GS Notes

20. Security Notes 02

14 min read

Elaborate Notes

Naxalism: Ideology, History, and State Response

Naxalism is a left-wing extremist ideology rooted in Maoist political and military thought, which has manifested as a protracted armed insurgency against the Indian state. The term “Naxalite” originates from the Naxalbari village in the Darjeeling district of West Bengal, where a violent peasant uprising occurred in 1967. This uprising, led by figures like Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal, and Jangal Santhal, marked a definitive break from the mainstream parliamentary Communist Party of India (Marxist) and led to the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [CPI(ML)] in 1969.

  • Maoist Philosophy and Core Tenets: The ideology underpinning Naxalism is fundamentally derived from the teachings of Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese Revolution. Its core principles are revolutionary and anti-state in nature.

    • Primacy of Armed Struggle: The philosophy is encapsulated in Mao’s famous dictum, “Power flows from the barrel of a gun.” Naxalites believe that state power, which they see as serving the interests of a ‘comprador-bourgeoisie’ and ‘feudal landlords’, can only be captured through violent means.
    • Rejection of Parliamentary Democracy: They view the Indian democratic system as a sham designed to perpetuate exploitation. They believe that participation in elections legitimizes an oppressive state structure and, therefore, advocate for its complete overthrow.
    • Protracted People’s War: The strategy is not a swift coup but a long-drawn-out armed struggle. This involves a three-stage process, as theorized by Mao: strategic defensive (building strength), strategic equilibrium (parity with state forces), and strategic offensive (final seizure of power).
    • Rural Base Areas: The revolution is envisioned as “encircling the cities from the countryside.” Naxalites aim to build up bases in remote rural and forested areas, transforming them into “liberated areas”—zones free from government control.
    • Class Annihilation and Expansion: Within these liberated areas, a parallel government or ‘Jantana Sarkar’ is established. They expand their influence by systematically eliminating perceived ‘class enemies’—landlords, moneylenders, police informers, and government officials—through ‘people’s courts’ (Jan Adalats) and targeted killings.
    • Seizure of Urban Centres: The final goal is to use the consolidated rural power base to encircle and eventually capture urban centres, leading to the seizure of national political power.
    • Advocacy for the Marginalized: As a part of their political mobilization, Maoists publicly assert that they are fighting for the rights (Jal, Jungle, Zameen - Water, Forest, Land) of the most marginalized sections of society, including the rural poor, landless labourers, Dalits, and particularly Adivasi (tribal) communities. They call for a radical restructuring of the socio-political and economic order.

  • Strategies and Tactics:

    • Military Strategy: The primary military tactic is guerrilla warfare, characterized by hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, and the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). They operate in small, clandestine squads or platoons, typically of 7-10 members, led by a commander, which allows for high mobility and secrecy.
    • Intelligence and Local Support: Their survival and operational success are heavily dependent on local intelligence networks. They cultivate support among the local population through a mix of ideological propaganda, provision of rudimentary justice, and coercion.
    • Propaganda: Naxalite groups run extensive propaganda campaigns, using pamphlets, cultural troupes (e.g., the erstwhile Jana Natya Mandali in Andhra Pradesh), and clandestine meetings to disseminate Maoist teachings and vilify the state.

  • Social Composition and Initial Success (Naxalbari Phase): The movement initially drew support from a diverse cross-section of society aggrieved by the post-independence state.

    • Poor Peasants & Landless Labourers: These groups were burdened by insecure tenancy, exploitative land rents, and debt bondage to moneylenders. The failure of early land reforms provided fertile ground for revolutionary appeal.
    • Tribals: Adivasi communities, facing encroachment on their traditional lands and forests (Jal, Jungle, Zameen), cultural alienation, and displacement by development projects and mining, became the movement’s core constituency, especially in the central Indian tribal belt.
    • Students and Intellectuals: In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a segment of radicalized urban youth and students from prestigious institutions in cities like Kolkata were drawn to the romanticism of Maoist revolution, forming the initial leadership cadre.

  • Decline of the First Phase (Post-1972): The initial Naxalbari movement collapsed within a few years due to a combination of internal weaknesses and a strong state response.

    • Lack of Analytical Approach: The leadership, particularly Charu Majumdar, grossly underestimated the coercive power and resilience of the Indian state. They were unprepared for the systematic and brutal counter-insurgency operations.
    • Indiscriminate Violence: The “annihilation of class enemies” line often degenerated into indiscriminate killings, including of low-ranking police constables who came from similar poor, rural backgrounds. This alienated potential sympathizers and led to a loss of popular support.
    • Tactical and Strategic Failures: The emphasis on individual assassinations (the “annihilation line”) over building mass organisations proved to be a tactical failure. It exposed cadres to state intelligence and prevented the development of a broad-based movement.
    • Leadership Factionalism: The movement was plagued by intense ideological debates and factionalism. Leaders like Asim Chatterjee and Sushital Roy Chowdhury disagreed with Majumdar’s rejection of trade unions and mass fronts. A major split occurred over the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, which Majumdar opposed, calling it a war between two bourgeoisies, while others supported it as a national liberation struggle.
    • Urban-Rural Disconnect: As scholar Sumanta Banerjee notes in his work “In the Wake of Naxalbari” (1980), the urban-bred intellectual leadership often had a romanticized and simplistic understanding of the complex rural realities, leading to a disconnect with the very people they sought to liberate.
    • State Repression: The state responded decisively. With the United Front government in West Bengal failing to contain the unrest, President’s rule was imposed. The government launched Operation Steeplechase in 1971, a joint army-police operation that systematically dismantled the Naxalite network in West Bengal. Simultaneously, legislative measures like the West Bengal Land Reform (Amendment) Act, 1970 were enacted to address some of the root agrarian grievances.

  • Extent and Phases of Naxalism in India: After its initial decline, the movement revived and consolidated over decades.

    • Phase I (1967-1972): The Naxalbari uprising and its suppression, ending with the death of Charu Majumdar in police custody in 1972.
    • Phase II (1972-2004): A period of fragmentation and regrouping. The movement shifted its epicentre to the forested regions of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, with the emergence of powerful groups like the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI).
    • Phase III (2004-Present): The merger of PWG and MCCI in 2004 to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist) marked a significant consolidation. This led to an aggressive expansion, with violence peaking around 2009-2010, when over 180 districts were affected. This period saw major attacks, such as the Dantewada (Chintalnar) massacre in April 2010, where 76 security personnel were killed. The state’s response intensified with operations unofficially termed “Operation Green Hunt.”
    • Recent Trends: Government data shows a significant decline in the geographical spread and intensity of violence. In 2021, only 46 districts reported LWE-related violence. Incidents fell by 77% from 2258 in 2009 to 509 in 2021, and related deaths fell by 85% from 1005 in 2010 to 147 in 2021. The main ‘Red Corridor’ is now concentrated in parts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Telangana.

  • Causes for the Persistence of Naxalism: Despite the state’s efforts, the problem persists due to deep-seated structural issues.

    • Socio-Economic Deprivation: Naxalism’s footprint almost perfectly overlaps with areas of extreme poverty, illiteracy, lack of healthcare, and social discrimination, particularly affecting tribal and Dalit communities. Former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in 2006, famously described Naxalism as the “single biggest internal security challenge” for India, acknowledging its developmental roots.
    • Development and Displacement: The LWE-affected belt is paradoxically India’s richest mineral region. Aggressive mining and industrial projects, often undertaken with inadequate environmental and social impact assessments, have led to large-scale displacement of tribal communities. Studies indicate that tribals constitute a disproportionately high percentage (over 40%) of the total displaced population in India since independence.
    • Inadequate Rehabilitation: Failed or non-existent rehabilitation and resettlement policies for displaced persons have led to an “aggravation of deprivation,” fostering deep resentment and antagonism towards the state, which Naxalites exploit.
    • Governance Vacuum and Administrative Failures:
      • In many remote areas, the state’s presence is either non-existent or predatory (e.g., corrupt officials, exploitative forest guards). This creates a ‘governance vacuum’, which Naxalites fill by establishing their parallel ‘Jantana Sarkars’.
      • Postings to these areas were often considered ‘punishment postings’, leading to the deployment of unmotivated or inefficient officials.
      • The failure of land reforms to be implemented effectively remains a primary cause of rural inequality and discontent.
      • Poor implementation of constitutional safeguards like the Fifth Schedule and laws like the Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA), 1996, has denied tribal communities their rightful participation in governance and control over their resources.
    • Political-Bureaucratic-Corporate Nexus: An alleged “unholy nexus” between politicians, bureaucrats, and mining mafias often subverts laws designed to protect local communities, further fuelling the conflict.
    • External Support: While direct state support is not conclusively proven in recent times, there have been historical allegations of support from China and documented instances of ideological and training linkages with Maoist groups in Nepal.

  • Approach of the Indian State: The government has adopted a multi-pronged strategy that combines security measures with development initiatives.

    • Political and Legislative Empowerment:
      • Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA), 1996: Aims to empower Gram Sabhas in tribal areas to manage their own affairs and resources.
      • Forest Rights Act (FRA), 2006: Seeks to recognize and vest forest rights and occupation in forest-dwelling scheduled tribes and other traditional forest dwellers.
    • Economic Empowerment and Development:
      • Aspirational Districts Programme (ADP): Focuses on rapid transformation of the most underdeveloped districts, a majority of which are LWE-affected, through monitoring of key performance indicators.
      • District Mineral Foundation (DMF): Mandated under the MMDR Act, 2015, it ensures that a portion of mining royalties is used for the development of local communities in mining-affected areas.
      • Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS) & Special Central Assistance (SCA): Funds are provided to states for public infrastructure and services like schools (e.g., Eklavya Model Residential Schools), health centres, roads, and skill development centres.
    • Law and Order Front:
      • Modernization of Police Forces Scheme: A central scheme providing financial assistance to states for upgrading their police forces with modern weaponry, communication, and mobility.
      • Security Related Expenditure (SRE) Scheme: The central government reimburses a significant portion of the security-related expenditure incurred by LWE-affected states.
      • Elite Anti-Naxalite Forces: Creation of specialized, well-trained forces like the Greyhounds (Andhra Pradesh/Telangana), Black Panther (Chhattisgarh), and the central CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action) battalion of the CRPF.
      • National Policy and Action Plan (2015): A holistic framework that combines security, development, ensuring rights, and perception management.
      • SAMADHAN Doctrine (2017): An acronym-based doctrine for LWE strategy: S- Smart Leadership, A- Aggressive Strategy, M- Motivation and Training, A- Actionable Intelligence, D- Dashboard-based KPIs, H- Harnessing Technology, A- Action plan for each theatre, N- No access to financing.

Prelims Pointers

  • Origin: Naxalbari village, Darjeeling district, West Bengal, in 1967.
  • Key Foundational Leaders: Charu Majumdar, Kanu Sanyal, Jangal Santhal.
  • Political Party Formation: Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) [CPI(ML)] was formed in 1969.
  • Core Ideology: Based on the teachings of Mao Zedong (Maoism).
  • Key Maoist Concepts: “Power flows from the barrel of a gun,” “Protracted People’s War,” “Encircling the cities from the countryside.”
  • Consolidation of Movement: The Communist Party of India (Maoist) was formed in 2004 through the merger of the People’s War Group (PWG) and the Maoist Communist Centre of India (MCCI).
  • Major State Counter-Offensive:
    1. Operation Steeplechase (1971): Joint army-police operation in West Bengal.
    2. Operation Green Hunt (c. 2009): Unofficial name for a large-scale offensive against Naxalites in the ‘Red Corridor’.
  • Major Naxal Attack: Dantewada (Chintalnar) Massacre, April 2010, where 76 CRPF personnel were killed.
  • Key Government Schemes/Acts:
    • Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act (PESA), 1996.
    • Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act (FRA), 2006.
    • District Mineral Foundation (DMF) established under the MMDR Amendment Act, 2015.
    • Aspirational Districts Programme (ADP).
  • Government’s Strategic Doctrines:
    • National Policy and Action Plan to Address LWE, 2015.
    • SAMADHAN Doctrine, announced in 2017.
  • Specialised Anti-Naxal Forces:
    • Greyhounds: Andhra Pradesh/Telangana Police.
    • CoBRA (Commando Battalion for Resolute Action): Specialised unit of CRPF.
  • Statistics (MHA):
    • LWE violence incidents reduced from a high of 2258 in 2009 to 509 in 2021.
    • Resultant deaths reduced from 1005 in 2010 to 147 in 2021.

Mains Insights

GS Paper I: Indian Society

  • Naxalism as a Symptom of Social Failure: The movement’s social composition (tribals, Dalits, landless poor) highlights the continued existence of deep-rooted structural inequalities, caste discrimination, and the failure of the state to protect its most vulnerable citizens. It is not merely an insurgency but a violent manifestation of social grievances.
  • Impact on Tribal Society: While claiming to be protectors of tribals, the Naxalite movement has had a devastating impact. It has disrupted traditional social structures, led to a vicious cycle of violence and counter-violence, militarized tribal youth, and hindered the reach of education and healthcare, trapping communities between the state and the insurgents.
  • Development and Displacement: The correlation between mineral wealth, tribal habitats, and Naxal influence creates a classic conflict triangle. The national imperative for economic growth clashes with the constitutional rights and livelihoods of Adivasi communities, providing a perennial recruitment ground for extremist groups.

GS Paper II: Polity and Governance

  • The Debate: Law & Order vs. Socio-Economic Issue: A key analytical debate is whether to treat Naxalism primarily as a law and order problem or as a socio-economic and political challenge. A purely security-centric approach often alienates the local population, while a purely development-centric approach can be ineffective in the face of extreme violence. The current Indian state policy officially combines both, but its implementation on the ground remains a challenge.
  • Failure of Governance as a Root Cause: The persistence of Naxalism is a direct indictment of the quality of governance in remote areas. The concept of a ‘governance vacuum’ is central to understanding the issue. This vacuum is not just an absence of administration but also the presence of a predatory and exploitative state machinery, which creates the space for parallel Naxal governance (‘Jantana Sarkar’).
  • Implementation Deficit of Constitutional Provisions: The poor and diluted implementation of the Fifth Schedule, PESA Act, and Forest Rights Act demonstrates a systemic failure to translate constitutional ideals and legislative intent into reality. This erodes the trust of tribal communities in the democratic process and makes the Naxalite narrative of an ‘exploitative state’ more compelling.

GS Paper III: Internal Security & Economy

  • Evolution of Naxalism as a Security Threat: The movement has evolved from a disorganized peasant uprising in the 1960s to a sophisticated, militarized insurgency with a unified command structure (post-2004). Its ability to inflict heavy casualties on security forces (e.g., Dantewada 2010) established it as a formidable internal security challenge.
  • The Development-Security Nexus: The government’s “Clear, Hold, and Build” strategy acknowledges that security operations must be followed immediately by development interventions. The absence of development post-clearing operations allows Naxalites to regain influence. The success of this strategy depends on the seamless coordination between security forces and civil administration.
  • Economic Impact: Left-Wing Extremism severely hampers economic activity in India’s mineral-rich heartland. It creates an unstable investment climate, disrupts mining operations, and damages critical infrastructure like railway lines and communication towers, thereby retarding the economic development of some of the country’s poorest regions.
  • Funding of Naxalism: A critical aspect of counter-strategy is choking their financial supply lines. Naxalites raise funds through extortion (‘levy’) from mining companies, infrastructure contractors, and local businesses, as well as from the cultivation and trade of forest products like tendu leaves.

GS Paper IV: Ethics, Integrity, and Aptitude

  • Ethical Dilemmas for Security Forces: Security personnel operate in a complex environment where it is difficult to distinguish between an active insurgent, a sympathizer, and a coerced civilian. This creates ethical dilemmas regarding the use of force, potential for human rights violations, and the challenge of winning the trust of the local population while fighting an invisible enemy.
  • Probity in Governance: The “unholy nexus” between politicians, bureaucrats, and mining mafias in LWE-affected areas represents a severe crisis of integrity and probity. This corruption not only fuels the insurgency by creating grievances but also undermines the state’s moral authority to fight it.
  • Public Service Values: The practice of ‘punishment postings’ reflects a lack of empathy, dedication, and motivation within the civil services. It shows a failure to instill the value that serving in the most challenging areas is a critical responsibility, not a penalty. An effective response to Naxalism requires public servants with high emotional intelligence and a strong commitment to public welfare.

Graph View