GS Notes

20. Security Notes 05

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Elaborate Notes

Contemporary Situation of Arunachal Pradesh

  • Spillover of Naga Insurgency: The Naga separatist movement, spearheaded by groups like the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), has historically sought the creation of a “Greater Nagalim” or Nagalim, an independent state encompassing all Naga-inhabited areas. This includes the Tirap, Changlang, and Longding (TCL) districts of Arunachal Pradesh, which are geographically contiguous with Nagaland and home to Naga tribes like the Wancho, Nocte, and Tangsa. Consequently, these districts have served as operational areas for NSCN factions (both NSCN-IM and the erstwhile NSCN-K) for recruitment, taxation, and safe havens, leading to a spillover of violence and extortion from Nagaland.
  • Impact of Ceasefire Agreement: The Government of India entered into a ceasefire agreement with the NSCN (Isak-Muivah) faction in 1997. This significantly reduced the scale of violence and direct confrontations between the security forces and the largest Naga insurgent group. While factional clashes and extortion activities have persisted, the overall security situation in the state has improved, leading to a state of relative peace.
  • The Chakma-Hajong Refugee Issue:
    • Historical Background: The Chakmas (largely Buddhist) and Hajongs (largely Hindu) are ethnic communities indigenous to the Chittagong Hill Tracts of erstwhile East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). They faced religious and ethnic persecution and were displaced by the construction of the Kaptai Dam on the Karnaphuli River in the early 1960s. Consequently, they fled to India between 1964 and 1965.
    • Settlement and Legal Interventions: The Government of India, under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, decided to settle these refugees in the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA), which later became Arunachal Pradesh. Despite living there for decades, they were not granted citizenship and faced local opposition. The issue reached the Supreme Court, which in its landmark judgments in National Human Rights Commission vs. State of Arunachal Pradesh & Anr. (1996) and a subsequent 2015 ruling, directed the central and state governments to process their applications and grant them citizenship, affirming their right to life and liberty.
    • State Opposition and Demographic Concerns: Following the judicial directives, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) initiated steps to grant citizenship. However, the Arunachal Pradesh government and local civil society groups, such as the All Arunachal Pradesh Students’ Union (AAPSU), have staunchly opposed this move. Their primary concern is the potential for “demographic inversion.” Arunachal Pradesh is a state with a delicate ethnic balance, protected by the Bengal Eastern Frontier Regulation, 1873 (Inner Line Permit system), which restricts the settlement of outsiders. Opponents argue that granting citizenship to a large number of refugees would alter the indigenous demographic profile, strain limited resources like land and jobs, and undermine the special constitutional protections afforded to the tribal communities of the state.

Contemporary Situation of Assam

  • United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA):

    • Formation and Ideology: ULFA was formed on 7 April 1979, by Assamese nationalists including Paresh Baruah and Arabinda Rajkhowa, emerging from the radical fringe of the anti-foreigner Assam Agitation (1979-1985). Its core objective was to establish a “Swadhin Asom” (sovereign, independent Assam) through armed struggle.
    • Grievances: The group’s ideology is rooted in a set of deep-seated grievances:
      1. Contested Integration: ULFA contests the legitimacy of Assam’s integration into the Indian Union, arguing it was a colonial construct post the Treaty of Yandabo (1826) and that the Assamese people never gave their free consent to be part of India.
      2. Cultural Distinctiveness: It asserts that Assam possesses a unique linguistic, cultural, and historical identity, which is fundamentally different from the rest of India and is being eroded.
      3. Economic Exploitation: A central tenet of ULFA’s narrative is that of Assam as a “colonial hinterland.” As argued by scholars like Sanjib Baruah in “India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality” (1999), the group claims that while the state is rich in natural resources like oil, tea, and coal, the economic benefits have been systematically siphoned off by the central government and non-Assamese business interests, leading to regional underdevelopment and poverty.
      4. Illegal Immigration: The influx of migrants, primarily from Bangladesh, is viewed as a state-sponsored demographic invasion designed to alter the ethnic composition of Assam and undermine the political and cultural dominance of the indigenous Assamese people.
    • Evolution and Decline:
      • Rise: ULFA gained significant popular support initially due to widespread public resonance with its grievances concerning unemployment, corruption, economic neglect, and the perceived threat from illegal immigration. Human rights violations by security forces during counter-insurgency drives like Operation Bajrang (1990) and Operation Rhino (1991) also fueled sympathy and recruitment.
      • Decline: Its support base eroded due to several factors: the criminalization of its cadres who increasingly indulged in extortion and kidnapping for ransom; loss of ideological credibility due to links with foreign intelligence agencies like Pakistan’s ISI; public weariness from the prolonged violence; and repeated failures to conclude peace talks.
    • Government of India’s Initiatives:
      1. Operation All Clear (2003): A decisive joint military operation launched by the Royal Bhutan Army, with logistical support from the Indian Army, which dismantled ULFA and NDFB camps in southern Bhutan, crippling their operational capacity.
      2. Peace Process: The government engaged in a long-drawn peace process, including a unilateral ceasefire in 2006. This culminated in a tripartite Suspension of Operations (SoO) agreement in 2011 between the Centre, the Government of Assam, and the pro-talks faction of ULFA.
      3. Factional Split: The peace process led to a formal split in the organization. The faction led by Chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa joined the talks, while the hardline faction, led by Commander-in-Chief Paresh Baruah, rejected the negotiations and rebranded itself as ULFA-Independent (ULFA-I), continuing its armed struggle from bases in Myanmar.

  • Bodo Insurgency:

    • Core Issues and Demands: The Bodos, the largest plains tribe in Assam, have long agitated for the protection of their distinct identity, culture, language, and traditional lands from perceived Assamese dominance and encroachment by migrants. Their demands have ranged from greater political representation and economic development to autonomy within Assam and, for some factions, a separate state of “Bodoland.”
    • Bodo Peace Accords: Three major accords have been signed to resolve the conflict:
      1. First Bodo Accord (1993): Created the Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC), which proved largely ineffective due to a lack of adequate financial and administrative powers.
      2. Second Bodo Accord (2003): Signed with the Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), this was a significant breakthrough. It led to the creation of the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, granting substantial autonomy over a territory designated as the Bodoland Territorial Area Districts (BTAD).
      3. Third Bodo Peace Accord (2020): A comprehensive agreement signed with all factions of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and student bodies like the All Bodo Students’ Union (ABSU).
        • Key Provisions: It provided for the alteration of the BTAD’s boundary, renaming it the Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR), and creating a commission to include contiguous Bodo-majority villages and exclude non-Bodo majority villages. It also created a Bodo-Kachari Welfare Council for Bodos outside the BTR, established a separate directorate for Bodo medium schools, made the Bodo language (in Devanagari script) an associate official language of Assam, and promised a substantial special development package.

Manipur

  • Complex Web of Issues: Manipur’s conflict is multi-layered, involving ethnic and territorial disputes.
    • Misgovernance and Corruption: Pervasive corruption and the siphoning of development funds have led to economic stagnation and a lack of opportunities, fuelling youth alienation and recruitment into insurgent groups.
    • Meitei Identity and Concerns: The Meitei community, concentrated in the Imphal Valley, feels its political and cultural dominance is eroding. As they are not a Scheduled Tribe, they cannot purchase land in the hill areas, which are protected for the tribes. This has led to a persistent demand for ST status for Meiteis.
    • Hill-Valley Divide: A significant cultural and political chasm exists between the predominantly Vaishnavite Hindu Meiteis of the valley and the largely Christian Naga and Kuki-Zomi tribes of the hills. This divide was accentuated by the mass conversion of tribal populations to Christianity by the 1930s.
    • Naga Insurgency Spillover: The NSCN(IM)‘s demand for Nagalim includes the four Naga-dominated hill districts of Manipur (Ukhrul, Senapati, Tamenglong, Chandel). This claim is a major source of tension and is vehemently opposed by both Meiteis and Kukis, leading to violent ethnic clashes, most notably the Naga-Kuki clashes of the 1990s.
    • Inter-Tribal Tensions: Conflicts over land, resources, and influence are common between tribes, particularly between Nagas and Kukis over territorial claims.
    • Ineffective Autonomous Councils: The Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) in the hill areas, created under a state act, are widely seen as powerless. Tribal groups have been demanding that these councils be brought under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution to grant them greater financial and legislative powers.
    • Economic Underdevelopment: Manipur lacks significant industries, making the state government the largest employer. This creates intense competition for limited government jobs and contributes to social unrest.
  • Major Insurgent Groups:
    • Valley-Based: United National Liberation Front (UNLF), People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK). Their primary grievance stems from the controversial Merger Agreement of 1949, which they claim was signed under duress, and they demand secession from India.
    • Hill-Based: Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and other Kuki-Zomi groups, which demand a separate state or autonomous region for their people.
  • Government Efforts:
    • Ceasefire with NSCN(IM) (1997): While aimed at Nagaland, this had major implications for Manipur. The ceasefire’s initial clause of being applicable “without territorial limits” sparked widespread protests in the Imphal Valley, forcing its revocation.
    • Suspension of Operations (SoO) with Kuki Groups: A tripartite SoO agreement was signed with the KNO and United People’s Front (UPF) in 2008, bringing a semblance of peace to Kuki-dominated areas.

Meghalaya

  • Context of Peace: Meghalaya has been relatively peaceful compared to its neighbours. The creation of the state in 1972, by carving it out of Assam, fulfilled the core political aspiration of the Khasi, Jaintia, and Garo tribes for self-determination, pre-empting a large-scale secessionist movement.
  • Contemporary Issues:
    • State vs. District Councils: As a Sixth Schedule state, Meghalaya has three powerful Autonomous District Councils (ADCs). There are frequent jurisdictional conflicts between the state government and the ADCs over control of resources like land and minerals.
    • Illegal Immigration: The porous border with Bangladesh has led to concerns about illegal immigration, especially in the Garo Hills region, which has sometimes fueled local militancy.
    • Border Dispute with Assam: A long-standing border dispute with Assam exists over twelve areas of contention, a legacy of the state’s creation. In a recent positive development, an agreement was signed in 2022 to resolve the dispute in six of these twelve areas.
  • Government Steps: The key step was the creation of a separate state. More recently, the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA) has been completely removed from the state, reflecting the improved security environment.

Mizoram

  • A Model of Conflict Resolution: Mizoram stands as a successful example of resolving insurgency and establishing lasting peace.
  • Historical Trajectory and Government Initiatives:
    • The insurgency was led by the Mizo National Front (MNF) under Laldenga, which grew out of the Mizo National Famine Front formed during the devastating ‘Mautam’ famine of 1959. The MNF declared independence in 1966.
    • The Government of India responded with a multi-pronged approach:
      1. In 1972, Mizoram was separated from Assam and granted the status of a Union Territory.
      2. After years of negotiations, the landmark Mizoram Peace Accord was signed in 1986 between the Union Government and the MNF.
      3. As per the accord’s provisions, Mizoram was conferred full statehood in 1987.
      4. The MNF laid down its arms, and its leader, Laldenga, became the Chief Minister, successfully integrating the former insurgent group into the democratic political mainstream.

Nagaland

  • The Naga Political Issue: This is the oldest and most complex insurgency in the region, predating India’s independence.
  • Contemporary Issues:
    • Factionalism: A primary obstacle to a lasting solution is the deep division among Naga groups. The original Naga National Council (NNC) gave way to the NSCN in 1980, which then split into the NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K) in 1988. Further fragmentation has led to multiple factions, often engaged in violent turf wars. The NSCN(IM) has been engaged in peace talks, while other groups remain outside the process.
    • Peace Process and Demands:
      • Early Steps: The creation of the Naga Hills Tuensang Area (NHTA) in 1957 and the granting of statehood to Nagaland in 1963 were early attempts at a political solution but were rejected by hardliners.
      • Ceasefire and Talks (1997-Present): A ceasefire was signed with the NSCN(IM) in 1997, initiating a peace process that has continued for over two decades. The key demands of the NSCN(IM) include:
        1. Recognition of the unique history and political situation of the Nagas.
        2. Repeal of AFSPA.
        3. Territorial integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and Myanmar into a “Greater Nagalim.”
        4. A separate Naga Constitution (‘Yezhabo’) and a separate flag.
    • Framework Agreement (2015): A significant step was the signing of a Framework Agreement between the Government of India and the NSCN(IM). While its contents are not fully public, it is understood to be a preamble that recognizes the unique history of the Nagas and sets the principles for a final settlement.
    • Persistent Problems and Deadlocks:
      • The Government of India insists that any solution must be within the framework of the Indian Constitution, while the NSCN(IM) holds out for “shared sovereignty,” a separate constitution, and a flag.
      • The government has unequivocally rejected the demand for Nagalim, assuring neighbouring states that their territorial integrity will not be compromised.
      • The continued application of AFSPA remains a major irritant, with incidents like the extra-judicial killings in Oting, Mon district in 2021, reinforcing Naga demands for its repeal. The Supreme Court has also taken cognizance of alleged extra-judicial killings in the region, highlighting the issue of impunity.

Tripura

  • Demographic Change and Insurgency: The root of Tripura’s insurgency was the massive demographic shift caused by the influx of Bengali Hindu refugees from former East Pakistan. This reduced the indigenous Tripuri (Borok) population to a minority in their own state, leading to a sense of alienation and loss of land and culture. This gave rise to demands for a sovereign Tripura from insurgent groups like the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF).
  • Government Initiatives: The government adopted a dual strategy of security action and political accommodation. The creation of the Tripura Tribal Areas Autonomous District Council (TTAADC) under the Sixth Schedule was a key political step to protect tribal rights. A robust security response, coupled with the fencing of the international border and cooperation from Bangladesh, effectively neutralized the insurgency. Reflecting this success, AFSPA was revoked from the state in 2015.

Approach of Indian State to Tackle Insurgencies

The Indian state has adopted a multi-pronged strategy, often described as a “carrot and stick” approach, to manage and resolve insurgencies in the Northeast.

  1. Security and Military Measures:

    • Legislative Framework: Imposition of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (AFSPA), 1958, in disturbed areas to give security forces enhanced operational powers. The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) is used to ban insurgent organizations.
    • Force Deployment: Utilization of specialized counter-insurgency forces like the Assam Rifles and other Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs).
    • Border Management: Implementation of the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS), involving fencing, technology, and surveillance to curb cross-border movement.
    • International Cooperation: Conducting joint efforts with neighbouring countries, such as Operation All Clear (2003) with Bhutan and coordinated operations with Myanmar.

  2. Political and Administrative Measures:

    • Granting Autonomy: The extension of the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution to create Autonomous District Councils (ADCs) has been a key tool for granting local self-governance to tribal communities.
    • Statehood and Administrative Reorganisation: The creation of new states (Nagaland, Meghalaya, Mizoram, etc.) from the erstwhile state of Assam has been a major strategy to accommodate ethnic and political aspirations.
    • Institutional Mechanisms:
      • North-Eastern Council (NEC): Established in 1971 as a statutory body for coordinated regional planning and development.
      • Ministry of DoNER: The creation of the Department of Development of North Eastern Region (DONER) in 2001, upgraded to a full-fledged Ministry in 2004, to provide focused attention to the region’s development needs.
    • Peace Negotiations and Rehabilitation: Engaging in dialogue with insurgent groups and offering comprehensive Surrender-cum-Rehabilitation Policies to encourage militants to return to the mainstream.

  3. Economic and Developmental Measures:

    • Strategic and Economic Integration: The ‘Act East’ Policy (successor to the ‘Look East’ Policy) envisions the Northeast not as a periphery but as a crucial land bridge and economic hub connecting India to Southeast Asia.
    • Infrastructure Development: Launching major connectivity projects like the IMT Trilateral Highway (India-Myanmar-Thailand) and the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project to enhance regional trade and connectivity.
    • Livelihood Promotion: Implementing schemes like the National Bamboo Mission and National Horticulture Mission to leverage the region’s ecological resources for economic development.
    • Border Trade: Establishing Border Haats (traditional markets) along the borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar to promote local trade and strengthen people-to-people ties.

Prelims Pointers

  • Naga Insurgency in Arunachal: Affects Tirap, Changlang, and Longding (TCL) districts.
  • Chakma and Hajong Refugees: Fled Chittagong Hill Tracts (erstwhile East Pakistan) in 1964-65; settled in NEFA (now Arunachal Pradesh).
  • SC Judgments on Chakma-Hajong: 1996 and 2015 verdicts directed the Centre to grant them citizenship.
  • ULFA Formation: 7th April 1979, emerged during the Assam Agitation (1979-1985).
  • Operation All Clear (2003): Joint operation by the Indian Army and Royal Bhutan Army against ULFA and NDFB camps in Bhutan.
  • ULFA Factions: Pro-talks (led by Arabinda Rajkhowa) and ULFA-Independent (led by Paresh Baruah).
  • Bodo Accords:
    1. First (1993): Created Bodoland Autonomous Council (BAC).
    2. Second (2003): Created Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) under the Sixth Schedule.
    3. Third (2020): Renamed BTAD to Bodoland Territorial Region (BTR); made Bodo an associate official language of Assam.
  • Manipur Merger: The princely state of Manipur merged with the Indian Union on October 15, 1949.
  • Valley-Based Insurgent Groups (Manipur): UNLF, PLA, PREPAK.
  • Hill-Based Insurgent Groups (Manipur): KNO, ZRO.
  • Meghalaya Statehood: 1972, carved out of Assam.
  • Mizoram Peace Accord: Signed in 1986 between the Union Government and the Mizo National Front (MNF).
  • Mizoram Statehood: 1987.
  • Nagaland Statehood: 1963, became the 16th state of India.
  • NSCN Split: Split into NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K) in 1988.
  • Nagaland Framework Agreement: Signed between the Government of India and NSCN(IM) in 2015.
  • Tripura AFSPA Revocation: AFSPA was withdrawn from Tripura in 2015.
  • North-Eastern Council (NEC): Established in 1971.
  • Ministry of DoNER: Created as a department in 2001, became a ministry in 2004.
  • Major Connectivity Projects: IMT Trilateral Highway, Kaladan Multi-Modal Project.

Mains Insights

1. The Interplay of Identity, Autonomy, and Insurgency

  • Cause-Effect Relationship: Most insurgencies in the Northeast are not rooted in economic deprivation alone but are fundamentally driven by the politics of ethnic identity and the quest for political autonomy. The fear of assimilation by a larger cultural group (e.g., Bodos fearing Assamese, or various tribes fearing mainland Indian culture) has been a powerful catalyst.
  • Government Response Analysis: The Indian state’s response has evolved from a purely military approach to a more nuanced strategy of political accommodation. The creation of states like Nagaland, Meghalaya, and Mizoram, and the application of the Sixth Schedule for Autonomous Councils, are direct acknowledgements that recognizing and safeguarding distinct identities is crucial for peace.
  • Debate: While statehood and autonomy have been successful in places like Mizoram and Meghalaya, they are not a panacea. In Manipur, the hill-valley dichotomy persists despite statehood, and in Assam, the creation of the BTC has led to conflicts between Bodos and non-Bodos within the BTR. This highlights the challenge of accommodating the aspirations of one group without alienating others in a multi-ethnic region.

2. Challenges in Peace Processes and Accord Implementation

  • The Naga Peace Process Dilemma: The Naga issue exemplifies the complexities of resolving long-standing conflicts. The government’s contradictory stance—recognizing the “unique history” of the Nagas in the Framework Agreement while simultaneously refusing to discuss core demands like a separate flag, constitution, and territorial integration—creates a perpetual stalemate. This ambiguity risks eroding the credibility of the peace process.
  • Factionalism as a Spoiler: The fragmentation of insurgent groups (e.g., NNC to NSCN and its multiple factions) poses a significant challenge. An accord signed with one faction is often rejected by others, leading to continued violence and undermining the legitimacy of the agreement. The Third Bodo Accord is notable for successfully bringing all major factions to the table.
  • Post-Accord Challenges: The success of an accord depends on its sincere implementation. The failure of the first Bodo Accord (1993) due to inadequate powers is a cautionary tale. Even with successful accords like the Mizo Accord, long-term peace requires sustained economic development and political integration to address the root causes of alienation.

3. Economic Development as a Tool for Conflict Resolution

  • From ‘Law and Order’ to ‘Development’: There is a clear policy shift from viewing the Northeast solely through a security prism to integrating it into India’s economic growth story, particularly via the ‘Act East’ Policy. The government’s hypothesis is that infrastructure development, connectivity, and economic opportunities can address grievances like unemployment and neglect, thereby reducing the appeal of insurgency.
  • Potential Pitfalls: Development projects must be inclusive and environmentally sustainable. There is a risk that large-scale infrastructure projects, if implemented without consulting local communities, could lead to displacement and alienation, creating new conflicts over land and resources. The focus should be on “development with equity” that empowers local communities rather than a top-down model that primarily benefits external contractors and corporations.
  • Border Management and Economy: Initiatives like Border Haats represent a positive shift from seeing borders as mere security frontiers to zones of economic exchange. This can help normalize relations, build trust with neighbouring countries, and provide sustainable livelihoods for local populations, thereby creating a “peace dividend.”

4. The Geopolitical Dimension of Northeast Insurgency

  • Role of Neighbouring Countries: The porous international borders with Myanmar, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and China have historically played a crucial role in sustaining insurgencies. These countries have served as sources of arms, training, and safe havens for Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs).
  • Diplomacy as a Counter-Insurgency Tool: India’s foreign policy has become an integral part of its Northeast strategy. Improved relations with Bangladesh have led to a crackdown on ULFA and other groups. Cooperation with Myanmar and the landmark ‘Operation All Clear’ with Bhutan have been critical in weakening the operational capacity of insurgent outfits.
  • The ‘Act East’ Policy Linkage: The success of the Act East Policy is contingent on peace and stability in the Northeast, as the region is the physical gateway to Southeast Asia. Therefore, resolving internal conflicts in the Northeast is not just a matter of internal security but a strategic imperative for India’s foreign policy and economic ambitions.

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