GS Notes

17. Polity Notes 37

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Elaborate Notes

OTHER LOCAL BODIES

These are specialised urban bodies created for specific purposes and are not always covered by the 74th Constitutional Amendment Act. They represent a diverse landscape of urban governance in India.

  • Town Area Committee

    • Historical Context: The concept of such committees emerged during the British colonial period as a transitional step for a settlement growing from a large village into a town. They were seen as a precursor to a full-fledged municipality.
    • Statutory Basis: A Town Area Committee is a statutory body, created by a separate Act of the concerned state legislature. Its composition, functions, and financial powers are entirely determined by that Act, leading to significant variation across states.
    • Nature and Functions: It is a semi-municipal authority entrusted with a limited range of civic functions such as street lighting, drainage, maintenance of roads, and sanitation in a small town. Its financial resources are also limited, often comprising local taxes, fees, and grants from the state government.
    • Composition: The members of the committee can be fully elected, fully nominated by the state government, or a mix of both, as stipulated in the state act. This flexibility often leads to less democratic accountability compared to a regular municipality.

  • Cantonment Board

    • Historical Context: Cantonments originated in British India as designated areas for quartering troops. The first cantonment was established in Barrackpore in 1765. To manage the growing civilian population within these areas, a system of governance was required, leading to the Cantonment Acts. The current governing legislation is the Cantonments Act, 2006, which replaced the colonial-era Cantonments Act of 1924.
    • Administrative Control: It is a unique federal body that operates under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence, not the state government. This places it outside the purview of the state-level urban governance framework. As of recent data, there are 62 cantonment boards in India.
    • Composition: A Cantonment Board is a body partly elected and partly nominated.
      • Elected Members: Hold office for a term of five years.
      • Nominated Members: Include military/ex-officio members.
      • Presiding Officer: The military officer commanding the station is the ex-officio President of the board. The Vice-President is elected by and from amongst the elected members of the board.
    • Functions: Its functions are similar to those of a municipality, including public health, water supply, sanitation, primary education, and street lighting for the civilian population.

  • Port Trust

    • Statutory Basis: Port Trusts are established in major port areas like Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, etc., by an Act of Parliament, primarily the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963.
    • Purpose: They have a dual role: first, to manage and protect the port’s infrastructure and facilitate maritime trade; second, to provide basic civic amenities to the people, including employees and their families, living within the port areas.
    • Administrative Control: They function under the direct control of the Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways.
    • Composition: The board consists of both elected and nominated members. The members represent various stakeholders such as labour unions, shipping companies, trade bodies, and government nominees from departments like customs and railways.

  • Township

    • Nature and Purpose: This is a form of urban administration established by large public sector enterprises (PSEs) to provide civic amenities to their staff and workers living in specially built housing colonies. Examples include townships by BHEL (Bhopal), SAIL (Bhilai, Rourkela), and NTPC.
    • Governance: It is not a democratic body. It is an extension of the administrative setup of the PSE. A Town Administrator is appointed by the enterprise to manage the township’s affairs. There is no provision for elected representatives.
    • Functions: It provides all essential services like housing, water, electricity, roads, sanitation, schools, and hospitals, which are typically the responsibility of a municipality.

  • Special Purpose Agencies (SPAs)

    • Nature: These are function-based, not area-based, agencies. Also known as ‘parastatals’ or ‘single-purpose’ agencies, they are set up to handle a specific function that the municipal corporation may not be equipped to handle.
    • Creation: They can be established as statutory bodies through an Act of the state legislature (e.g., Delhi Development Authority, State Housing Boards) or as non-statutory bodies through an executive resolution.
    • Autonomy and Issues: SPAs function as autonomous bodies, independent of the local urban governments. This often leads to a fragmented administrative landscape. The Second Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC) in its 6th Report, “Local Governance” (2007), pointed out that the proliferation of such parastatals has eroded the functional domain of municipalities, undermined their authority, and created problems of coordination.
    • Examples: Urban Development Authorities, Water Supply and Sewerage Boards, Housing Boards, Pollution Control Boards, Transport Corporations.

  • Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC)

    • Constitutional Mandate: The 74th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, inserted Article 243ZE, which mandates the establishment of an MPC in every metropolitan area with a population of ten lakh or more.
    • Purpose: Its primary role is to prepare a draft development plan for the entire metropolitan area. This is a crucial task for integrated and holistic planning, as it consolidates the plans prepared by the municipalities and panchayats within the region.
    • Composition: The state legislature is empowered to make provisions for the composition of the MPC. However, the Constitution mandates that not less than two-thirds of the members of an MPC must be elected by, and from amongst, the elected members of the municipalities and the chairpersons of the panchayats in the metropolitan area. The remaining members are nominated by the state government, usually including experts and officials.

The unique administrative structure of the National Capital Territory (NCT) of Delhi has been a persistent source of jurisdictional and political conflict between the elected government of Delhi and the Union Government, represented by the Lieutenant Governor (LG).

  • Constitutional Framework (69th Amendment Act, 1991):

    • This amendment introduced Article 239AA and Article 239AB, granting Delhi a special status. It provided for a Legislative Assembly and a Council of Ministers headed by a Chief Minister.
    • Division of Powers (Article 239AA): The Delhi Assembly can legislate on all subjects in the State List and Concurrent List, except for three subjects: Public Order, Police, and Land. These three subjects remain under the exclusive domain of the Union Government.
    • Executive Power: The executive power of the Delhi government corresponds to its legislative powers. The LG is the administrator who is bound to act on the “aid and advice” of the Council of Ministers on all matters except the three reserved subjects.
    • Point of Contention: The proviso to Article 239AA(4) states that in case of a difference of opinion between the LG and the Council of Ministers on “any matter”, the LG shall refer it to the President for a decision. This clause has been a major source of friction.

  • Judicial Intervention and Interpretation:

    • Govt. of NCT of Delhi vs. Union of India (2018): The Supreme Court’s Constitution Bench delivered a landmark judgment clarifying the power dynamics.
      • It held that the LG is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers and cannot act independently, except in matters related to the three reserved subjects.
      • Critically, it interpreted the phrase “any matter” to not mean “every matter”. The power of referral to the President should be exercised only in exceptional cases and not as a routine practice to stall the decisions of the elected government.
      • The court invoked the principles of collaborative federalism and constitutional morality, urging both functionaries to work harmoniously.

  • The “Services” Conundrum:

    • The central point of dispute became the control over administrative services (Entry 41 of the State List), specifically the power to transfer and post officers.
    • Govt. of NCT of Delhi vs. Union of India (2023): A Constitution Bench of the SC ruled unanimously that the Delhi government has legislative and executive control over “services”.
    • The Court’s reasoning was rooted in the principle of ministerial responsibility, stating that for a government to be accountable to the legislature and the people, it must have control over the civil servants who implement its policies. This established the “triple chain of command”: Civil Service → Ministers → Legislature → Electorate.

  • Parliamentary Overrides and Recent Developments:

    • Government of NCT of Delhi (Amendment) Act, 2021: This act significantly altered the power balance. It stipulated that the expression “Government” in any law made by the Delhi Assembly shall mean the LG. It also made it mandatory for the elected government to obtain the LG’s opinion before any executive action.
    • Government of NCT of Delhi (Amendment) Act, 2023: Passed to nullify the SC’s 2023 judgment on services.
      • It created a National Capital Civil Service Authority (NCCSA) to make recommendations to the LG on transfers, postings, and vigilance matters.
      • The NCCSA comprises the CM of Delhi (as Chairperson), the Chief Secretary of Delhi, and the Principal Home Secretary of Delhi. Decisions are by majority vote, effectively giving the two bureaucrats (appointed by the Centre) a veto over the elected CM.
      • It further grants the LG the final authority to accept or reject the NCCSA’s recommendations, cementing the Union’s control over services. This matter has been referred back to a larger constitutional bench by the Supreme Court.

  • Paradox of President’s Rule (Article 239AB):

    • This article empowers the President, on a report from the LG, to impose President’s Rule in case of a breakdown of constitutional machinery in Delhi.
    • The paradox, as noted by critics, is that the LG, who is the de facto administrator on key issues and a representative of the Centre, would be recommending President’s Rule essentially for a failure in the administrative machinery which he/she significantly controls.

  • Proposed Solutions:

    • The Balakrishnan Committee Report (1989), which recommended the 69th Amendment, had envisioned a collaborative structure.
    • A frequently suggested model is that of other world capitals, like Washington D.C. in the USA. There, strategic areas and federal buildings fall under the direct control of the federal government, while the rest of the city is administered by an elected local government (Mayor and Council). A similar model for Delhi could involve creating a ‘New Delhi’ district under the Union’s control, while granting greater autonomy or full statehood to the rest of the NCT.

ELECTION COMMISSION

The Election Commission of India (ECI) is an autonomous constitutional authority responsible for administering election processes in India.

  • Constitutional Provisions:

    • Article 324 of the Constitution vests the power of “superintendence, direction and control” of elections to Parliament, State Legislatures, and the offices of the President and Vice-President in the ECI.
    • It’s crucial to note that the ECI is not concerned with elections to panchayats and municipalities. These are conducted by State Election Commissions, constitutional bodies created under Articles 243K and 243ZA respectively.

  • Composition and Evolution:

    • Article 324(2) states that the ECI shall consist of the Chief Election Commissioner (CEC) and such number of other Election Commissioners (ECs), if any, as the President may from time to-time fix.
    • Historical Timeline:
      • 1950–1989: The ECI functioned as a single-member body.
      • October 1989: Ahead of the 9th Lok Sabha elections, it was made a multi-member body with the appointment of two ECs.
      • January 1990: It was reverted to a single-member body.
      • October 1993: It was again made a multi-member body and has remained so since.
    • In the T.N. Seshan vs. Union of India (1995) case, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the multi-member commission, clarifying that the CEC and ECs have equal powers, with the CEC only having a casting vote in case of a tie. Decisions are made by majority.

  • Appointment and Independence:

    • The CEC and ECs are appointed by the President. Their conditions of service and tenure are determined by an Act of Parliament. They hold office for a term of six years or up to the age of 65 years, whichever is earlier.
    • Appointment Process (Recent Change):
      • In Anoop Baranwal vs. Union of India (2023), the SC mandated that appointments be made on the advice of a committee comprising the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha, and the Chief Justice of India.
      • However, Parliament subsequently passed the CEC and other ECs (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Term of Office) Act, 2023, which replaced the CJI with a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM, giving the executive a majority in the selection process.
    • Security of Tenure:
      • The CEC enjoys strong security of tenure and can only be removed from office in the same manner and on the same grounds as a Judge of the Supreme Court.
      • Other ECs can only be removed on the recommendation of the CEC. This distinction is a point of criticism, as it creates a perceived hierarchy. The Administrative Reforms Commission and various experts have recommended that ECs should have the same protection from removal as the CEC.

  • Constitutional Flaws:

    • The Constitution has not prescribed any specific qualifications (legal, educational, administrative) for the members.
    • The term of the members is not specified in the Constitution itself, but is determined by statute.
    • There is no constitutional prohibition on retiring commissioners from taking up further appointments under the government, which could potentially compromise their independence.

  • Governing Legislations:

    • Representation of the People Act, 1950 (RPA, 1950): This act deals with the allocation of seats in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies, delimitation of constituencies, qualifications of voters, and the preparation of electoral rolls.
    • Representation of the People Act, 1951 (RPA, 1951): This comprehensive act provides for the actual conduct of elections, including notifications, administrative machinery, registration of political parties, qualifications and disqualifications of candidates, electoral offences, and corrupt practices.
    • Delimitation Act (under Article 82): Following each Census, Parliament enacts a Delimitation Act. A high-powered Delimitation Commission redraws the boundaries of constituencies. The 84th Amendment Act of 2001 froze the delimitation of constituencies based on the 1971 census for seat allocation and the 2001 census for boundary readjustment, until the first census after 2026.

MAJOR ISSUES IN THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

  • Criminalization of Politics: The entry of candidates with criminal backgrounds into politics remains a grave concern. Despite Supreme Court directives, such as in Public Interest Foundation vs Union of India (2018), mandating political parties to publicize the criminal antecedents of their candidates, the problem persists. The ECI lacks the power to disqualify candidates at the pre-conviction stage.
  • Role of Money Power: Excessive and illicit expenditure during elections distorts the level playing field. The introduction of Electoral Bonds was meant to bring transparency but was criticized for its anonymity. The Supreme Court in Association for Democratic Reforms vs Union of India (2024) struck down the scheme as unconstitutional, citing a violation of the voters’ right to information under Article 19(1)(a).
  • Misuse of Religion and Caste: Appealing to voters on the basis of caste or religion is a corrupt practice under Section 123 of the RPA, 1951. However, enforcement is weak, and identity politics remains pervasive.
  • Model Code of Conduct (MCC): The MCC is a set of guidelines agreed upon by political parties to ensure ethical conduct during elections. While it has been effective, it lacks statutory backing. The ECI’s power to enforce it is often challenged, leading to debates on whether to give it legal force.
  • Credibility of ECI: The ECI’s credibility has been questioned due to perceptions of partisanship, especially in matters of enforcing the MCC against ruling party members and the recent changes in the appointment process which give the executive a greater say.
  • Simultaneous Elections: The idea of “One Nation, One Election” is proposed to reduce costs and policy paralysis due to frequent elections. However, critics, including former CECs like S. Y. Quraishi, argue it could undermine federalism, nationalize local issues, and require significant constitutional amendments. The Law Commission of India in its draft report (2018) supported the idea with caveats.
  • Electoral Integrity (EVMs, VVPATs): While EVMs have made the voting process efficient, concerns about their reliability persist. The ECI introduced the Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) system to enhance transparency. The Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the integrity of the EVM-VVPAT system.
  • State Funding of Elections: Committees like the Indrajit Gupta Committee on State Funding of Elections (1998) have recommended partial state funding to curb the influence of money power. However, a consensus on its implementation remains elusive due to complexities and the risk of it being an add-on rather than a substitute for private funding.

Prelims Pointers

  • Town Area Committee: Created by a state legislature act for small towns; semi-municipal authority.
  • Cantonment Board: Governed by the Cantonments Act, 2006; works under the Ministry of Defence.
  • There are currently 62 cantonment boards in India.
  • The military officer commanding the station is the ex-officio President of a cantonment board.
  • Port Trust: Established in major port areas by an Act of Parliament (e.g., Major Port Trusts Act, 1963).
  • Township: Not an elected body; an administrative extension of a Public Sector Enterprise for its employees.
  • Special Purpose Agency (SPA): A function-based (not area-based) autonomous body, also known as a parastatal.
  • Metropolitan Planning Committee (MPC): Mandated by Article 243ZE of the Constitution for areas with 10 lakh+ population.
  • A minimum of two-thirds of MPC members must be elected from amongst elected members of municipalities and chairpersons of panchayats.
  • Delhi’s Special Status: Conferred by the 69th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1991, which inserted Articles 239AA and 239AB.
  • The Delhi Assembly cannot legislate on three State List subjects: Public Order, Police, and Land.
  • National Capital Civil Service Authority (NCCSA): Created by the GNCTD (Amendment) Act, 2023 to control “services” in Delhi.
  • NCCSA Composition: Chief Minister of Delhi (Chairperson), Chief Secretary of Delhi, and Principal Home Secretary of Delhi.
  • Election Commission of India (ECI): A permanent, independent constitutional body under Article 324.
  • ECI conducts elections for: President, Vice-President, Parliament, and State Legislatures.
  • State Election Commissions (under Arts. 243K & 243ZA) conduct Panchayat and Municipal elections.
  • The CEC and ECs have a tenure of 6 years or up to 65 years of age.
  • The CEC can be removed like a Supreme Court judge; other ECs are removed on the CEC’s recommendation.
  • RPA, 1950: Deals with electoral rolls, voter qualification, and delimitation.
  • RPA, 1951: Deals with the conduct of elections, corrupt practices, and disqualifications.
  • Article 82: Provides for the readjustment of seats and delimitation of constituencies after every census.

Mains Insights

  • Challenges in Urban Governance (GS-II):

    1. Fragmentation of Authority: The existence of multiple parastatals like Development Authorities and Jal Boards alongside elected municipalities (ULBs) creates a governance maze. This leads to a lack of accountability, poor coordination, and undermines the spirit of the 74th Amendment which sought to empower ULBs.
    2. Democratic Deficit: Bodies like Townships and nominated Town Area Committees lack democratic accountability. Cantonment Boards, being under the Ministry of Defence, operate outside the state’s democratic framework, creating a dual-governance structure within a city.
    3. Failure of Integrated Planning: Despite the constitutional mandate for Metropolitan Planning Committees (MPCs), they are either non-existent or dysfunctional in many cities. This failure is a key reason for haphazard urban growth, as there is no single body to integrate transport, housing, and environmental planning for an entire metropolitan region.

  • Federalism and Delhi’s Governance Model (GS-II):

    1. Asymmetric Federalism vs. Cooperative Federalism: The Delhi model is a prime example of asymmetric federalism. However, the continuous tussle between the Centre and the elected state government violates the principles of cooperative federalism, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized. The conflict is a microcosm of broader Centre-State tensions in India.
    2. Supremacy of Representative Democracy: The core of the debate is the conflict between the will of the people expressed through an elected assembly and the administrative control of the Union government’s nominee (LG). The frequent use of legislative power by Parliament to nullify judicial verdicts that empower the elected government raises serious questions about constitutional propriety and the separation of powers.
    3. Impact on Governance: The administrative paralysis caused by this jurisdictional conflict directly affects the citizens of Delhi. Key policy decisions on public health, transport, and environment are often delayed, demonstrating how political-constitutional deadlocks can have severe real-world consequences.

  • Electoral Reforms and the Role of the ECI (GS-II):

    1. Independence of the ECI: The recent change in the appointment process for Election Commissioners, which gives the executive a 2:1 majority in the selection committee, is a significant point of concern. This may compromise the perceived neutrality of the ECI, an institution whose credibility is foundational to democratic trust.
    2. Statutory Powers vs. Moral Authority: The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) is a powerful tool but relies on moral suasion. There is a strong debate on whether granting it statutory backing would make it more effective or entangle the ECI in endless litigation, thereby paralyzing the election process.
    3. Tackling Core Issues: The ECI’s inability to decisively tackle the “twin evils” of money power and criminalization of politics is a major limitation. Reforms like empowering the ECI to de-register political parties for gross violations, and creating a more robust framework for internal party democracy, are critical for cleaning up the electoral system. The striking down of electoral bonds is a positive step towards transparency, but the challenge of illicit funding remains.

Previous Year Questions

Prelims

  1. With reference to the Delimitation Commission, consider the following statements: (UPSC Prelims 2012)

    1. The orders of the Delimitation Commission cannot be challenged in a Court of Law.
    2. When the orders of the Delimitation Commission are laid before the Lok Sabha or State Legislative Assembly, they cannot effect any modifications in the orders. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 Answer: (c) Both 1 and 2

  2. Consider the following statements: (UPSC Prelims 2017)

    1. The Election Commission of India is a five-member body.
    2. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs decides the election schedule for the conduct of both general elections and bye-elections.
    3. Election Commission resolves the disputes relating to splits/mergers of recognised political parties. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 and 2 only (b) 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 3 only Answer: (d) 3 only

  3. In India, which of the following reviews the independent regulators in sectors like telecommunications, insurance, electricity, etc.? (UPSC Prelims 2019)

    1. Ad Hoc Committees set up by the Parliament
    2. Parliamentary Department Related Standing Committees
    3. Finance Commission
    4. Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission
    5. NITI Aayog Select the correct answer using the code given below. (a) 1 and 2 (b) 1, 3 and 4 (c) 3, 4 and 5 (d) 2 and 5 Answer: (a) 1 and 2 (This question relates to bodies outside the direct executive, similar in spirit to ECI and other statutory bodies).

  4. Consider the following statements regarding the latest amendments to the Election Laws in India: (Based on recent themes)

    1. A citizen who turns 18 on the 1st of April or July of a year can now register as a voter on that date, instead of waiting for the 1st of January of the next year.
    2. The electoral roll data can be linked with the Aadhaar ecosystem for authentication purposes, but it is not mandatory for voters. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 Answer: (c) Both 1 and 2 (Reflects the Election Laws (Amendment) Act, 2021).

  5. With reference to the Lieutenant Governor (LG) of Delhi, which of the following statements is correct? (Conceptual Question) (a) The LG has the power to legislate on all subjects in the State List for Delhi. (b) The LG is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers on all matters without any exception. (c) In case of a difference of opinion with the Council of Ministers, the LG can refer the matter to the President. (d) The LG is appointed by the Chief Minister of Delhi. Answer: (c) In case of a difference of opinion with the Council of Ministers, the LG can refer the matter to the President.

Mains

  1. Discuss the role of the Election Commission of India in the light of the evolution of the Model Code of Conduct. (UPSC Mains GS-II 2022) Answer Framework:

    • Introduction: Define the Model Code of Conduct (MCC) as a set of consensus-based norms for political parties’ conduct during elections, enforced by the ECI under Article 324.
    • Evolution of MCC: Trace its origins from Kerala in 1960 to its gradual acceptance and rigorous enforcement by the ECI, especially since the era of T.N. Seshan in the 1990s. Mention how it has expanded to cover social media, government advertisements, etc.
    • Role of ECI in Enforcing MCC:
      • Guardian of Free and Fair Elections: Explain how ECI uses the MCC to ensure a level playing field by preventing the misuse of official machinery, hate speech, and inducements.
      • Moral and Constitutional Authority: Despite lacking statutory backing, the ECI’s enforcement derives its power from its constitutional mandate under Article 324 and its established credibility.
      • Tools of Enforcement: Mention the issuance of notices, censuring candidates, and, in extreme cases, recommending the countermanding of polls.
    • Challenges and Criticisms:
      • Lack of Statutory Backing: Discuss the debate on whether to make it legally enforceable, highlighting the pros (deterrence) and cons (judicial delays).
      • Delayed Action and Allegations of Partisanship: Mention instances where the ECI was perceived to be slow or lenient in acting against powerful incumbents.
      • New Challenges: Digital media, fake news, and surrogate advertising pose new enforcement challenges.
    • Conclusion: Conclude by stating that the MCC, enforced by the ECI, has been a cornerstone of India’s electoral integrity. However, to maintain its effectiveness, the ECI must continuously adapt its strategies and its institutional independence must be fiercely protected.

  2. To what extent, in your opinion, has the decentralisation of power in India changed the governance landscape at the grassroots? (UPSC Mains GS-II 2022) Answer Framework:

    • Introduction: Briefly introduce the 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts as the foundational steps towards constitutionalising decentralisation of power to Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and Urban Local Bodies (ULBs).
    • Positive Changes in Governance Landscape:
      • Political Empowerment: Mention the creation of over 3 million elected representatives, with one-third reservation for women, leading to increased political participation of marginalised groups.
      • Deepening of Democracy: Decisions on local issues are now taken by local representatives, making governance more accessible and responsive.
      • Improved Service Delivery: In states with effective devolution (e.g., Kerala), PRIs/ULBs have improved the implementation of schemes related to health, education, and sanitation.
      • Bottom-up Planning: The acts mandated the creation of District Planning Committees and Metropolitan Planning Committees to facilitate decentralised planning.
    • Limitations and Challenges:
      • The 3Fs Problem: Lack of effective devolution of Functions, Finances, and Functionaries from state governments to local bodies.
      • Dominance of Bureaucracy: State government officials often control the functioning of local bodies, undermining the authority of elected representatives.
      • Structural Deficiencies: Issues like the lack of infrastructure, technical expertise, and interference from Members of Parliament/Legislative Assembly (e.g., via MPLADS/MLALADS).
      • Rise of Parastatals: As mentioned in the notes, Special Purpose Agencies often encroach upon the functions of ULBs, weakening them.
    • Conclusion: Conclude that while decentralisation has fundamentally altered the governance landscape by creating a third tier of government, its full potential remains unrealised. Effective governance at the grassroots requires a genuine commitment from state governments to devolve power in letter and spirit.

  3. The jurisdiction of the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) regarding lodging an FIR and conducting a probe within a particular state is being questioned by various States. However, the power of the States to withhold consent to the CBI is not absolute. Explain with special reference to the federal character of India. (UPSC Mains GS-II 2021) Answer Framework: (This question is analogous to the Delhi-Centre conflict as it deals with federal fault lines and jurisdiction).

    • Introduction: Explain the CBI’s origin under the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) Act, 1946, and its status as the premier investigative agency of the Centre.
    • Jurisdictional Framework and Consent:
      • Explain that under Section 6 of the DSPE Act, the CBI requires the “general consent” of the state government to investigate cases within its territory.
      • Mention the recent trend of several states withdrawing this general consent, citing misuse of the agency for political purposes, thereby straining Centre-State relations.
    • When Consent is Not Required (Power is Not Absolute):
      • High Court/Supreme Court Orders: Explain that when the Supreme Court or a High Court orders a CBI probe under its constitutional powers (Articles 32 and 226), the state’s consent is not required. This is the primary exception.
      • Investigation of Central Government Employees: The CBI can investigate central government employees within a state without its consent.
      • Continuing Investigation: If a case was registered when general consent was in effect, the CBI can continue the investigation even after the consent is withdrawn.
    • Federal Character Implications:
      • State Autonomy: The provision for consent upholds the principle of federalism and the state’s constitutional jurisdiction over ‘Police’ and ‘Public Order’.
      • Centre-State Tensions: Withdrawal of consent reflects a deep trust deficit and is often a symptom of political conflict between the ruling party at the Centre and in the state.
      • Need for Balance: The judiciary’s power to order a CBI probe acts as a constitutional check, ensuring that serious cases of corruption or interstate crime are not stalled due to political reasons, thus balancing state autonomy with the need for justice.
    • Conclusion: Conclude that the issue of CBI jurisdiction is a classic example of the friction inherent in India’s quasi-federal structure. While states have the power to withhold consent, this power is balanced by judicial oversight to ensure it is not used to shield corruption, thereby preserving the rule of law.

  4. “The local self-government system in India has not proved to be an effective instrument of governance”. Critically examine the statement and give your views to improve the situation. (UPSC Mains GS-II 2017) Answer Framework:

    • Introduction: Acknowledge the constitutional status of Local Self-Government (LSG) post the 73rd and 74th Amendments but state that their effectiveness has been a mixed bag.
    • Arguments for LSGs being Ineffective:
      • Financial Starvation: Over-dependence on state and central grants; poor own-source revenue generation.
      • Functional Subordination: State governments are reluctant to devolve key functions and functionaries, treating LSGs as mere implementing agencies.
      • Capacity Deficit: Lack of trained personnel, technical expertise, and infrastructure at the local level.
      • Political Interference: Dominance of state-level politicians and bureaucracy (e.g., role of District Collector) over local elected bodies.
      • Lack of Gram Sabha Empowerment: In many places, the Gram Sabha remains a token body rather than a vibrant forum for participatory democracy.
    • Arguments for LSGs being Effective (Counter-view):
      • Political Empowerment: Success in creating a new generation of leaders, especially women and from marginalized communities.
      • Democratic Deepening: Brought governance closer to the people.
      • Success Stories: Cite examples like Kerala’s People’s Plan Campaign which showcases the potential of effective decentralization.
    • Measures for Improvement:
      • Activity Mapping: Clearly define the functions of each tier of government to avoid ambiguity.
      • Fiscal Decentralisation: Implement the recommendations of State Finance Commissions sincerely. Allow LSGs greater powers of taxation.
      • Capacity Building: Invest in training for elected representatives and officials.
      • Leveraging Technology: Use e-governance to improve transparency and service delivery.
      • Empowering Gram Sabhas: Create awareness and ensure their decisions are respected.
    • Conclusion: Conclude that while the LSG system faces significant hurdles, it is an indispensable instrument of governance. The solution lies not in discarding the system, but in strengthening it through genuine devolution of the 3Fs and robust capacity building.

  5. Critically examine the role of the Election Commission of India in ensuring free and fair elections, and suggest necessary reforms to strengthen its autonomy. (Conceptual Question) Answer Framework:

    • Introduction: Introduce the ECI as a constitutional body under Article 324, tasked with the monumental responsibility of conducting free and fair elections in the world’s largest democracy.
    • Critical Examination of ECI’s Role (Successes and Failures):
      • Successes: Successful conduct of numerous national and state elections, high voter turnout, systematic voter registration (SVEEP), enforcement of the MCC, introduction of EVMs and VVPATs, and managing election logistics on a massive scale.
      • Failures/Challenges: Inability to curb money power and criminalization, allegations of partisan behavior in enforcing the MCC, controversies over EVMs, limited powers to de-register parties, and recent concerns over the appointment process.
    • Reforms to Strengthen Autonomy:
      • Appointment Process: Recommend the collegium-based appointment process as suggested by the Supreme Court in the Anoop Baranwal (2023) case and reports like the 2nd ARC and Dinesh Goswami Committee, to make it more independent and transparent.
      • Security of Tenure for ECs: Grant the same constitutional protection from removal to Election Commissioners as is available to the CEC to ensure they can function without fear.
      • Independent Secretariat and Consolidated Fund Expenditure: Give the ECI control over its own secretariat and charge its expenditure on the Consolidated Fund of India to ensure financial autonomy.
      • Enhanced Powers: Grant the ECI powers to de-register political parties and frame rules for regulating their internal functioning and finances.
      • Post-Retirement Restrictions: Introduce a cooling-off period or constitutional bar on post-retirement appointments for all commissioners to prevent any perception of executive influence.
    • Conclusion: Conclude that the ECI has been a remarkably successful institution, but to face contemporary challenges and maintain public trust, structural reforms that bolster its autonomy and powers are imperative.

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