GS Notes

Polity Notes 21

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The Office of the Speaker of Lok Sabha

  • Constitutional Provisions and Election: The office of the Speaker is established under Article 93 of the Constitution, which states that the House of the People (Lok Sabha) shall, as soon as may be, choose two members of the House to be respectively Speaker and Deputy Speaker. By parliamentary convention, the Speaker is typically a member of the ruling party or coalition. The first Speaker of the Lok Sabha, G.V. Mavalankar, in his address in 1947, emphasised the need for the Speaker to be impartial and rise above party politics, a principle that remains a cornerstone of the office’s intended functioning.

  • Tenure and Removal:

    • Security of Tenure: The Speaker holds office from the date of their election till immediately before the first meeting of the Lok Sabha after the dissolution of the one to which they were elected (Article 94). They do not vacate their office upon the dissolution of the House.
    • Cessation of Office: A Speaker’s position becomes vacant if:
      1. They cease to be a member of the Lok Sabha.
      2. They resign by writing to the Deputy Speaker. A constitutional grey area exists regarding resignation when the Deputy Speaker’s office is also vacant. The Supreme Court has not definitively ruled, but it is argued that in such a scenario, the resignation could be addressed to the Secretary-General of the Lok Sabha or the President.
      3. They are removed by a resolution passed by a majority of all the then members of the House, known as an effective majority. This process, outlined in Article 94(c), requires a 14-day advance notice. When such a resolution is under consideration, the Speaker cannot preside but can speak, participate in proceedings, and vote in the first instance.

  • Powers and Functions: The Speaker is the head of the Lok Sabha and its principal spokesperson. Their authority is derived from the Constitution, the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of Lok Sabha, and Parliamentary Conventions.

    • Conduct of Business: The Speaker has final and binding power in conducting the business of the House. Their decisions on procedural matters cannot be challenged in any court of law, as established in cases like M.S.M. Sharma vs. Sri Krishna Sinha (1959), which upheld the internal autonomy of the legislature.
    • Anti-Defection Law: The Speaker decides on the disqualification of a member under the Tenth Schedule (Anti-defection Law). Initially, this decision was final. However, the Supreme Court in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) ruled that the Speaker’s decision is subject to judicial review on grounds of mala fides, perversity, or violation of constitutional mandate.
    • Money Bill: Article 110(3) grants the Speaker the final authority to decide whether a Bill is a Money Bill. This decision is not subject to judicial review.
    • Joint Sitting: The Speaker presides over a joint sitting of the two Houses of Parliament, convened by the President under Article 108 to resolve a deadlock over a non-Money Bill.
    • Parliamentary Committees: The Speaker appoints the chairpersons of all parliamentary committees of the Lok Sabha and supervises their functioning.
    • Secret Sittings: The Speaker can, on the request of the Leader of the House, allow a secret sitting, where no stranger can be present in the chamber, lobby, or galleries.

  • Provisions for Independence and Impartiality:

    • Security of Tenure: A difficult removal process (effective majority) ensures the Speaker is not under constant threat from the ruling party.
    • Salaries and Allowances: As per Article 97, the Speaker’s salary is fixed by Parliament and is charged on the Consolidated Fund of India, making it non-votable.
    • Conduct Cannot be Discussed: Their conduct in regulating the procedure of the House cannot be discussed or criticised except on a substantive motion for their removal.
    • Casting Vote: The Speaker does not vote in the first instance but can exercise a ‘casting vote’ in the case of a tie (Article 100), a provision meant to resolve deadlocks impartially.

Problem: Politicization of the Office of the Speaker

  • Context: Despite constitutional safeguards, the Speaker’s office, particularly at the state level, has often been accused of partisan behaviour. This is most evident in the application of the anti-defection law, where Speakers have been accused of delaying decisions on disqualification petitions to benefit the ruling party, as was alleged in the political crises in states like Karnataka (2019) and Manipur (2020).
  • Proposed Solution - The British Model: It is often suggested that India adopt the UK convention of “Once a Speaker, always a Speaker”. This model includes several practices:
    1. Party Resignation: Upon election, the Speaker resigns from their political party to ensure absolute impartiality.
    2. Uncontested Election: By convention, major political parties do not field a candidate against the Speaker in their constituency during general elections.
    3. Cross-Party Support: In the UK, a candidate for Speaker must be nominated by at least 12 MPs, of whom at least three must be from a different party.
    • Applicability in India: Adopting this would require a strong political consensus. It is argued that once elected, an Indian Speaker should resign from their party. Further, a convention could be developed for their re-nomination and potential re-election to the post in the subsequent Lok Sabha to ensure continuity and experienced leadership, insulating the office from political vicissitudes.

The Office of the Deputy Speaker

  • The Deputy Speaker is also elected by the Lok Sabha from amongst its members (Article 93). By convention, since the 11th Lok Sabha, the post has been offered to a member of the principal opposition party.
  • They perform the duties of the Speaker’s office when it is vacant or when the Speaker is absent (Article 95). In doing so, they possess all the powers of the Speaker.
  • A unique privilege is that if the Deputy Speaker is appointed as a member of any parliamentary committee, they automatically become its chairman.
  • The removal process is identical to that of the Speaker.

Problem: Parliamentary Privileges and their Misuse

  • Constitutional Basis: Article 105 grants certain powers, privileges, and immunities to the Houses of Parliament, their committees, and their members. Key privileges include:

    1. Freedom of Speech in Parliament: No member is liable to any proceedings in any court for anything said or any vote given by them in Parliament.
    2. Right of Publication of Proceedings: No person is liable for publishing reports, papers, votes, or proceedings by or under the authority of a House of Parliament.
    3. Freedom from Arrest: Members cannot be arrested in civil cases during the session of the House and 40 days before its commencement and 40 days after its conclusion. This immunity does not extend to criminal cases or preventive detention.

  • The Problem of Non-Codification: The Constitution provided that until defined by Parliament, privileges would be the same as those of the British House of Commons at the commencement of the Constitution. Despite recommendations from bodies like the National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution (NCRWC, 2002), Parliament has not enacted a law to codify these privileges. This ambiguity has led to misuse and conflict.

    • JMM Bribery Case: In P.V. Narasimha Rao vs State (CBI/SPE) (1998), the Supreme Court interpreted Article 105(2) to grant immunity from prosecution to MPs who took bribes to vote in Parliament. This controversial verdict was recently overturned by a seven-judge bench in Sita Soren vs Union of India (2024), which ruled that parliamentary privilege does not protect legislators who accept bribes in connection with a vote or speech in the legislature.
    • Conflict with Media Freedom: Privileges have been used to intimidate journalists and media houses for critical reporting, creating a clash with the Fundamental Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression (Article 19(1)(a)).
    • Unparliamentary Conduct: Incidents such as the use of pepper spray during the debate on the Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Bill (2014) highlight how privileges are sometimes seen as a shield for disruptive behaviour rather than a tool for effective functioning.

  • Proposed Solution: The codification of privileges is essential to bring clarity, prevent misuse, and balance them with the fundamental rights of citizens. This would define the scope of privileges, establish clear penalties for breaches, and ensure they serve their intended purpose of enabling fearless debate, not shielding misconduct.

Problem: Lacunae in the Legislative Process

  • Delegated Legislation: This refers to the delegation of law-making power by the legislature to the executive. It is considered necessary because:

    • Parliament lacks the time and technical expertise to deliberate on the intricate details of modern, complex legislation.
    • It allows for flexibility, as the executive can make rules and regulations to adapt to changing circumstances without a formal amendment process.
    • It enables experimentation, such as implementing schemes like MGNREGA in pilot phases.
    • The Committee on Subordinate Legislation in both Houses is tasked with scrutinising whether the executive is exercising this power within the scope of the parent act.

  • The Decline of Legislative Scrutiny:

    • Hasty Passing of Bills: Recent years have seen a trend of passing significant legislation with minimal debate. For example, Section 66A of the IT Act (later struck down by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, 2015) and the three Farm Bills (2020) were passed amidst uproar and without adequate discussion.
    • Bypassing Committees: There has been a sharp decline in the percentage of Bills referred to Departmentally-Related Standing Committees (DRSCs). According to PRS Legislative Research, while 71% of bills were referred to DRSCs in the 15th Lok Sabha (2009-14), this fell to 25% in the 16th Lok Sabha (2014-19) and further to just 13% in the 17th Lok Sabha (as of late 2023). This undermines the principle of “legislative oversight.”
    • Role of the Whip and Anti-Defection Law: The party whip, an instruction to vote along party lines, enforced by the threat of disqualification under the Tenth Schedule, has stifled inner-party democracy. Unlike in the UK, where MPs often vote based on conscience or constituency interests on ordinary legislation, Indian MPs are bound by the party’s decision, reducing Parliament to a forum for ratifying executive decisions.

  • Private Member’s Bills:

    • A Bill introduced by an MP who is not a minister is a Private Member’s Bill. Fridays are allotted for their discussion.
    • Historically, they have been instrumental in shaping law. However, the last such Bill to be enacted was The Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Bill, 1968, which became an Act in 1970.
    • The President has an absolute veto over Private Member’s Bills, a power inherited from the Governor-General’s powers under the Government of India Act, 1935, which is seen as a disincentive for MPs to pursue legislative initiatives.

  • Proposed Solutions:

    1. Mandatory Committee Scrutiny: Make it a rule to refer all significant Bills to DRSCs for detailed examination.
    2. Reform Anti-defection Law: As recommended by the Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms (1990), the whip should be restricted to motions that threaten the stability of the government, such as no-confidence motions or money bills, allowing MPs freedom on other legislative matters.
    3. Strengthen Private Member’s Bills: The absolute veto of the President on these bills should be reconsidered to encourage legislative participation from individual MPs.

Prelims Pointers

  • Speaker’s Election: Article 93 provides for the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Lok Sabha.
  • Speaker’s Resignation: The Speaker submits their resignation to the Deputy Speaker.
  • Speaker’s Removal: Can be removed by a resolution passed by an ‘effective majority’ (majority of all the then members of the House) after a 14-day notice.
  • Continuity of Office: The Speaker continues in office even after the dissolution of the Lok Sabha until the first meeting of the new House.
  • Joint Sitting: Presided over by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha (Article 108). If the Speaker is absent, the Deputy Speaker presides.
  • Money Bill Certification: The Speaker’s decision on whether a Bill is a Money Bill is final (Article 110).
  • Salary and Allowances: Charged on the Consolidated Fund of India and are not subject to the annual vote of Parliament.
  • Deputy Speaker Convention: A member from the main opposition party is conventionally elected as the Deputy Speaker.
  • Parliamentary Privileges: Mentioned in Article 105 (for Parliament) and Article 194 (for State Legislatures).
  • Freedom from Arrest: Available only in civil cases, not in criminal cases or under preventive detention laws. The period is 40 days before and after the session.
  • Delegated Legislation: Law-making power delegated by the legislature to the executive. It is overseen by the Committee on Subordinate Legislation.
  • Private Member’s Bill: A bill introduced by an MP who is not a minister.
  • Last Passed Private Member’s Bill: The Supreme Court (Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction) Bill, 1968, was passed in 1970.
  • Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992): Made the Speaker’s decision under the anti-defection law subject to judicial review.
  • Sita Soren vs Union of India (2024): Ruled that legislators do not have immunity from prosecution for accepting bribes for a vote or speech.

Mains Insights

1. Politicization of the Speaker’s Office and the Crisis of Impartiality (GS Paper II)

  • Cause-Effect Relationship: The practice of the Speaker not formally resigning from their political party creates a perception of bias. This perception is exacerbated when their decisions, especially under the Tenth Schedule, consistently favour the ruling party. The effect is a decline in the credibility of the legislature, increased disruptions from the opposition, and a greater tendency for political disputes to be settled in courts rather than on the floor of the House.
  • Debate on Adopting the UK Model:
    • Arguments For: Adopting the UK’s ‘once a speaker, always a speaker’ convention, including resignation from the party, would significantly enhance the office’s impartiality and institutional integrity. It would foster greater trust among all members.
    • Arguments Against: India’s fragmented, multi-party system makes it difficult to build the consensus needed for an uncontested election for the Speaker in their constituency. A Speaker detached from a party might lack the political support base to be re-elected. The change requires a shift in political culture, not just a procedural amendment.

2. Parliamentary Privileges: A Tool for Democracy or a Cloak for Impunity? (GS Paper II)

  • Historiographical Viewpoint: The privileges were adopted from the British system, where they evolved as a defense for Parliament against the monarchy. In the Indian context, the debate is whether these undefined privileges are necessary for a sovereign Parliament or if they clash with the principles of a modern republic based on constitutionalism, rule of law, and fundamental rights (especially Articles 14, 19, and 21).
  • Analysis of Non-Codification:
    • Legislative Reluctance: Parliament’s failure to codify privileges can be seen as a deliberate strategy to retain wide, flexible powers. Codification would subject these privileges to judicial scrutiny for potential violation of Fundamental Rights.
    • Judicial Intervention: The Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence, from granting wide immunity in the P.V. Narasimha Rao case (1998) to revoking it in the Sita Soren case (2024), shows the judiciary stepping in to define the limits of these privileges where the legislature has failed to act. This highlights the classic tension between parliamentary sovereignty and judicial review.

3. The ‘Decline of Parliament’ and the Rise of the Executive (GS Paper II)

  • Systemic Issue: The hasty passage of bills, bypassing of committee scrutiny, and the rigid application of the party whip are not isolated incidents but symptoms of a larger trend: the growing dominance of the executive over the legislature. This transforms Parliament from a deliberative body into a ratifying one.
  • Consequences:
    • Poor Quality of Laws: Laws passed without adequate scrutiny often contain flaws, leading to implementation challenges and litigation (e.g., Section 66A of the IT Act).
    • Erosion of Accountability: When Parliament cannot effectively hold the executive accountable through debate and oversight, a key pillar of parliamentary democracy is weakened.
    • Rise of Judicial Activism: The judiciary often fills the vacuum created by legislative inaction or poorly drafted laws. This leads to accusations of judicial overreach but is often a consequence of the legislature’s abdication of its responsibilities.
    • Weakening of Federalism: Passing bills with significant impact on states, like the Farm Bills, without sufficient debate or consultation with states undermines the federal spirit of the Constitution.

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