiding officer (Speaker/Chairman) has the final authority to decide on disqualification. This power has been controversial. The Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) upheld the Speaker’s power but made it subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fides, perversity, etc.
      • Misuse:
        • No Time Limit: The law does not specify a time frame for the Speaker to decide on a disqualification plea. This has led to Speakers delaying decisions to benefit the ruling party. The Supreme Court in Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur Legislative Assembly (2020) ruled that disqualification petitions should be decided by Speakers within a period of three months.
        • Stifling Dissent: The whip, backed by the penalty of disqualification under ADL, forces MPs to toe the party line, even if it goes against their own judgment or the interests of their constituency. This has effectively converted MPs from representatives of the people to mere delegates of their party high command, reducing the scope for individual contribution and informed debate.
        • Executive Dominance: The combination of a brute majority, the whip, and the ADL ensures that the government can pass any legislation it wants, transforming the legislature from a body that holds the executive accountable into a rubber stamp for executive decisions.

Suggested Solutions and Reforms

  • Strengthening Legislative Procedure:

    • Amend Article 107 to make mandatory referral of all bills to parliamentary committees for scrutiny, similar to the practice in mature democracies like the UK.
    • Ensure a minimum number of days are allocated for debate on every bill.

  • Reforming the Anti-Defection Law:

    • Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms (1990) recommended that disqualification should be limited to cases where a member voluntarily gives up party membership or votes/abstains on a confidence motion, no-confidence motion, or a money bill. For other bills, MPs should be free to vote their conscience.
    • Removing Speaker’s Adjudicatory Role:
      1. The power to decide disqualification cases could be vested in the President/Governor, who would act on the binding advice of the Election Commission.
      2. The Supreme Court suggested in the Manipur case (2020) that Parliament should consider setting up an independent, permanent tribunal headed by a retired judge to decide defection cases swiftly and impartially.
    • Automatic Vacancy: A simpler reform could be that any member who resigns from their party or defects must also resign their seat. They would be free to contest the subsequent by-election. This would subject their decision to the immediate approval of the electorate.

  • Promoting Participatory Democracy:

    • MPs should be encouraged to consult their constituents on important bills, transforming representative democracy into a more participatory model where citizens’ views directly influence legislation.

Financial Business of the House

The Parliament’s control over the nation’s finances is a cornerstone of its power, encapsulated in the principle of “no taxation without representation.” The budget process is the primary instrument for this control.

  • Budget (Annual Financial Statement - Article 112):
    • The budget is a statement of the estimated receipts and expenditure of the Government of India for a financial year (April 1 to March 31).
    • It is prepared by the Budget Division of the Department of Economic Affairs in the Ministry of Finance.
    • Key Changes: Since 2017, the Railway Budget has been merged with the General Budget, and the date of presentation was advanced to February 1st. This was done to ensure the entire budget process is completed before the commencement of the new financial year, thus obviating the need for a ‘Vote on Account’.

Steps in Budget Enactment

  1. Presentation of Budget: The Finance Minister presents the budget in the Lok Sabha with a speech. It is then laid in the Rajya Sabha. No discussion takes place on this day.
  2. General Discussion: This takes place in both Houses for a few days. The House discusses the budget as a whole or any question of principle involved. No motions are moved or voted upon.
  3. Scrutiny by Departmental Committees: After the general discussion, the Houses are adjourned for a period (about 3-4 weeks). During this gap, the 24 Departmentally Related Standing Committees (DRSCs) scrutinize the Demands for Grants of various ministries and prepare reports. These reports are advisory in nature.
  4. Voting on Demands for Grants:
    • This stage is exclusive to the Lok Sabha. The demands are presented ministry-wise.
    • During this stage, members can move Cut Motions to express disapproval.
      • Policy Cut Motion: States that “the amount of the demand be reduced to Re 1.” It represents disapproval of the policy underlying the demand.
      • Economy Cut Motion: States that “the amount of the demand be reduced by a specified amount.” It represents that the proposed expenditure is extravagant.
      • Token Cut Motion: States that “the amount of the demand be reduced by Rs 100.” It is moved to ventilate a specific grievance.
    • Guillotine: On the last day allocated for the discussion of demands, the Speaker puts all the remaining demands to vote, whether they have been discussed or not. This is known as the guillotine.
  5. Passing of Appropriation Bill (Article 114):
    • This bill gives the government the legal authority to withdraw money from the Consolidated Fund of India to meet the expenditure voted by the Lok Sabha and the expenditure charged on the fund.
    • Charged Expenditure: This is non-votable by Parliament, though it can be discussed. It includes salaries and allowances of the President, Speaker, Supreme Court judges, CAG, etc., ensuring their independence from parliamentary pressures.
  6. Passing of Finance Bill:
    • This bill contains the government’s taxation proposals for the upcoming financial year. It must be passed within 75 days of its introduction. With its passage, the budgetary process is complete.

Problems in the Budgetary Process

  • Prevalence of Guillotine: A significant portion of the budget is often passed without discussion due to the guillotine, undermining detailed parliamentary scrutiny of government spending.
  • Weakness of Committee Scrutiny: The recommendations of DRSCs are not binding on the government and are often ignored.
  • Lack of Expertise: MPs often lack the technical expertise required for a thorough analysis of complex budgetary proposals.
  • Lack of Performance Linkage: The budget is traditionally a “line-item budget,” focusing on allocations (inputs) rather than performance (outputs and outcomes). There is a slow shift towards outcome-based budgeting, but its implementation remains weak.

Prelims Pointers

  • Simple Majority: Majority of members present and voting. Used for Ordinary Bills, No-confidence motions.
  • Absolute Majority: Majority of the total membership of the House.
  • Effective Majority: Majority of the effective strength of the House (Total strength - Vacancies). Used for the removal of the Vice-President in RS (Article 67).
  • Special Majority (Article 368): Majority of total membership + 2/3rd of members present and voting. Used for Constitutional Amendment Bills.
  • Delegated Legislation: Legislature delegates rule-making power to the executive. Controlled by the Committee on Subordinate Legislation.
  • Last Private Member’s Bill passed: 1970.
  • A deadlock between Houses is considered if a bill is pending in the second house for more than 6 months.
  • Joint Sitting (Article 108): Summoned by the President, presided over by the Speaker of Lok Sabha. Decision by simple majority. Not applicable to Money Bills and Constitutional Amendment Bills.
  • Anti-Defection Law: Added by the 52nd Amendment Act, 1985, as the Tenth Schedule.
  • The 91st Amendment Act, 2003, replaced the ‘split’ provision (1/3rd) with the ‘merger’ provision (2/3rd).
  • The deciding authority under the Anti-Defection Law is the Presiding Officer of the House.
  • Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992): Speaker’s decision under the Tenth Schedule is subject to judicial review.
  • Budget: Referred to as the ‘Annual Financial Statement’ under Article 112.
  • The budget is presented on February 1st.
  • Cut Motions are moved only in the Lok Sabha.
    • Policy Cut: Reduce demand to Re 1.
    • Economy Cut: Reduce by a specific amount.
    • Token Cut: Reduce by Rs 100.
  • Appropriation Bill (Article 114): Authorizes withdrawal of funds from the Consolidated Fund of India.
  • Charged Expenditure: Non-votable by Parliament (e.g., salary of SC judges).
  • Guillotine: Putting all outstanding demands for grants to vote without discussion on the last day.

Mains Insights

  • Decline in the Role of Parliamentarians:

    • Cause-Effect: The dominance of the executive, coupled with the rigid party discipline enforced by the Anti-Defection Law, has diminished the role of an individual MP from a lawmaker and a check on the executive to a mere follower of the party line. This has adversely impacted the quality of legislation, as bills are passed without adequate debate and scrutiny, leading to potential implementation challenges and constitutional issues.
    • Historiographical Viewpoint: The ‘Westminster model’ adopted by India assumes a balance where Parliament holds the executive accountable. However, scholars like Pratap Bhanu Mehta argue that in India, the fusion of executive and legislature, combined with a ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system, has created an ‘executive-legislature’ rather than a separation, leading to executive dominance.

  • Anti-Defection Law: A Necessary Evil or a Democratic Stifler?

    • Dichotomy: The law was enacted to ensure stability by preventing horse-trading. However, it has been criticized for stifling dissent and intra-party democracy. It fails to distinguish between principled dissent and opportunistic defection.
    • Speaker’s Partisan Role: The Speaker’s role as the adjudicating authority under the Tenth Schedule is a classic case of conflict of interest, as they remain a member of a political party. This has led to accusations of partisan decision-making, undermining the law’s credibility.
    • Reforms Debate: The debate on reforms revolves around either amending the law to limit its application (as suggested by the Dinesh Goswami Committee) or changing the adjudicating authority (as suggested by the Supreme Court) to ensure impartiality and timely disposal of cases.

  • Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Budget: A Procedural Formality?

    • Effectiveness vs. Expediency: The annual budget process is often a race against time. The frequent use of the ‘guillotine’ means that a large portion of public expenditure is approved without any parliamentary debate, raising questions about financial accountability.
    • Role of Committees: While DRSCs were created to enable detailed scrutiny, their recommendations are only advisory and often disregarded by the government. This reduces a potentially powerful oversight mechanism to a mere formality.
    • Shift to Outcome-Based Budgeting: The traditional ‘line-item’ budgeting focuses on financial allocation rather than results. A shift towards outcome-based budgeting is crucial to link public spending with measurable performance indicators, thereby enabling Parliament to assess not just the quantum of spending but its effectiveness in achieving policy goals.

  • From Representative to Participatory Democracy:

    • The current model limits citizen participation to voting every five years. The suggestion that MPs should consult their constituents on bills before voting in Parliament is a move towards a more deliberative and participatory democracy. This can bridge the gap between citizens and lawmakers and enhance the legitimacy of laws. However, this poses logistical challenges and requires institutional mechanisms for effective public consultation.

Previous Year Questions

Prelims

  1. With reference to the Parliament of India, which of the following Parliamentary Committees scrutinizes and reports to the House whether the powers to make regulations, rules, sub-rules, by-laws, etc. conferred by the Constitution or delegated by the Parliament are being properly exercised by the Executive? (UPSC CSE 2018) (a) Committee on Government Assurances (b) Committee on Subordinate Legislation (c) Rules Committee (d) Business Advisory Committee

    Answer: (b) Committee on Subordinate Legislation

    • Explanation: This committee is specifically tasked with overseeing delegated legislation to ensure the executive does not overstep the powers granted by the parent Act passed by Parliament.

  2. Which one of the following is not a feature of a Money Bill in India? (UPSC CSE 2023 - Modified for relevance) (a) It can be introduced only in the Lok Sabha. (b) The Rajya Sabha must return the Bill within 14 days. (c) The President can summon a joint sitting to resolve a deadlock. (d) The decision of the Speaker on whether a bill is a Money Bill is final.

    Answer: (c) The President can summon a joint sitting to resolve a deadlock.

    • Explanation: There is no provision for a joint sitting for a Money Bill under Article 108. The Rajya Sabha has limited powers and the Lok Sabha can override its suggestions.

  3. Consider the following statements: (UPSC CSE 2020)

    1. The Constitution of India defines its ‘basic structure’ in terms of federalism, secularism, fundamental rights and democracy.
    2. The Constitution of India provides for ‘judicial review’ to safeguard the citizens’ liberties and to preserve the ideals on which the Constitution is based.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2

    Answer: (b) 2 only

    • Explanation: The concept of ‘basic structure’ is a judicial innovation from the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973); it is not defined in the Constitution. However, the power of judicial review is implicit in various articles (like 13, 32, 226) and has been explicitly affirmed by the judiciary. The question relates to parliamentary power and its limits.

  4. In India, which of the following review the independent regulators in sectors like telecommunications, insurance, electricity, etc.? (UPSC CSE 2019)

    1. Ad Hoc Committees set up by the Parliament
    2. Parliamentary Department Related Standing Committees
    3. Finance Commission
    4. Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission
    5. NITI Aayog

    Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1 and 2 (b) 1, 3 and 4 (c) 3, 4 and 5 (d) 2 and 5

    Answer: (a) 1 and 2

    • Explanation: The primary oversight of regulators is done by the Parliament, either through specific Ad Hoc committees or through the relevant Departmentally Related Standing Committees (DRSCs).

  5. Regarding the Anti-Defection Law in India, consider the following statements:

    1. The law specifies that the presiding officer must decide on a defection case within six months.
    2. A merger of a political party is protected from disqualification only if at least two-thirds of its legislators agree to the merger.
    3. The original Act of 1985 allowed for disqualification to be evaded in case of a ‘split’ involving one-third of a party’s legislators.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 and 3 only (c) 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3

    Answer: (b) 2 and 3 only

    • Explanation: The law does not specify a time limit for the presiding officer, which is a major point of criticism. The Supreme Court has suggested a three-month period. Statements 2 and 3 accurately describe the provisions of the 91st Amendment and the original 52nd Amendment, respectively.

Mains

  1. “The role of individual MPs (Members of Parliament) has diminished over the years and as a result healthy constructive debates on policy issues are not usually witnessed.” How far can this be attributed to the anti-defection law, which was legislated but with a different intention? (UPSC CSE 2020, 15 marks)

  2. To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India? (UPSC CSE 2021, 15 marks)

  3. The jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) regarding lodging an FIR and conducting a probe within a particular state is being questioned by various States. However, the power of the States to withhold consent to the CBI is not absolute. Explain with special reference to the federal character of India. (UPSC CSE 2021, 15 marks) (Note: While not directly on parliamentary procedure, this question touches upon the executive’s powers and federal dynamics, which are often debated in Parliament.)

  4. ‘The Parliament of India has become a talking shop rather than an effective instrument of scrutiny.’ Critically examine the statement. (UPSC CSE - Mock Question Pattern)

  5. The budget-making process in India often prioritizes expediency over thorough scrutiny, as evidenced by the frequent use of the ‘guillotine’. Discuss the weaknesses in the parliamentary scrutiny of the budget and suggest measures to strengthen financial accountability. (UPSC CSE - Mock Question Pattern)

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