Polity Notes 31

The Evolution of Centre-State Relations in India

The dynamic of Centre-State relations in India is a quintessential example of how political realities shape constitutional practice. While the Constitution of India provides a federal framework with a unitary bias, its actual functioning has evolved through distinct phases, driven largely by the prevailing political ecosystem rather than mere constitutional text. Scholars like Granville Austin in The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation (1966) described the Indian model as “cooperative federalism,” but its practical manifestation has been far from consistent.

Phase I: Era of One-Party Dominance (1947-1967)

This initial phase is often characterized as a period of ‘consensual federalism’ or a de facto unitary state, primarily due to the overwhelming dominance of the Indian National Congress.

• Political Context: The Congress party, under leaders like Jawaharlal Nehru and later Lal Bahadur Shastri, held power both at the Centre and in almost all states. This political homogeneity ensured that conflicts between the Centre and states were minimal and were often resolved within the internal mechanisms of the party rather than through constitutional channels.
• Role of Party High Command: The Congress Working Committee (CWC) functioned as an extra-constitutional centre of power. The selection of state Chief Ministers and even Governors was often decided by the party’s central leadership, making state governments subservient to the Centre’s directives. This blurred the lines between party hierarchy and constitutional governance.
• Office of the Governor: During this period, the Governor’s office was not a major point of contention. Governors, appointed by the Centre, were generally seen as aligning with the state governments, given their shared party affiliation. Their discretionary powers were rarely a source of friction.
• Planning Commission: Established in March 1950 through an executive resolution, the Planning Commission became a powerful instrument of central control over state policy and finance. It adopted a centralized, top-down approach for the Five-Year Plans. As noted by political scientist Paul Appleby in his report Public Administration in India: Report of a Survey (1953), this centralized planning mechanism gave the Union significant leverage over states. However, due to the political consensus and the high credibility of the national leadership, the Commission’s role was not widely contested by the states.
• Use of Article 356: The provision for President’s Rule was used sparingly. The most notable and controversial instance was the dismissal of the first democratically elected Communist government in the world, led by E.M.S. Namboodiripad in Kerala in 1959. This event was a harbinger of the potential for misuse of this article for political purposes, although such instances remained an exception during this phase.

Phase II: Era of Confrontational Federalism (1967-1990)

The general elections of 1967 marked a watershed moment, ending the Congress party’s monopoly on power. Non-Congress governments emerged in several states, initiating an era of Centre-State conflict.

• Shift in Political Landscape: The rise of regional parties and coalition governments (Samyukta Vidhayak Dals) in states created a multi-polar political system. This divergence between the ruling party at the Centre (Congress) and those in several states became the primary cause of confrontation.
• Contentious Issues:
  • Office and Discretionary Powers of the Governor: The Governor was increasingly perceived as an “agent of the Centre.” Governors often used their discretionary powers—in appointing Chief Ministers, testing majorities, and recommending President’s Rule—to undermine non-Congress state governments. For instance, the dismissal of the United Front government in West Bengal (1967) and the N. T. Rama Rao government in Andhra Pradesh (1984) are classic examples.
  • Misuse of Article 356: This period witnessed the most frequent and flagrant misuse of Article 356. It was invoked over 80 times, often on flimsy grounds of “breakdown of constitutional machinery,” which in reality meant political inconvenience for the central government. The dismissal of nine state governments by the Janata Party government in 1977 and the subsequent dismissal of nine non-Congress (I) governments by the Indira Gandhi government in 1980 institutionalized this politically motivated practice.
  • Role of the Planning Commission: State governments began to openly criticize the Planning Commission for its arbitrary allocation of funds and for encroaching upon their autonomy in developmental planning. The perception grew that financial assistance was tied to political loyalty.
  • All India Services (IAS, IPS): State governments expressed grievances over the dual control structure of All India Services, arguing that officers often prioritized the directives of the central government over those of the state, undermining state authority.
• State Demands and Institutional Response: The growing friction led to demands for greater state autonomy. The Chief Ministers’ Conference in 1983 was a significant event where radical demands were put forth. In response to these escalating tensions, the Union government appointed the Sarkaria Commission in 1983 under Justice R.S. Sarkaria to examine Centre-State relations. Its report, submitted in 1988, made 247 recommendations to promote cooperative federalism, though many of its key suggestions were not implemented for years.

Phase III: Era of Cooperative and Bargaining Federalism (1990 onwards)

The decline of single-party dominance at the Centre and the advent of coalition politics from 1989 onwards fundamentally altered the dynamics of Centre-State relations.

• Emergence of Coalition Governments: The necessity of forming coalitions at the Centre gave immense bargaining power to regional parties. As key constituents of the central government, parties like the DMK, TDP, and TMC could influence national policy and ensure that the interests of their respective states were protected. This interdependence led to a more consultative and accommodative relationship, often termed “bargaining federalism” by scholar Morris Jones.
• Judicial Activism: The judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, played a pivotal role in safeguarding federal principles. The landmark judgment in S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) proved to be a critical check on the arbitrary use of Article 356.
• Presidential Activism: Presidents like K. R. Narayanan exercised their constitutional authority with greater prudence. For instance, in 1997 and 1998, he returned the cabinet’s recommendations to impose President’s Rule in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar respectively, asking for a reconsideration, thereby upholding federal norms.
• Economic Liberalization (1991): Globalization and economic reforms opened up new avenues for states to engage directly with foreign investors and multilateral agencies. This fostered a spirit of competitive federalism, where states competed with each other to attract investment, thereby increasing their fiscal autonomy and reducing their dependence on the Centre.
• Deepening of Federalism: The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts of 1992 established a third tier of government (Panchayats and Municipalities), constitutionally mandating democratic decentralization and strengthening the federal structure from the grassroots level.
• Role of Media and Civil Society: Increased vigilance from an active media and civil society organizations brought greater transparency and public scrutiny to the actions of the central government, creating a deterrent against the blatant misuse of power.

S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994)

This Supreme Court judgment is a cornerstone in the jurisprudence of Indian federalism. It arose from the dismissal of the S. R. Bommai-led Janata Dal government in Karnataka in 1989. The court laid down a series of binding guidelines that significantly curtailed the Centre’s power to impose President’s Rule.

1. Judicial Review: The Court held that the proclamation of President’s Rule under Article 356 is not absolute and is subject to judicial review. Courts can strike down the proclamation if it is found to be based on mala fide, irrelevant, or extraneous grounds.
2. Floor Test is Supreme: The majority of a government must be tested only on the floor of the Legislative Assembly. The Governor’s subjective satisfaction is not a substitute for a floor test. This put an end to the practice of dismissing governments in Raj Bhavans.
3. Suspended Animation: The Court mandated that upon proclamation of President’s Rule, the State Assembly should not be dissolved immediately but only be kept in ‘suspended animation’. This allows for the possibility of reviving the assembly if the parliamentary approval for the proclamation is not granted.
4. Parliamentary Approval for Dissolution: The dissolution of the State Assembly can only occur after both Houses of Parliament have approved the proclamation under Article 356(3).
5. No Joint Sitting: Approval for the proclamation must be secured from both houses separately; there is no provision for a joint sitting.
6. Federalism as Basic Structure: In a monumental declaration, the Court affirmed that federalism is a part of the ‘basic structure’ of the Indian Constitution, and therefore, it cannot be abrogated.
7. Governor’s Appointment: The Court endorsed the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission regarding the appointment of Governors to ensure their impartiality:
   • The appointee should be an eminent person from some walk of life.
   • He should be a person from outside the State.
   • He should be a detached figure and not too intimately connected with the local politics of the State.
   • He should be a person who has not taken too great a part in politics generally, and particularly in the recent past.
   • It is desirable that a politician from the ruling party is not appointed as Governor of a state which is being run by some other party.

Bihar Assembly Dissolution Case (Buta Singh case), 2006

This case, Rameshwar Prasad & Ors v. Union of India, further reinforced the principles laid down in the Bommai judgment.

• Context: In 2005, following an inconclusive election in Bihar, Governor Buta Singh recommended the dissolution of the assembly, apprehending that post-poll alliances were being formed through unethical means (“horse-trading”). The UPA government at the Centre accepted this and dissolved the assembly.
• Supreme Court’s Ruling:
  • The Supreme Court declared the dissolution of the Bihar assembly unconstitutional and based on mala fide intentions.
  • It heavily criticized the Governor for acting in haste and on mere suspicion, without allowing a political process to unfold and failing to follow the Bommai guidelines.
  • The Court held that the Governor cannot prevent the formation of a government on the subjective fear of horse-trading.
  • Crucially, the Court asserted that the Council of Ministers at the Centre must independently verify the facts in a Governor’s report and not act as a mere “rubber stamp,” highlighting the politicization of the Governor’s office.
  • While the dissolution was held unconstitutional, the Court did not restore the assembly as the election process was already underway, demonstrating judicial restraint. The judgment served as a strong admonition to both the Central executive and the office of the Governor.

Prelims Pointers

• The Planning Commission was established by an executive resolution of the Government of India in March 1950.
• The first use of Article 356 to dismiss a state government with a majority was in Kerala in 1959 against the E.M.S. Namboodiripad government.
• The Sarkaria Commission was appointed in 1983 to examine Centre-State relations and submitted its report in 1988.
• The landmark Supreme Court case that laid down guidelines for the use of Article 356 is S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994).
• In the S. R. Bommai case, the Supreme Court declared federalism as a part of the ‘basic structure’ of the Constitution.
• The judgment stipulated that the test of majority of a government should be conducted only on the floor of the House.
• The state assembly should be kept in suspended animation until Parliament approves the proclamation under Article 356.
• The 73rd and 74th Constitutional Amendment Acts, 1992, established the third tier of government (Panchayati Raj Institutions and Urban Local Bodies).
• The Supreme Court case that held the dissolution of the state assembly on the Governor’s report based on the apprehension of horse-trading as unconstitutional was the Bihar Assembly Dissolution Case (2006), also known as Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India.
• The Sarkaria Commission recommended that the Governor should be an eminent, apolitical person from outside the state.

Mains Insights

1. The Political Nature of Indian Federalism:

   • Cause-Effect: The nature of Centre-State relations in India is less a product of constitutional design and more a consequence of the prevailing party system. The transition from a single-party dominant system (cooperative/centralized phase) to a multi-party coalition system (confrontational/bargaining phase) directly illustrates this. The recent return of a single-party majority at the Centre since 2014 has again raised concerns about a tilt towards centralization.
   • Analysis: This demonstrates the ‘political constitutionalism’ at play, where the balance of power is determined by political negotiations and electoral outcomes rather than just judicial interpretation.

2. The Governor’s Office: A Persistent Point of Friction:

   • Debate: The role of the Governor remains one of the most contentious issues in Indian federalism. The debate revolves around whether the Governor is a mere constitutional head of the state or an agent of the Centre. While constitutional propriety demands the former, political history, especially during the 1970s and 80s, points towards the latter.
   • Viewpoints: Various commissions, including Sarkaria and Punchhi (2007), have recommended measures to depoliticize the Governor’s appointment and codify their discretionary powers, yet these recommendations have been largely ignored by successive governments, indicating a lack of political will to reform an office that offers significant leverage.

3. Judicial Review as a Bulwark of Federalism:

   • Significance: The Supreme Court’s activism, particularly in the S.R. Bommai case, has been instrumental in preserving the federal structure. By establishing the ‘floor test’ as the sole determinant of majority and bringing the imposition of Article 356 under judicial review, the judiciary created a powerful check against executive overreach.
   • Contemporary Relevance: The principles laid down in Bommai continue to be relevant, as seen in cases like the Uttarakhand (2016) and Arunachal Pradesh (2016) crises, where the judiciary intervened to restore democratically elected governments. This highlights the judiciary’s role as the “balance wheel of the federation.”

4. From Cooperative to Competitive Federalism:

   • Evolution: The narrative of Indian federalism has evolved. While ‘cooperative federalism’ remains the ideal, the post-1991 economic reforms ushered in an era of ‘competitive federalism’, with states vying for investment.
   • New Institutions & Challenges: The abolition of the Planning Commission and the creation of the NITI Aayog (2015) was intended to foster cooperative federalism by involving states as equal partners. Similarly, the GST Council represents a unique model of pooled sovereignty. However, challenges persist, with states often alleging bias in fund allocation, encroachment on their legislative domains (e.g., recent farm laws, education policy), and the use of central agencies against political opponents, straining the federal fabric.