20. Security Notes 03

Elaborate Notes

Critique of the Strategy/Approach of the Indian State Against Naxalism

• (a) & (b) Lack of Coordination between State Governments and between Centre-State Agencies:

  • Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) is an inter-state problem, with Naxalite cadres frequently moving across porous state borders (e.g., the tri-junction of Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha). However, policing remains a state subject, leading to fragmented responses.
  • State police forces have often been accused of guarding their intelligence jealously, viewing it as a source of operational advantage. This reluctance to share real-time inputs hampers coordinated, pre-emptive operations. The creation of the Multi-Agency Centre (MAC) at the central level and Subsidiary MACs (SMACs) at the state level under the Intelligence Bureau was a direct response to this challenge, aiming to create a seamless intelligence-sharing grid. However, operational effectiveness is still debated.
  • A significant “turf war” often exists between Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) like the CRPF and the state police. This friction stems from differences in operational command, perceived superiority of central forces, and lack of mutual trust. Scholar Ajai Sahni has frequently pointed out that effective counter-insurgency requires the primacy of local police due to their superior ground knowledge and intelligence networks, a principle often undermined by these inter-agency conflicts.

• (c) Inadequate Training and Combat Capabilities of State Forces:

  • State police forces, traditionally trained for conventional policing, are often ill-equipped for jungle warfare and counter-insurgency operations. The dependence on central forces is a direct consequence of this capacity gap.
  • The Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India, in its reports on state finances and police modernization, has consistently highlighted these deficiencies. The figures cited from a Chhattisgarh report are illustrative:
    • Obsolete Weaponry: The 23% obsolete weapons likely refer to older models like the .303 Lee-Enfield rifles, which are outmatched by the automatic weapons (like AK series rifles) used by Naxalites.
    • Shortages and Modernization Gaps: The cited shortage of 10,000 weapons and the MHA’s partial fulfillment of demand (14,000 out of 19,000) show a persistent gap between requirement and supply.
    • Underutilization of Funds: The unspent amount of ₹54 crore under the Modernisation of Police Forces (MPF) scheme points to administrative inefficiency, bureaucratic hurdles, and a lack of capacity within the state police departments to plan and execute modernization projects effectively.

• (d) Lack of Coordination between Civic Administration and Security Establishments:

  • The Expert Group of the Planning Commission (2008), chaired by D. Bandyopadhyay, strongly emphasized that the Naxal issue is fundamentally a developmental failure. Its report highlighted a “governance vacuum” in these areas.
  • The “clear, hold, and develop” strategy is central to counter-insurgency theory. The note accurately points out its failure in practice. Security forces may ‘clear’ an area of Naxal presence, but if the civil administration does not immediately move in with tangible development projects (schools, PDS, healthcare), the Naxals invariably return to fill the vacuum.
  • Conversely, development projects like road construction are often targeted by Naxals as they facilitate the movement of security forces. The failure of security forces to provide adequate protection to these infrastructure projects (e.g., contractors and workers being abducted or killed) leads to a vicious cycle of stalled development.

• (e) High-handedness of Central Security Forces:

  • Allegations of human rights violations, fake encounters, and sexual assault against the local tribal population by security forces are common. Such actions alienate the very people whose “hearts and minds” the state aims to win.
  • Works like The Burning Forest: India’s War in Bastar by Nandini Sundar provide an academic and ethnographic account of the impact of state violence on Adivasi communities, arguing that such heavy-handedness often pushes neutral locals towards the Naxalite cause. This creates a trust deficit that is extremely difficult to bridge.

• (f) Inadequate Surrender Policies of the States:

  • Surrender policies have often been ad-hoc and varied significantly from state to state. While some states offered attractive monetary packages, they lacked a comprehensive rehabilitation framework.
  • Effective rehabilitation must include vocational training, psychological counselling to de-radicalize cadres, assistance in social reintegration (which is difficult due to stigma), and protection from Naxal retaliation. The lack of a uniform and holistic central policy has led to inconsistent outcomes, with many surrendered cadres failing to join the mainstream.

Andhra Model

The Andhra Pradesh model is often cited as a successful example of a multi-pronged counter-LWE strategy, implemented primarily in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

• Developmental Front:

  • The strategy recognized that Naxalism’s appeal stemmed from genuine socio-economic grievances. The state launched targeted developmental interventions.
  • Revamped Public Distribution System (PDS): Ensuring food security by providing subsidized food grains in the most affected districts directly countered the Naxal narrative of state neglect.
  • Remote & Interior Area Development Programmes: These focused on last-mile connectivity by building roads, which not only spurred economic activity but also enabled better state presence. Improving health facilities addressed a critical need.
  • Modernization of Land Records: Land alienation is a core historical grievance. Digitizing records and curtailing the discretionary powers of lower-level revenue officials (Patwaris/Tehsildars) reduced corruption and exploitation, directly addressing a key Naxal recruitment plank.
  • Flagship Schemes: ‘Indiramma’ (Integrated Novel Development in Rural Areas and Model Municipal Areas) focused on rural housing and infrastructure, while ‘Jalayagnam’ was a massive irrigation project. These large-scale, visible schemes demonstrated the state’s commitment to development.

• Law and Order Front:

  • Greyhounds: This elite force, established in 1989 by IPS officer K.S. Vyas, became the spearhead of Andhra’s offensive.
    • Training: They received specialized training in guerrilla tactics, jungle and survival warfare, and intelligence-based operations, effectively mirroring and surpassing the Naxals’ own methods.
    • Operational Doctrine: They operate in small, agile teams, relying heavily on human intelligence (HUMINT) and technical intelligence (TECHINT). Their success was built on surprise, speed, and precision.
  • Civilian Vigilante Groups: Unlike the controversial state-sponsored Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh (which was declared illegal by the Supreme Court in Nandini Sundar & Ors. vs. State of Chhattisgarh, 2011), Andhra’s approach was more structured. It focused on using surrendered Naxalites, whose knowledge of the terrain and Naxal networks was invaluable. This was tied to attractive surrender and rehabilitation policies that encouraged defections.

Way Forward

• Political Solutions:

  • (a) Functional Tribal Advisory Councils (TACs): Established under the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution, TACs are meant to advise the Governor on matters pertaining to the welfare of Scheduled Tribes. However, they are often defunct or their advice is not heeded. Empowering them would ensure tribal participation in their own governance.
  • (b) Reforms in the Forest Rights Act, 2006: The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 is a landmark legislation. However, its implementation has been slow due to bureaucratic apathy and resistance from the forest department. Effective implementation, particularly of community forest rights, can empower tribal communities and address historical injustices.
  • (d) Sincere Dialogue: A political dialogue is essential for a lasting solution. This requires the state to address the root causes of the conflict and offer a credible path for rebels to join the democratic mainstream, as seen in the resolution of the Mizo insurgency.

• Administrative Solutions:

  • (a) Sensitization of Bureaucracy: Training and sensitizing officials about the unique cultural and social context of tribal communities can help bridge the gap between the state and the people.
  • (b) Community Involvement: Shifting from a top-down, supply-driven development model to a bottom-up, participatory approach ensures that projects meet the actual needs of the community and fosters a sense of ownership.
  • (c) Motivated and Capable Officers: Posting competent and motivated officers to LWE-affected areas is crucial. This can be encouraged through special incentives, better infrastructure, and fixed, longer tenures.

• Law and Order Solutions:

  • (a) Upgrading State Forces: States must invest in creating their own specialized forces modeled on the Greyhounds, reducing over-reliance on CAPFs. Training in guerrilla warfare, intelligence gathering, and modern weaponry is paramount.
  • (b) Modern Surrender and Rehabilitation Policy: A uniform, centrally-guided policy should be designed, focusing on holistic rehabilitation. This policy must provide security, financial assistance, vocational training, and psychological support to ensure former cadres can successfully reintegrate into society.

Discussion on the Tribals

This section provides a basic anthropological context for understanding tribal societies.

• The evolution from hunter-gatherer (forager) societies to organized groups marks the beginning of human culture. Knowledge transmission through oral traditions, paintings (e.g., Bhimbetka rock shelters), and later, inscriptions, was key to this process.
• The history of human interaction is characterized by cooperation, conflict, and indifference. Conflict, often over resources, has been a constant theme.
• The defining characteristic of tribal (Adivasi) groups in the Indian context is their historical “aloofness” or relative isolation from the mainstream caste-based agrarian societies of the plains. This isolation, often due to geography (hills and forests), allowed them to develop unique social structures, cultural practices, and economic systems intimately tied to their natural environment (jal, jangal, jameen - water, forest, land). This distinct identity is central to understanding their perspective and historical grievances against the encroachments of the modern state and market forces. The debate between scholars like Verrier Elwin (who advocated for a policy of temporary isolation to protect them from exploitation) and G.S. Ghurye (who argued for their assimilation as “backward Hindus”) shaped early post-independence tribal policy.

Insurgency in the North East: Historical Roots

• Pre-Colonial Context:

  • The North-East was largely a patchwork of kingdoms and autonomous tribal communities. The Ahom Kingdom, founded by the Tai prince Sukapha in 1228, was the dominant power in the Brahmaputra Valley for nearly 600 years (1228-1826).
  • The Konbaung dynasty of Burma was a rising expansionist power in the 18th and early 19th centuries, leading to inevitable conflict with the British East India Company, which was consolidating its hold over Bengal and expanding eastward.

• The First Anglo-Burmese War (1824-1826):

  • Reasons:
    1. Border Clashes: An undefined and long border between British India and an expansionist Burma led to frequent friction.
    2. Commercial Interests: Both powers sought to control the trade routes and resources of the region.
    3. Geopolitical Concerns: British fear of French influence at the Burmese court was a significant factor, consistent with their broader global rivalry with France.
  • Treaty of Yandaboo (1826): This treaty marked a turning point. Burma ceded Assam, Manipur, Arakan, and Tenasserim to the British. It effectively ended the Ahom kingdom and initiated the formal process of British annexation of the North-East.

• British Consolidation and Policies (1826-1895):

  • Administrative Division: The British divided Assam, placing Lower Assam under direct control (Commissionerate System) and initially allowing an Ahom prince to rule Upper Assam as a protectorate. However, following rebellions, the whole of Assam was brought under direct rule by 1838. Over the next few decades, the British systematically annexed other territories, including the Cachar, Jaintia, Naga, and Lushai (Mizo) hills.
  • The Posa System: The Ahoms had a system of paying tributes (posa) in kind (goods, not cash) to the hill tribes (like Nagas, Mizos) to ensure peace and prevent raids on the plains. The British continued this system but monetized it, replacing payments in kind with cash. This seemingly simple change had profound impacts:
    • It forcibly integrated tribal economies into the colonial cash economy, making them dependent.
    • It transformed a relationship based on mutual respect (or fear) into one of direct administrative and financial control, undermining the authority of tribal chiefs.
  • Policy of Non-Interference and Isolation: While the British integrated the region economically, they adopted a policy of administrative isolation for the hill areas.
    • Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873 (Inner Line Permit): This regulation created an “Inner Line,” restricting the entry of outsiders into designated hill areas. The stated purpose was to protect tribal communities from commercial exploitation by plainsmen. However, it also served to create a political and administrative buffer, preventing the hill tribes from developing political linkages with the growing nationalist movement in the rest of India.
    • Administrative Classification: The Government of India Act, 1919 declared these areas “Backward Tracts.” The Government of India Act, 1935, further refined this into “Excluded Areas” (e.g., Naga Hills, Lushai Hills) and “Partially Excluded Areas.”
      • Excluded Areas: Administered directly by the Governor of Assam, with no representation in the provincial legislature.
      • Partially Excluded Areas: Had some representation, but the Governor retained significant discretionary power.
    • This policy of administrative separation fostered a distinct political consciousness among the tribes, separate from the Indian mainstream, which became a major factor in post-independence insurgencies.

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Prelims Pointers

• Naxalism:
  • Key reports on Naxalism: Expert Group of the Planning Commission (2008), chaired by D. Bandyopadhyay.
  • Modernisation of Police Forces (MPF) is a centrally sponsored scheme to assist state police forces.
  • Andhra Pradesh’s elite anti-naxal force: Greyhounds (founded in 1989).
  • Andhra Pradesh development schemes mentioned: Indiramma Yojana, Jalayagnam.
• Tribal Governance & Rights:
  • Tribal Advisory Councils (TACs) are mandated by the Fifth Schedule of the Constitution.
  • The Forest Rights Act (FRA) was enacted in 2006. Its full name is The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006.
• North-East History:
  1. Ahom Dynasty ruled Assam from 1228 to 1826 A.D.
  2. The First Anglo-Burmese War took place from 1824 to 1826.
  3. The Treaty of Yandaboo was signed in 1826 between the British and Burma.
  4. The Treaty of Yandaboo resulted in British control over Assam and Manipur.
  5. The Posa system was a practice of paying tributes by the Ahoms to the hill tribes.
  6. The Inner Line Permit (ILP) system was introduced by the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation of 1873.
  7. The province of Assam was created in 1874.
  8. Under the Government of India Act, 1919, hill areas were declared “Backward Tracts”.
  9. The Government of India Act, 1935, divided hill areas into “Excluded Areas” and “Partially Excluded Areas”.

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Mains Insights

Critique of State’s Strategy on Naxalism

• Security-centric vs. Development-centric Debate: The state’s approach has often oscillated between treating Naxalism purely as a law and order problem versus a socio-economic one. The failure lies in not pursuing both with equal vigour simultaneously. A security-only approach (e.g., Operation Green Hunt) alienates the local population, while a development-only approach is impossible without first establishing security and state control. The Andhra Model’s success lay in its effective synthesis of both prongs.
• Federalism and Internal Security: The challenges of coordination highlight a key friction point in India’s federal structure. While law and order is a State List subject, insurgencies like Naxalism are national security threats. This necessitates mechanisms for seamless Center-State cooperation, yet constitutional divisions and political rivalries often create roadblocks, undermining the effectiveness of the national counter-LWE strategy.
• The Problem of State Capacity: The underutilization of modernization funds by Chhattisgarh police is a classic example of low state capacity. It’s not just about the availability of funds, but the administrative ability to plan, procure, and implement. This weakness in governance at the state and local levels is a root cause for the persistence of the problem.

The Andhra Model: Success and Replicability

• Cause of Success: The Andhra Model succeeded because it was a holistic, long-term strategy. It combined a ruthless, intelligence-driven security offensive (Greyhounds) with a genuine political and administrative will to address core grievances (land rights, PDS). This dual approach broke the Naxals’ operational capacity while simultaneously eroding their popular support base.
• Limitations and Challenges in Replicability: The model may not be universally replicable.
  1. Geography: The terrain in Andhra is less challenging than the dense, contiguous forests of the Dandakaranya region (Bastar).
  2. Socio-Political Context: The nature of tribal communities and their relationship with the state differ across regions.
  3. Political Will: The success in Andhra was driven by sustained political and administrative commitment, which may be lacking in other states.
  4. The Vigilante Question: The use of surrendered cadres and civilian groups is a double-edged sword. If not strictly controlled and regulated by law (as the Supreme Court warned in the Salwa Judum case), it can lead to civil war-like situations and gross human rights violations.

Legacy of Colonial Policies in the North-East

• Cause and Effect: Colonial Policy and Post-Independence Insurgency: The British policies of administrative isolation (Inner Line, Excluded Areas) had a direct causal link to the rise of insurgency after 1947.
  • Effect: By preventing integration with the rest of India, these policies fostered a unique and separate identity among the hill tribes. When independence came, many groups (like the Nagas under A.Z. Phizo) feared that their distinct culture and identity would be subsumed by the Indian ‘mainstream’. This fear, combined with a lack of political connection to the nationalist movement, became the ideological bedrock for secessionist demands.
• Historiographical Viewpoint - The Frontier State: Scholars like Willem van Schendel argue that the North-East should be viewed as a “frontier” region where the process of state-making was incomplete and contested. British policies were not about governance but about “pacification” and creating a buffer against Burma and China. This legacy of viewing the region and its people through a security lens, rather than a developmental or political one, continued to influence New Delhi’s policies for decades after independence, often exacerbating the conflict.
• Economic Disruption as a Cause of Conflict: The monetization of the ‘Posa’ system is a micro-example of a larger process. Colonial economic policies disrupted traditional, self-sufficient tribal economies and forcibly integrated them into a resource-extraction model (tea plantations, oil, timber). This created new forms of dependency and exploitation, laying the economic groundwork for future grievances that insurgents could capitalize on.