17. Polity Notes 34

Elaborate Notes

PROCLAMATION OF PRESIDENT’S RULE

President’s Rule, constitutionally termed ‘Proclamation concerning Failure of Constitutional Machinery in States’, is provided for under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution. This provision was heavily debated in the Constituent Assembly, with Dr. B.R. Ambedkar expressing the hope that it would remain a “dead letter,” to be used only in the rarest of rare cases. However, its frequent application has made it one of the most controversial articles of the Constitution.

• Grounds for Imposition: Article 356 empowers the President to issue a proclamation if he is satisfied, on receipt of a report from the Governor of the State or otherwise, that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Another ground is provided under Article 365, which states that if a state fails to comply with or to give effect to any direction from the Centre, it shall be lawful for the President to hold that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried on.
• Parliamentary Approval and Duration:
  • A proclamation imposing President’s Rule must be approved by both Houses of Parliament within two months from the date of its issue.
  • The approval requires only a simple majority in each House, i.e., a majority of the members of that House present and voting. There is no provision for a joint sitting to resolve a deadlock.
  • If approved, it continues for six months. It can be extended for a maximum period of three years with parliamentary approval, every six months.
  • However, the 44th Amendment Act of 1978 introduced constraints on extending President’s Rule beyond one year. An extension requires that (a) a Proclamation of National Emergency is in operation in the whole of India or any part of the state, and (b) the Election Commission certifies that holding general elections to the state assembly is difficult.
• Revocation: A proclamation of President’s Rule may be revoked by the President at any time by a subsequent proclamation. Such a proclamation does not require parliamentary approval.
• Consequences of President’s Rule:
  • The President can take up all the functions of the state government and powers vested in the Governor or any other executive authority in the state. The Governor, on behalf of the President, carries on the state administration with the help of the chief secretary or advisors appointed by the President. Thus, the Governor becomes the real executive during this period.
  • The President can declare that the powers of the state legislature are to be exercised by or under the authority of the Parliament. Parliament can then delegate the power to make laws for the state to the President or any other authority specified by him.
  • Laws made by the Parliament or the President during this period continue to be operative even after the President’s Rule. However, they are not automatically repealed. They remain in force until repealed or altered by the state legislature. As noted, they become inoperational six months after the revocation unless re-enacted or repealed by the state legislature.
  • The President can also suspend the constitutional provisions relating to any body or authority in the state.
• Historical Context and Judicial Scrutiny:
  • The first instance of President’s Rule was in Punjab in 1951, imposed on the grounds of political instability in the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU).
  • The landmark Supreme Court judgment in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) laid down crucial guidelines to prevent the misuse of Article 356. The court held that the President’s satisfaction is subject to judicial review, the proclamation must be based on relevant material, and the State Assembly should not be dissolved before parliamentary approval. This judgment significantly curtailed the arbitrary imposition of President’s Rule.

FINANCIAL EMERGENCY

Article 360 of the Constitution empowers the President to proclaim a Financial Emergency. This provision was inspired by the National Recovery Act of 1933 of the United States.

• Grounds and Proclamation: The President can proclaim a Financial Emergency if they are satisfied that a situation has arisen whereby the financial stability or credit of India or any part of its territory is threatened.
• Parliamentary Approval and Duration:
  • A proclamation declaring a financial emergency must be approved by both the Houses of Parliament within two months from the date of its issue, requiring a simple majority.
  • Once approved by both Houses, the Financial Emergency continues indefinitely until it is revoked. This means there is no maximum period prescribed for its operation and repeated parliamentary approval is not required for its continuation.
• Revocation: A proclamation of Financial Emergency may be revoked by the President at any time. This revocation does not require parliamentary approval.
• Judicial Review: The 38th Amendment Act of 1975 had made the satisfaction of the President in declaring a Financial Emergency final and conclusive. However, this provision was deleted by the 44th Amendment Act of 1978, implying that the proclamation is subject to judicial review.
• Impact of Financial Emergency:
  • Centre’s Control over States: The executive authority of the Centre extends to giving directions to any state to observe such canons of financial propriety as may be specified in the directions. These directions can include a provision requiring the reduction of salaries and allowances of all or any class of persons serving in the state, and the reservation of all money bills and other financial bills for the consideration of the President after they are passed by the state legislature.
  • Impact on Union Employees and Judiciary: The President may issue directions for the reduction of salaries and allowances of all or any class of persons serving the Union, and the judges of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. This is a significant provision as it affects the emoluments of the higher judiciary, which are otherwise protected.
• Historical Context: To date, a Financial Emergency has never been proclaimed in India. The country faced a severe balance of payments crisis in 1991, leading to major economic reforms, but a formal emergency was not declared. Similarly, during the economic slowdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, there were discussions, but the government did not resort to this provision.

STATE LEGISLATURE

Articles 168 to 212 in Part VI of the Constitution deal with the organization, composition, duration, officers, procedures, privileges, powers, and so on of the state legislature.

• Bicameralism: Most states in India have a unicameral legislature (only a Legislative Assembly). As of now, six states have a bicameral system (a Legislative Assembly and a Legislative Council): Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Telangana. The Parliament approved the creation of a Legislative Council for Tamil Nadu through the Tamil Nadu Legislative Council Act, 2010, but the subsequent state government has not implemented it.
• State Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha):
  • Its members are directly elected by the people on the basis of universal adult franchise.
  • Its maximum strength is fixed at 500 and minimum strength at 60. However, there are exceptions for smaller states like Sikkim (32), Goa (40), and Mizoram (40).
  • Union Territories of Delhi, Puducherry, and Jammu & Kashmir have their own Legislative Assemblies.
• State Legislative Council (Vidhan Parishad):
  • Creation and Abolition (Article 169): The Parliament can abolish a legislative council where it exists or create it where it does not exist. This process is initiated by the State Legislative Assembly, which must pass a resolution to that effect by a special majority (a majority of the total membership of the assembly and a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting).
  • Following this resolution, the Parliament must pass an Act to this effect, but this requires only a simple majority. This Act is not deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 368. If there is a disagreement between the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on this bill, there is no provision for a joint sitting. The will of the Lok Sabha prevails.
  • The resolution passed by the state assembly is not binding on the Parliament. Parliament can choose to act on it or not.
  • Composition: The maximum strength of the council is fixed at one-third of the total strength of the assembly and the minimum strength is fixed at 40. The actual strength is fixed by Parliament.
  • Members are partly elected and partly nominated:
    • 1/3 are elected by the members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs).
    • 1/3 are elected by members of local bodies like municipalities, district boards, etc.
    • 1/12 are elected by graduates of three years’ standing and residing in the state.
    • 1/12 are elected by teachers of three years’ standing in educational institutions not lower than secondary schools.
    • 1/6 are nominated by the governor from amongst persons having special knowledge or practical experience in literature, science, art, co-operative movement, and social service. This composite method aims to bring diverse expertise into the legislative process.
• Relative Powers of Assembly and Council: The constitutional position of the council is much weaker than the assembly.
  • Ordinary Bills: An ordinary bill can originate in either House. In case of a deadlock, the will of the Assembly prevails. The Council can only delay a bill for a maximum period of four months (three months in the first instance and one month in the second).
  • Money Bills: Money bills can be introduced only in the Assembly. The Council cannot reject or amend a money bill; it can only make recommendations and must return the bill to the Assembly within 14 days. The Assembly can either accept or reject these recommendations. The Speaker of the Assembly has the final power to decide whether a bill is a Money Bill or not.
  • Budget: The Council can only discuss the budget but cannot vote on the demands for grants, which is an exclusive privilege of the Assembly.
  • Control over Executive: The Council of Ministers, headed by the Chief Minister, is collectively responsible only to the Legislative Assembly. The Council can discuss and criticize government policies, but it cannot remove the ministry by passing a no-confidence motion.
  • Existence: The very existence of the Legislative Council depends on the will of the Legislative Assembly.

LOCAL SELF GOVERNMENT & 73rd CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT

The 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, marked a watershed moment in the journey of democratic decentralization in India. It gave constitutional status to Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs).

• Significance of Rural Development:
  • Historical and Demographic Context: At independence, India was predominantly rural. As per the 2011 Census, 68.8% of the population resided in rural areas. Agriculture remains the primary source of livelihood for a significant portion (around 55%) of the workforce. Therefore, national development is intrinsically linked to rural development.
  • Political Dimension: The amendment aimed to transform representative democracy into a more participatory one. While India has about 800 MPs and around 4,120 MLAs, the 73rd Amendment created over 3 million elected representatives at the local level, fostering democracy at the grassroots. It provided for reservation for women (at least one-third), Scheduled Castes (SCs), and Scheduled Tribes (STs) in proportion to their population, promoting political empowerment of marginalized sections.
  • Administrative Dimension: It was recognized that top-down policy implementation often fails. Empowering local bodies was seen as crucial for the effective delivery of services and implementation of government schemes, as local representatives have a better understanding of local needs and challenges.
  • Economic Dimension: Rural development is key to both the supply side (food security, agricultural productivity) and demand side (rural incomes driving overall economic demand) of the national economy.
• Evolution of Panchayati Raj:
  • Community Development Programme (1952) & National Extension Service (1953): These were the first major rural development initiatives post-independence. They failed primarily due to a lack of popular participation and excessive bureaucracy.
  • Balwant Rai Mehta Committee (1957): Appointed to examine the working of the above programs, it recommended the establishment of a scheme of ‘democratic decentralisation’, which ultimately came to be known as Panchayati Raj. Its key recommendation was a three-tier PRI system: Gram Panchayat at the village level, Panchayat Samiti at the block level, and Zila Parishad at the district level. Rajasthan was the first state to establish Panchayati Raj, in Nagaur district on October 2, 1959. Andhra Pradesh followed soon after.
  • Ashok Mehta Committee (1978): Appointed by the Janata Party government, it recommended a two-tier system: Zila Parishad at the district level and Mandal Panchayat for a group of villages. It emphasized the need for political parties to participate in Panchayat elections.
  • G.V.K. Rao Committee (1985): Appointed by the Planning Commission, it found that PRIs had been reduced to ‘grass without roots’ and recommended strengthening the Zila Parishad to make it the principal body for managing development programs.
  • L.M. Singhvi Committee (1986): Appointed by the Rajiv Gandhi government, it was the first to strongly recommend that PRIs be accorded constitutional status. It also emphasized the role of Gram Sabhas.
  • Thungon Committee (1988): Also recommended constitutional recognition for PRIs.
  • Legislative Efforts: The 64th Constitutional Amendment Bill (1989) was introduced by the Rajiv Gandhi government but was defeated in the Rajya Sabha. Finally, the P.V. Narasimha Rao government successfully introduced and passed the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts in 1992, which came into force in 1993.
• Challenges in the Functioning of Gram Sabha:
  • The Gram Sabha, consisting of all registered voters in a panchayat area, is envisioned as the soul of the Panchayati Raj system and an embodiment of direct democracy, akin to the vision of ‘Gram Swaraj’ articulated by Mahatma Gandhi. However, its functioning is beset with problems.
  • Size: The ideal of a small, manageable village assembly making decisions by consensus is difficult to achieve in reality. In many states, Gram Panchayats cover large populations, sometimes exceeding 25,000, making a meaningful meeting of the entire Gram Sabha practically impossible. The suggested solution is to institutionalize Ward Sabhas for smaller, more manageable units.
  • Participation of Women: Despite one-third reservation in panchayat bodies, the participation of women in Gram Sabha meetings remains low due to patriarchal social structures, household responsibilities, and cultural restrictions. The concept of separate ‘Mahila Sabhas’ has been proposed to ensure their voices are heard and incorporated.
  • Irregular Meetings and Dominance of Panchayat: The Act mandates regular meetings, but they are often not held. When they are, quorum is frequently an issue. Consequently, the elected Gram Panchayat often takes decisions unilaterally, subverting the Gram Sabha’s role as the primary decision-making body. The ideal relationship is that of an assembly (Gram Sabha) and an executive (Gram Panchayat), but this is rarely realized.
  • Migration: Large-scale rural-to-urban migration means a significant number of registered voters are not physically present in the village to attend meetings. Leveraging technology like video conferencing could be a potential solution to ensure their participation.

Prelims Pointers

• President’s Rule:
  • Constitutional Provisions: Article 356 (failure of constitutional machinery) and Article 365 (failure to comply with Centre’s directions).
  • Parliamentary Approval: Required within two months by a simple majority in both Houses.
  • Duration: Initially for six months. Maximum period of three years with parliamentary approval every six months.
  • First Imposition: Punjab (in PEPSU) in 1951.
  • Judicial Review: The proclamation is subject to judicial review as per the S.R. Bommai case (1994).
• Financial Emergency:
  • Constitutional Provision: Article 360.
  • Grounds: Threat to financial stability or credit of India or any part thereof.
  • Parliamentary Approval: Required within two months by a simple majority.
  • Duration: Continues indefinitely once approved, until revoked. No repeated parliamentary approval is needed.
  • Revocation: By the President at any time; does not require parliamentary approval.
  • Imposition History: Never imposed in India to date.
• State Legislature:
  • Relevant Articles: 168 to 212 in Part VI of the Constitution.
  • Bicameral States (6): Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Bihar, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh.
  • Legislative Assembly (Vidhan Sabha): Minimum strength is 60, maximum is 500. Exceptions exist (e.g., Sikkim, Goa).
  • Legislative Council (Vidhan Parishad):
    1. Creation/Abolition: Under Article 169. Requires a resolution by the State Assembly (special majority) and an Act of Parliament (simple majority).
    2. Strength: Maximum 1/3rd of Assembly’s strength, minimum 40.
    3. Composition of Members:
       • 1/3 elected by MLAs.
       • 1/3 elected by local bodies.
       • 1/12 elected by graduates.
       • 1/12 elected by teachers.
       • 1/6 nominated by the Governor.
• Local Self Government:
  • 73rd Amendment Act, 1992: Added Part IX (‘The Panchayats’) and the 11th Schedule (29 functional items) to the Constitution. Came into force on April 24, 1993.
  • Key Committees:
    1. Balwant Rai Mehta Committee (1957): Recommended a three-tier system.
    2. Ashok Mehta Committee (1978): Recommended a two-tier system.
    3. G.V.K. Rao Committee (1985): Stressed the need to revive PRIs.
    4. L.M. Singhvi Committee (1986): First to recommend constitutional status for PRIs.
  • First State: Rajasthan (Nagaur district, Oct 2, 1959) was the first state to establish Panchayati Raj.
  • Gram Sabha: Consists of all persons registered in the electoral rolls of a village within the area of the Panchayat. It is the foundation of the Panchayati Raj system.

Mains Insights

• President’s Rule (Article 356) and Federalism:
  • Cause-Effect Relationship: The frequent and often politically motivated use of Article 356 has been a major source of tension in Centre-State relations. It has been used to dismiss state governments led by opposition parties, undermining the federal structure of the Indian polity. This has led to a climate of confrontational federalism rather than cooperative federalism.
  • Debate & Historiography: The provision was debated as a necessary evil in the Constituent Assembly. While Dr. Ambedkar saw it as a “dead letter,” political expediency has made it a “deadly weapon.” The Supreme Court’s intervention in the S.R. Bommai case was a critical turning point, establishing safeguards against its misuse. However, debates continue on whether the provision should be amended or even repealed.
  • Commission Recommendations: The Sarkaria Commission (1988) and the Punchhi Commission (2007) recommended that Article 356 should be used only as a last resort, in cases of actual breakdown of constitutional machinery, and that all possibilities of forming an alternative government should be explored before its imposition. They also suggested that the Governor’s report should be a “speaking document” giving clear reasons for the recommendation.
• Relevance of State Legislative Councils:
  • A Check on Hasty Legislation vs. A ‘Costly Luxury’: Proponents argue that Legislative Councils (Vidhan Parishads) serve as a crucial check on hasty and ill-considered legislation passed by the Legislative Assembly. They provide a forum for sober and detailed debate, away from the electoral pressures of the lower house, and can be populated by experts and intellectuals through nomination.
  • Arguments Against: Critics view them as an unnecessary drain on the state exchequer, a ‘costly ornamental luxury’. They argue that councils can delay legislation and are often used to accommodate politicians who have lost elections or to provide sinecures for party loyalists, thus becoming a tool for political patronage rather than a chamber of expertise.
  • Asymmetrical Federalism: The fact that only a few states have a second chamber reflects the asymmetrical nature of Indian federalism, where states have a choice in their legislative structure. The ease of creation and abolition (simple majority in Parliament) also makes their existence politically contingent.
• Local Self-Government: A Revolution Stalled?
  • Substantive vs. Procedural Decentralization: The 73rd Amendment was revolutionary in establishing a uniform, constitutionally mandated framework for PRIs. It ensured procedural decentralization through regular elections, reservations, and the creation of institutions like the State Election Commission and State Finance Commission.
  • Challenges to Substantive Decentralization: The real challenge lies in substantive decentralization, which involves the actual devolution of the ‘3 Fs’ - Funds, Functions, and Functionaries. State governments have often shown reluctance to transfer meaningful power and resources to local bodies, viewing them as rival power centers. Many of the 29 subjects in the 11th Schedule remain on paper, with no real authority or budget transferred.
  • Gram Sabha as the Lynchpin: The success of Panchayati Raj hinges on the effective functioning of the Gram Sabha. As long as it remains weak due to low participation, elite capture, and procedural irregularities, the goal of participatory governance and ‘Gram Swaraj’ will remain elusive. Strengthening the Gram Sabha through institutional reforms (like Ward Sabhas) and capacity building is critical for deepening democracy at the grassroots.

Previous Year Questions

Prelims

1. Which one of the following is not a feature of Indian federalism? (UPSC CSE 2017) (a) There is an independent judiciary in India. (b) Powers have been clearly divided between the Centre and the States. (c) The federating units have been given unequal representation in the Rajya Sabha. (d) It is the result of an agreement among the federating units. Answer: (d) The Indian Federation is not the result of an agreement among the states like the American Federation. It is a ‘holding together’ federation, not a ‘coming together’ one.

2. The main advantage of the parliamentary form of government is that (UPSC CSE 2017) (a) the executive and legislature work independently. (b) it provides for continuity of policy and is more efficient. (c) the executive remains responsible to the legislature. (d) the head of the government cannot be changed without an election. Answer: (c) The core principle of a parliamentary system is the collective responsibility of the executive to the legislature.

3. Local self-government can be best explained as an exercise in (UPSC CSE 2017) (a) Federalism (b) Democratic decentralisation (c) Administrative delegation (d) Direct democracy Answer: (b) Local self-government is the classic example of democratic decentralization, which involves transferring power and responsibility from central government to subordinate or quasi-independent local governments.

4. Consider the following statements:

   1. The Parliament of India can place a particular law in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution of India.
   2. The validity of a law placed in the Ninth Schedule cannot be examined by any court and no judgement can be made on it. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (UPSC CSE 2018) (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 Answer: (a) Statement 1 is correct. Statement 2 is incorrect because the Supreme Court in the I.R. Coelho case (2007) ruled that laws placed in the Ninth Schedule after April 24, 1973, are open to judicial review if they violate the basic structure of the Constitution.

5. With reference to the funds under Members of Parliament Local Area Development Scheme (MPLADS), which of the following statements are correct?

   1. MPLADS funds must be used to create durable assets like physical infrastructure for health, education, etc.
   2. A specified portion of each MP’s fund must benefit SC/ST populations.
   3. MPLADS funds are sanctioned on a yearly basis and the unused funds cannot be carried forward to the next year.
   4. The District Authority must inspect at least 10% of all works under implementation every year. Select the correct answer using the code given below: (UPSC CSE 2020) (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 3 and 4 only (c) 1, 2 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 4 only Answer: (d) Statement 3 is incorrect. The MPLADS funds are non-lapsable. Unused funds can be carried forward to the subsequent year. Statements 1, 2 and 4 are correct features of the scheme.

Mains

1. To what extent, in your view, the Parliament is able to ensure accountability of the executive in India? (UPSC CSE 2021) Answer Framework:

   • Introduction: Briefly explain the principle of executive accountability to the legislature in a parliamentary democracy.
   • Mechanisms for Ensuring Accountability: Discuss various parliamentary devices like Question Hour, Zero Hour, Adjournment Motion, No-Confidence Motion, Censure Motion, and various discussions. Mention the role of parliamentary committees (PAC, Estimates Committee, etc.).
   • Limitations and Challenges: Discuss factors that weaken parliamentary control, such as the brute majority of the ruling party, the politics of coalition, the increasing complexity of governance, decline in the quality of debates, and the ordinance-making power of the executive.
   • Conclusion: Conclude by stating that while Parliament has several tools to ensure accountability, their effectiveness is often constrained by political realities. Suggest measures for strengthening parliamentary oversight.

2. “The local self-government system in India has not proved to be an effective instrument of governance”. Critically examine the statement and give your views to improve the situation. (UPSC CSE 2017) Answer Framework:

   • Introduction: Acknowledge the revolutionary potential of the 73rd and 74th Amendments in establishing a third tier of government.
   • Arguments Supporting the Statement (Ineffectiveness):
     • Lack of Devolution (3 Fs): Discuss the reluctance of state governments to devolve funds, functions, and functionaries.
     • Financial Dependence: PRIs are heavily dependent on state and central grants, undermining their autonomy.
     • Bureaucratic Hurdles: Excessive control by state bureaucracy (e.g., District Collectors).
     • Structural Deficiencies: Issues like elite capture, weak Gram Sabhas, and lack of capacity building for elected representatives.
   • Arguments Against the Statement (Effectiveness):
     • Political Empowerment: Mention the creation of millions of new elected posts, especially for women and marginalized communities.
     • Grassroots Democracy: It has brought governance closer to the people.
     • Improved Service Delivery: In states like Kerala, PRIs have shown remarkable success in areas like health and education.
   • Measures to Improve the Situation: Suggest steps like activity mapping to clearly demarcate functions, ensuring timely transfer of funds as per State Finance Commission recommendations, capacity building for representatives, and strengthening Gram Sabhas.
   • Conclusion: Conclude that while the system faces significant challenges, it remains a vital instrument for democratic deepening. The need is to address the implementation gaps with strong political will.

3. How far do you think cooperation, competition and confrontation have shaped the nature of federation in India? Cite some recent examples. (UPSC CSE 2020) Answer Framework:

   • Introduction: Define Indian federalism as a ‘quasi-federal’ or ‘holding together’ system, inherently containing elements of cooperation, competition, and confrontation.
   • Cooperative Federalism: Explain the concept and provide examples like the GST Council (fiscal cooperation), NITI Aayog’s framework, and joint efforts during the COVID-19 pandemic.
   • Competitive Federalism: Explain how the Centre encourages states to compete for investment and better governance. Cite examples like Ease of Doing Business rankings, Swachh Survekshan, and various indices released by NITI Aayog.
   • Confrontational Federalism: Discuss instances of friction. Cite examples such as the misuse of Article 356 in the past, disputes over the role of the Governor, disagreements over central laws (e.g., Farm Laws, CAA), and financial issues like delays in GST compensation.
   • Conclusion: Conclude that the nature of Indian federalism is dynamic and fluid, shifting between these three modes depending on the political context, the party in power at the Centre and states, and the issues at hand. A balance favouring cooperation is essential for national progress.

4. ‘The jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) regarding lodging an FIR and conducting a probe within a particular state is being questioned by various States. However, the power of the States to withhold consent to the CBI is not absolute.’ Explain with special reference to the federal character of India. (UPSC CSE 2021) Answer Framework:

   • Introduction: Briefly introduce the CBI as a premier investigating agency established by the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946.
   • CBI’s Jurisdiction and State Consent: Explain that ‘Police’ is a State List subject. Therefore, under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, the CBI needs general consent from the state government to investigate cases within its territory.
   • States Withdrawing Consent: Mention recent examples of states withdrawing their general consent, leading to a situation where the CBI must seek case-specific consent, which can be denied. This reflects the confrontationist aspect of federalism.
   • When Consent is Not Absolute: Explain the exceptions. The Supreme Court and High Courts can order a CBI probe without state consent under their constitutional powers (Articles 32 and 226) to ensure justice. Also, consent is not required for investigating central government employees or for cases registered in Union Territories.
   • Federal Implications: Analyse this issue from a federal perspective. State autonomy vs. the need for a central agency to investigate inter-state crimes and corruption. The withdrawal of consent is often seen as a political tool by states to protect their interests, while the Centre’s use of the CBI is often accused of being politically motivated.
   • Conclusion: Conclude by highlighting the need for a balance to uphold the federal structure while ensuring that the investigation of serious crimes is not hampered by political considerations. Suggest reforms to ensure the CBI’s autonomy and credibility.

5. Critically examine the role of the Governor in the State politics in India, particularly in the context of coalition governments. (UPSC CSE 2018 - Similar theme to federalism and executive power) Answer Framework:

   • Introduction: Describe the Governor’s dual role as the constitutional head of the state and as an agent of the Centre.
   • Discretionary Powers and Controversy: Focus on the Governor’s discretionary powers that become critical in coalition politics:
     • Appointment of Chief Minister: In case of a hung assembly, the Governor’s discretion in inviting a party/coalition to form the government is crucial and often controversial.
     • Dismissal of the Ministry: The power to dismiss a government that has lost its majority.
     • Recommending President’s Rule (Article 356): This is the most controversial power, often alleged to be used at the behest of the central government.
     • Reserving Bills for President’s Consideration: This can be used to stall legislation passed by the state legislature.
   • Judicial Pronouncements and Commission Recommendations: Discuss the guidelines laid down in the S.R. Bommai case (e.g., floor test is the only way to prove majority). Mention recommendations from the Sarkaria and Punchhi Commissions for a non-partisan role of the Governor.
   • Conclusion: Conclude that the Governor’s role is pivotal for maintaining constitutional governance, but its politicization has strained Centre-State relations. Emphasize the need for appointing non-partisan individuals and adhering to constitutional conventions and judicial guidelines to uphold the federal spirit.