20. Security Notes 08

Elaborate Notes

Defining Organized Crime

Organized crime refers to the unlawful activities conducted by highly organized, disciplined, and often large-scale associations. These groups primarily engage in supplying illicit goods and services or commit other serious crimes for profit, operating outside the formal state structures.

• International Definition: The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC, 2000) defines an “organized criminal group” as a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences… in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.
• Academic Perspective: Scholar Donald Cressey, in his work “Theft of the Nation” (1969), characterized organized crime syndicates like the American Mafia (La Cosa Nostra) as having a formal, hierarchical structure similar to a corporation, with clear divisions of labor and a code of conduct.
• Types of Activities: The activities are diverse and often exploit market demands that the legal economy cannot or will not meet. Examples include:
  • Loan Sharking: Lending money at illegally high interest rates and using threats or violence to collect debts.
  • Racketeering: Operating illegal businesses (“rackets”) or extorting money from legitimate businesses through intimidation (e.g., protection money).
  • Prostitution and Gambling: Running illegal rings and networks that often involve coercion and human trafficking.
  • Drug Trafficking: The cultivation, manufacture, distribution, and sale of controlled substances, which remains one of the most profitable sectors for organized crime.

Common Characteristics of Organized Crime

While definitions vary, certain characteristics are consistently observed across different criminal organizations:

• Non-ideological Motivation: The primary driver is pecuniary gain or material benefit. Unlike terrorist groups, they do not seek to overthrow the government or impose a political or religious ideology. Their goal is to coexist with the state, often by corrupting it, to maximize profit.
• Continuity and Structure: These are not ad-hoc groups but established entities that can survive changes in leadership and membership, ensuring longevity. They often possess a hierarchical or networked structure.
• Strategic Planning: Operations are not random but are meticulously planned to maximize profit and minimize risk. This includes logistical planning for smuggling, money laundering schemes, and identifying new markets.
• Internal Codes and Discipline: Many groups have strict internal rules and codes of conduct. A well-known example is the Sicilian Mafia’s code of ‘Omertà’ (code of silence), which forbids cooperation with state authorities under penalty of death.
• Restricted Membership: Membership is not open. It often requires sponsorship, a loyalty test, or initiation rituals to ensure reliability and secrecy. This creates a cohesive and disciplined unit.
• Use of Force and Intimidation: Violence or the threat of violence is a fundamental tool used to enforce contracts, eliminate rivals, discipline members, and intimidate witnesses or state officials.

Indian Definition of Organized Crime

India does not have a central law to combat organized crime. However, several states have enacted their own legislation. The most prominent among these is the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act (MCOCA), 1999.

• MCOCA Definition: The Act defines “organised crime” as “any continuing unlawful activity by an individual, singly or jointly, either as a member of an organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such syndicate, by use of violence or threat of violence or intimidation or coercion, or other unlawful means with the objective of gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining undue economic or other advantage for himself or any other person or promoting insurgency.”
• Key Elements:
  • Continuing Unlawful Activity: This implies a pattern of crime, not an isolated incident.
  • Organised Crime Syndicate: Refers to a group of two or more persons involved in such activities.
  • Dual Motive: The definition uniquely includes “promoting insurgency” alongside pecuniary gain, explicitly acknowledging the potential nexus between crime and political violence/terrorism within the Indian context.

Defining Terrorism

There is no universally accepted legal definition of terrorism, which remains a significant challenge for international cooperation. The adage, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” highlights the political and subjective nature of the term.

• International Instruments: Despite the lack of a single definition, there are 19 international legal instruments (conventions and protocols) that criminalize specific terrorist acts, such as aircraft hijacking, hostage-taking, and terrorist bombings.
• EU Definition: The European Union’s Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002) defines terrorist offences as intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organization, committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, unduly compelling a Government or international organization to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country.
• START Definition: The Global Terrorism Database, maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), defines a terrorist act as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.”
• UNGA Perspective: The UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (1994) describes terrorism as “Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes…”

Differences Between Terrorism and Organized Crime

Basis	Terrorism	Organized Crime
Motivation	Primarily driven by political, religious, or social ideology. The goal is to effect systemic change, overthrow a government, or establish a new order (e.g., ISIS’s goal of a Caliphate).	Primarily driven by non-ideological, pecuniary motives. The goal is wealth accumulation and economic power. They seek to exploit the existing system for profit, not overturn it.
Goals	Political: To influence state policy, coerce the public, and achieve political objectives. Economic activities are a means to an end (funding operations).	Economic: To generate profit through illicit activities. Political influence is sought mainly to protect and expand their criminal enterprises (e.g., by bribing officials).
Publicity	Actively seeks publicity and media attention to maximize the psychological impact of their violence, spread fear, and propagate their message. They claim responsibility for their attacks.	Prefers anonymity and operates in the shadows to avoid detection by law enforcement and rivals. Publicity is detrimental to their business operations.
Confrontation with State	Directly confronts the state, viewing it as the primary enemy and a symbol of the order they wish to destroy. Their actions are a direct challenge to the state’s monopoly on violence.	Generally avoids direct confrontation with the state. They prefer to co-opt, corrupt, or neutralize state agents (police, judges, politicians) to create a safe operating environment.

Similarities Between Organized Crime and Terrorism

Despite their differences, both phenomena share several operational and structural similarities:

• Common Enemy: Both view the state and its law enforcement agencies as their primary adversary, albeit for different reasons.
• Rule-Based Order: Both operate with a clandestine, hierarchical, or cell-based structure and are governed by internal rules and codes of conduct to ensure discipline and secrecy.
• Use of Violence and Fear: Both rely on violence, intimidation, and coercion as fundamental tools to achieve their objectives, control territory, and eliminate opposition.
• Asymmetrical Threat: Both pose an asymmetrical threat to the state. As non-state actors, they use unconventional tactics to challenge the much more powerful state apparatus.

Linkages Between Terrorism and Organized Crime

The clear distinction between politically motivated terrorists and profit-driven criminals has become increasingly blurred. This relationship is often conceptualized as a continuum.

Theoretical Framework: The Crime-Terror Continuum

This model, extensively discussed by scholars like Tamara Makarenko (2004), illustrates the evolving relationship between the two groups, which can range from a simple transaction to a complete fusion.

• a) Alliance/Cooperation: This is the most basic level of interaction. Terrorist and criminal groups form tactical, short-term or long-term alliances for mutual benefit.
  • Examples: A terrorist group might pay a criminal syndicate for access to established smuggling routes for moving operatives or weapons. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) collaborated with criminal gangs in smuggling and racketeering activities.
• b) Operational Motivation (Adoption of Tactics): One group starts adopting the methods of the other.
  • Examples: Terrorist groups like the FARC in Colombia engaged in kidnapping for ransom, a typically criminal activity, to fund their insurgency. Conversely, criminal gangs in Latin America have used car bombs (‘carro-bombas’), a terrorist tactic, to intimidate rivals and state officials.
• c) Transformation: A group’s original identity begins to change as it increasingly engages in the activities of the other. The original motivations (political or profit) become muddled.
  • Example: Over decades, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) transformed from a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group into a major player in the global cocaine trade. While it retained its political rhetoric, its day-to-day operations became indistinguishable from a drug cartel.
• d) Convergence (Hybridization): The distinction between the two groups disappears, resulting in a hybrid entity that is both a criminal enterprise and a terrorist organization.
  • Example: Dawood Ibrahim’s D-Company in India began as a criminal smuggling and extortion syndicate but later converged with Islamist terror groups, orchestrating the 1993 Mumbai serial bomb blasts with support from Pakistan’s ISI. It pursues both profit and politico-ideological goals.

Relationship Through Case Studies

• A) Terrorism and Drug Trafficking (Narco-terrorism): This is the most well-documented linkage. Drug trafficking provides a high-volume, continuous stream of funding.
  • Global Context: The UNODC’s World Drug Report 2023 highlights the vast scale of the global drug market. A significant portion of illicit opium production originates from Afghanistan (historically funding the Taliban) and Myanmar (the Golden Triangle).
  • Examples:
    • The Taliban in Afghanistan has long financed its insurgency through taxes on opium poppy cultivation and heroin trafficking.
    • Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Somalia are deeply involved in trafficking heroin that moves from Afghanistan through Africa to Europe.
• B) Terrorism and Weapons Trafficking: Access to sophisticated weaponry is crucial for terrorists. Organized crime networks control the illicit arms market.
  • Example: The AK-47 assault rifle has become a global symbol of terrorism and insurgency, partly due to its widespread availability on the black market, often supplied by criminal syndicates from conflict zones or former Soviet bloc countries.
• C) Terrorism and Trade in Collectable Items: The illicit trade in cultural property provides funding and serves ideological purposes.
  • Ideological Goal: The destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in 2001 by the Taliban was an act of cultural cleansing aimed at erasing pre-Islamic history.
  • Financial Goal: ISIS systematically looted ancient sites like Palmyra in Syria and museums in Iraq, selling priceless artifacts on the international black market through criminal intermediaries to fund its “caliphate”. UNESCO has repeatedly warned about this “cultural racketeering.”
• D) Terrorism and Human Trafficking: This provides terrorist groups with revenue, recruits, and strategic assets.
  • Revenue and Victims: The UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons notes that women and girls are the primary victims. Terrorist groups exploit victims for sexual slavery, forced labor (organ trade, begging), and forced marriage.
  • Strategic Use: ISIS notoriously targeted the Yazidi minority in Iraq (2014), perpetrating a genocide and systematically enslaving thousands of women and girls. Boko Haram uses kidnapped children as suicide bombers and women as human shields or for propaganda.
• E) Terrorism and Intellectual Property (IP) Theft: This is a low-risk, high-reward criminal enterprise.
  • Scale: The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reported that trade in counterfeit and pirated goods was 2.5% of world trade in 2013, a figure that has likely grown.
  • Examples: The sale of contraband cigarettes, pirated software, and counterfeit pharmaceuticals has been linked to funding groups like Hezbollah and various terrorist cells in North Africa and Europe.
• F) Terrorism and Use of Natural Resources: Control over valuable natural resources in weak or failed states can make a terrorist group financially self-sufficient.
  • Examples:
    • At its peak in 2015, ISIS controlled oil fields in Syria and Iraq, earning millions of dollars per day from the illicit sale of crude oil, making it one of the wealthiest terrorist organizations in history.
    • Al-Shabaab in Somalia has historically generated significant revenue by controlling and taxing the illicit charcoal trade, leading to massive deforestation and environmental degradation. This is sometimes termed “conflict charcoal”.

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Prelims Pointers

• MCOCA: The Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999, defines organized crime as continuing unlawful activity for pecuniary benefits or to promote insurgency.
• UNTOC: The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000) is the main international instrument against organized crime.
• Global Terrorism Database (GTD): Maintained by the National Consortium for the START, it provides data and definitions related to terrorism.
• Crime-Terror Continuum: A theoretical model explaining the relationship between organized crime and terrorism, with stages like alliance, operational motivation, transformation, and convergence.
• Narco-terrorism: A term referring to the nexus between drug trafficking and terrorist activities.
• Key Groups and their Illicit Activities:
  • ISIS: Illicit oil trade, trafficking of cultural artifacts (e.g., from Palmyra), human trafficking (Yazidis).
  • Al-Shabaab: Illicit charcoal trade in Somalia, heroin smuggling.
  • Boko Haram: Heroin smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, human trafficking.
  • Taliban: Opium poppy cultivation and heroin trade in Afghanistan.
  • FARC (Colombia): Cocaine production and trafficking, kidnapping for ransom.
  • D-Company (India): Started as a criminal syndicate, later converged with terrorism (1993 Mumbai blasts).
• Golden Crescent: An illicit opium production area covering parts of Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.
• Golden Triangle: An illicit opium production area covering parts of Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand.
• Reports & Organizations:
  • UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; publishes the World Drug Report.
  • OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; reports on counterfeit trade.
  • UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; works to protect cultural heritage from destruction and trafficking.
• Bamiyan Buddhas: Statues destroyed by the Taliban in Afghanistan in March 2001.

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Mains Insights

Factors Driving the Crime-Terror Nexus

1. Globalization and Technology: Porous borders, global financial networks, and advancements in communication (dark web, encrypted messaging) and finance (cryptocurrency) have created a permissive environment for both criminal and terrorist networks to operate transnationally and collaborate.
2. State Failure and Ungoverned Spaces: Weak or failed states lack the capacity to control their territory, enforce laws, or provide basic services. These areas (e.g., parts of Somalia, Syria, Afghanistan) become safe havens where terrorist and criminal groups can operate with impunity, control resources, and build alliances.
3. Decline in State Sponsorship: Following the end of the Cold War and increased international pressure, state sponsorship for many terrorist groups declined. To survive, these groups were forced to seek alternative, self-sustaining sources of funding, leading them into profitable criminal enterprises like drug trafficking.
4. Mutual Symbiosis: The relationship is often a “marriage of convenience.” Terrorists possess military skills, disciplined cadres, and ideological motivation. Criminals have established smuggling routes, money laundering networks, and access to illicit markets. They can trade these capabilities for mutual benefit.

Implications for National and Global Security

1. Amplified Threat: The nexus creates a ‘hybrid’ threat that is more potent, resilient, and resourceful than either organized crime or terrorism alone. A well-funded terrorist group is more lethal, and a politically motivated criminal group can be more destabilizing.
2. Undermining State Sovereignty: These hybrid groups challenge the state’s monopoly on violence, create parallel economies, and can even establish ‘shadow governance’ in territories they control, thereby eroding the legitimacy and authority of the state.
3. Corruption and Weakening of Institutions: The vast profits generated are used to corrupt public officials, including politicians, police, and the judiciary. This systemic corruption weakens democratic institutions, undermines the rule of law, and hampers state efforts to combat these threats.
4. Regional and Global Destabilization: The transnational nature of this nexus means that instability in one region (e.g., drug production in Afghanistan) can directly fuel terrorism and crime thousands of miles away (e.g., in Europe or Africa), creating a complex web of interconnected security challenges.

Challenges for Law Enforcement and Policy Making

1. Jurisdictional Ambiguity: Law enforcement agencies are traditionally structured to deal with crime, while the military and intelligence agencies are geared towards national security threats like terrorism. The crime-terror nexus falls into a grey area, often leading to institutional turf wars and a lack of coordinated response.
2. Intelligence Gaps: Intelligence gathering for criminal investigations (requiring evidence for prosecution) differs significantly from intelligence for counter-terrorism (focused on pre-emption). Bridging this gap and fostering seamless intelligence sharing between different agencies is a major challenge.
3. Legal Frameworks: Anti-terrorism laws (like UAPA in India) and laws against organized crime (like MCOCA) have different legal standards, procedures, and punishments. Applying the appropriate legal framework to a hybrid group can be complex. There is a need for legislation that can effectively address this converged threat.
4. Following the Money: While tracking financial flows is a key strategy, the use of informal value transfer systems (like Hawala), cryptocurrencies, and complex money laundering schemes across multiple jurisdictions makes it extremely difficult to cut off the financial lifeline of these groups. This requires enhanced international cooperation and financial intelligence capabilities.